POSO REMAINS CALM AFTER POLICE RAID

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000229 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM PINS PNAT PTER KJUS KPAO KISL ID SUBJECT: POSO REMAINS CALM AFTER POLICE RAID REF: A. JAKARTA 194 ¶B. JAKARTA 152 Classified By: Political Officer Stanley Harsha for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Poso, Central Sulawesi is currently calm several days following the raid by police and Detachment 88 of the Muslim militant stronghold of Gebang Rejo Subdistrict. Reaction from the local and national Muslim community has been muted although even moderate Muslim figures are generally complaining publicly and privately that police should have used negotiation instead of force and that the action could lead to further civil unrest, despite the fact that police spend months trying to negotiate the militants' surrender. Hardliners are complaining of discrimination against Muslims. Vice President Yusuf Kalla personally authorized the operation, a close contact of Kalla told us. President Yudhoyono had strongly endorsed police follow-up action to get the militants who escaped during the police operation, a source at the cabinet meeting held the day after the raid told us. Still, both he and Vice President Yusuf Kalla have been quiet since the raid in the light of negative publicity and critica l statements by some Muslim leaders. Indonesian police and other officials have explained the reasons for the raid in detail, displaying the cache of guns and explosive devices seized, yet the media has focused on criticism raised by hardliners rather than on the operation's success. End summary. ¶2. (C) Poso is currently calm, though locals are reporting periodic small explosions heard around the area. 200 additional Mobile Brigade police arrived in Poso January 25 and are actively pursuing the remaining members of the Central Sulawesi police's most wanted list and their supporters who fled from the January 22 raid into the mountains surrounding Poso, according to a journalist contact. He also heard from his Poso contacts that most of the wanted list members had since fled the Poso area to Palu, Toli-Toli and Gorontalo, predominantly Muslim areas where they can hide more easily, and mentioned local rumors that ten more Muslim extremists had just arrived in Poso from Central Java. Police are tightly controlling all entry points to Poso to prevent more Muslim extremists from entering the area from outside, Edmon Leonardo, head of the Poso branch of a human rights organization Kontras, told us. He also reported that many of the outsiders staying in Gebang Rejo, the site of the two recent raids, are returning to their villages outside Poso to avoid involvement in any future raids. ¶3. (C) Reaction from local Muslims to the January 22 raid has been limited. Only Sagaf Al-Jufri, chairman of the Central Sulawesi Ulema Council and leader of Al-Khairat Pesantren, has made a statement. Al-Jufri, known as a moderate Muslim leader who is strongly opposed to local mujahidin movements, stated support for local police to maintain peace and order and to enforce the law in Poso. The Muslim Student Association called for an anti-government demonstration in Palu on January 25, but only a few people turned out according to a Palu-based youth leader. The Muslim Forum for Struggle held a meeting in Palu with local religious leaders to discuss the recent raids that reportedly also drew a sparse crowd. Our contacts think that local Muslims do not want to be provoked to further violence by "outsiders", and while they remain suspicious of the police and their motives, do not want to be drawn in to a larger conflict. ¶4. (C) Leonardo and Dewi Rana Amir, director of the Women's Learning Center, told us about a recent meeting of inter-faith conflict resolution groups and NGOs that concluded a "fact finding team" was needed to investigate the two recent raids and other incidents contributing to the instability in Poso. This idea had been discarded in the past because opposition from local police and fears that both Muslim and Christian instