PDAS MCNERNEY'S IRAN CONSULTATIONS IN INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002296 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, T, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, NEA, NEA/IR, ISN, ISN/RA, IO, IO/UNP, PLEASE PASS TO IRAN COLLECTIVE. E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UNSC MNUC ID IR SUBJECT: PDAS MCNERNEY'S IRAN CONSULTATIONS IN INDONESIA REF: A. JAKARTA 1919 ¶B. 06 JAKARTA 6026 Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney visited Indonesia on August 14 for productive consultations regarding Iran's nuclear program. Senior diplomat and Middle East expert Alwi Shihab reiterated Indonesia's commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue and said Indonesia would try to persuade Iran to comply with IAEA and UNSC requirements. Department of Foreign Affairs interlocutors stressed that no automatic use of force and the principle of suspending sanctions in return for Iran suspending enrichment were firm Indonesian requirements in any future UNSCR. Academic and media figures stressed that the Yudhoyono administration had paid a high political price for Indonesian support for UNSCR 1747 and would need domestic political cover to support a future resolution. PDAS McNerney also took our case to the Indonesian public in a newspaper interview. END SUMMARY Indonesia Looking for a Role -------------- ¶2. (C) Alwi Shihab, a former foreign minister currently serving as President Yudhoyono's special envoy for the Middle East, described his June visit to Iran where he met with a defiant President Ahmadinajad. He said Indonesia looked to help resolve the Iran nuclear issue through peaceful dialogue. PDAS McNerney stressed that the United States and our European partners were committed to negotiations and that the P5 1 offer remained on the table should Iran suspend its enrichment activities and cooperate with the IAEA. ¶3. (C) During a lengthy private meeting in Tehran with President Ahmadinajad, Shihab delivered a strong message from President Yudhoyono; Iran must resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful negotiations. He described the Iranian leader as stubborn and insistent on Iran's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. The Indonesians stressed that Iran must show flexibility responding to the UNSC's demands and urged the Iranians to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric. Shihab explained to Ahmadinajad that the Indonesians supported UNSCR 1747 not to punish Iran but to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international nonproliferation norms. ¶4. (C) Shihab stressed the need to compromise and said that Iran needed a face saving way out of its dispute with the U.S. Iran sees its right to peaceful nuclear power as a matter of national dignity and would not be seen as giving in to pressure. He raised the possibility of a staged process where Iran could gradually halt its nuclear activities as negotiations progressed. PDAS McNerney stressed that Iran's dispute was not with the U.S. alone, but also with the EU, its Arab neighbors and with the IAEA, which referred the matter to the UNSC. She added that a staged approach was not feasible because it would still allow Iran to develop sensitive nuclear technologies while negotiations continued, which is why the Security Council requires that Iran cease its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as a basis for negotiation. ¶5. (C) Shihab offered the possibility that President Yudhoyono or another senior GOI official might visit Iran prior to a future UNSC vote to give Tehran a "last warning." He added that Indonesia was a friend of both Iran and of the West and, unlike Iran's Arab neighbors, did not have any strategic interest in the Persian Gulf. This gave Indonesia the credibility to act as an intermediary. Shihab added that he would stress the need for Iran to show flexibility to Iranian DepForMin Araghchi, a powerful figure reportedly close to President Ahmadinajad. He also described Indonesia's planned investment in a fertilizer factory in Iran, saying that this sort of economic engagement gave the GOI some influence over Tehran. ¶6. (C) BIO NOTE: A scholar of religious studies, Shihab spent approximately ten years in the United States, both as a student at Temple University and a faculty member at Harvard Divinity School. Two of his children are students at Pennsylvania State University: a son pursuing an MS in petroleum engineering and a daughter studying for a BA in JAKARTA 00002296 002 OF 004 international relations, economics and psychology. Shihab's son was born in the United States and holds an American passport. END BIO NOTE DEPLU Looking for a Way Forward -------------- ¶7. (C) PDAS McNerney stressed to Desra Percaya, Director for International Security and Disarmament Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),that the USG wanted to consult early with the GOI and sought Indonesian input for a possible future UNSCR. She added that the P5 1 offer remained open should Iran stop its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. However, she noted, the international community must be prepared to increase the pressure on Iran if it does not comply with the UNSC's requirements. Percaya agreed that the Indonesia wanted to find ways to stop Iran's nuclear program and outlined some of the GOI's requirements for an acceptable resolution. ¶8. (C) Percaya thanked PDAS McNerney for consulting with the GOI early in the process. Drawing on his participation in discussions at the June 26-29 Oslo Forum, he outlined four broad principles that should guide the international community's dealings with Iran. Any approach to the nuclear issue should also address underlying concerns about U.S. - Iran relations. A solution must also address broader security issues in the Middle East, including providing Iran with negative security assurances. The international community must respect Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear power under Article 4 of the NPT, including clarifying what enrichment activities are allowed under IAEA safeguards. Finally, Percaya stressed that the international community refrain from any steps that would include the automatic use of force against Iran. (The Oslo Forum is an annual track-two event organized by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Percaya noted that Kofi Annan and Ambassador Thomas Pickering participated in the Iran-related discussions.) ¶9. (C) Drawing on these general principles Percaya said the GOI had some clear redlines for the next resolution: it must not include any automatic use of force and it must maintain the principle of suspension-for-suspension. (That is, that the UNSC would suspend sanctions on Iran when Iran suspended its nuclear activities.) PDAS McNerney stressed that the USG seeks a diplomatic, not military, solution to the crisis but added that all options remained on the table. She also said that the P5 1 offer gave Iran incentives should it agree to the suspension-for-suspension offer by the UN Security Council that the GOI supported. She added that any new resolution should increase the pressure on Tehran by strengthening existing measures, adding new measures -- such as a mechanism for the inspection of Iran-bound cargoes suspected of being WMD related -- and establishing an expert panel to monitor Iranian compliance. ¶10. (C) While the Iranians insisted that they were complying with the IAEA, Percaya questioned whether they had done anything of substance while doing all they could to delay the process. It was clear, however, that GOI officials did not understand the IAEA's outstanding questions regarding Iran's program. Following a briefing on this subject, Percaya asked how Iran was any different from Indonesia. He also expressed the GOI's clear frustrations with the activities of the Iranian Ambassador in Jakarta. DEPLU had become so concerned about the Ambassador's lobbying of Indonesian legislators and provocative statements to religious groups that they called him in and asked him to cease such activities. Percaya conceded, however, that many Indonesians were sympathetic to Iran because they viewed Tehran as articulating the grievances of the Muslim world over issues like Iraq and Palestine. ¶11. (C) Percaya said Iran aspired to regional leadership in the Middle East. Unlike Burma or the DPRK, Tehran did not seek international isolation. This fact gave the international community some leverage over Iran and provided a mechanism to pressure the regime into complying with IAEA requirements. ¶12. (C) Percaya agreed that support for a future resolution would be consistent with Indonesia's support of the NPT. He said, however, that the domestic political context would make it very difficult for the GOI to act. Legislators, many of JAKARTA 00002296 003 OF 004 them aspiring candidates for the 2009 presidential election, would undoubtedly use the issue to embarrass President Yudhoyono. He also said Indonesian arguments for support of the NPT were undermined by the alleged special treatment given India, a non-NPT country, under the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. He also added that GOI hoped a resolution would not be tabled during Indonesia's November presidency of the UNSC. Domestic Controversy -------------- ¶13. (C) During a lunch hosted by the DCM, PDAS McNerney asked key academic and media figures to describe the political fall-out from Indonesia's support of UNSCR 1747 and to outline the domestic political constraints on GOI support for future UNSC action on Iran. Indonesian interlocutors all agreed that the Yudhoyono administration paid a high political price for its support of 1747 and would have difficulty supporting any future resolutions. Endy Mouzardi Bayuni, editor in chief of the Jakarta Post, commented that the content of a future resolution was not important; the Indonesian public would see GOI support as a vote against the Iranian people. Well-connected academic and former GOI official Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, currently with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and the Habibie Center, commented that future Indonesian government actions would have everything to do with what happens in Indonesia and nothing to do with what happens in Iran or New York. ¶14. (C) Dr. Anwar stressed that Indonesia's long commitment to the NPT motivated its prior support for measures against Iran's nuclear program. This argument was largely lost on the Indonesian public, according to Bayuni, because the GOI did not make the case for its position before the vote on 1747 was cast. The Yudhoyono administration failed to consult with key stakeholders, including the DPR and the media, which could have lessened the eventual political fall-out. ¶15. (C) PDAS McNerney stressed that the United States did not seek sanctions in order to harm the Iranian people, but to pressure the Iranian government to abandon its nuclear program. The Habibie Center's Anwar noted that many Indonesians do not understand this position. Instead, they see U.S. efforts to secure another UNSC resolution as a pretext for future military action against Iran. She also said that some Indonesians see the United States - India nuclear deal as evidence that the USG is inconsistent in its support for global nonproliferation norms. Bayuni added that the lack of U.S. action against Israel's alleged nuclear program contributed to this perception. ¶16. (C) Indonesians resented what they saw as heavy-handed U.S. pressure to support UNSCR 1747, according to ANTV Vice Chief Editor Uni Lubis. She described widespread rumors about a telephone call between Presidents Bush and Yudhoyono prior to the vote on 1747. While the call had been primarily a discussion of an upcoming G-33 meeting on the Doha Round, Indonesians saw it as the United States telling Indonesia to "shut up and take notes" on how to vote in the UNSC. ¶17. (C) While many Indonesians see the United States as pressuring Indonesia, they have a more benign view of Iran. They do not regard Iran as a destabilizing influence in the Middle East. Moreover, many Indonesians remain convinced of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Several interlocutors noted that the GOI was still reeling from the rapturous welcome the Indonesian public gave Iranian President Ahmadinajad when he visited Jakarta in May 2006 (ref B). ANTV's Lubis added that Iran's current Ambassador to Indonesia was very effective, especially in his public diplomacy efforts among Muslim groups. ¶18. (C) Dr. Anwar also opined that the Indonesian legislature (DPR) carried on for too long demanding that President Yudhoyono personally appear in the DPR to explain the government's vote on UNSCR 1747 (ref A). Jakarta Post editor Bayuni added that the public was increasingly frustrated with the transparent power struggle between the president and the legislature, which had delayed action on numerous pieces of legislation. Although he weathered a political storm, President Yudhoyono won his battle with the DPR and might get away with defying them again on Iran, according to Bayuni. JAKARTA 00002296 004 OF 004 ¶19. (C) In response to PDAS McNerney's question, academic and media figures offered advice on securing Indonesian support for a future resolution. Bayuni commented that that the GOI wanted to support a future resolution but needed political cover to do so. Key to that cover would be recognizing that the GOI played an important role on the UNSC and its concerns should be listened to carefully. The fact that UNSCR 1747 incorporated several amendments proposed by the GOI helped make the case that the resolution reflected GOI concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. PDAS McNerney stressed that her visit to Jakarta was for precisely the purpose of consultation with GOI officials well before a draft resolution was put forward. Getting the Message Out -------------- ¶20. (SBU) At the end of her visit, PDAS McNerney sat for an on-the-record interview with foreign affairs reporter Abdul Khalik of the Jakarta Post. She stressed that the USG viewed Indonesia as a critical member of the UNSC, was sensitive to Indonesia's concerns and would consult closely with the GOI on any resolution. She also said Indonesia should support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) because the initiative was consistent with the GOI's long-standing support of international nonproliferation goals. The interview was given prominent coverage in the Jakarta Post the next day. (Mission has sent a copy of the interview to the Department.) ¶21. (SBU) PDAS McNerney approved this message. HUME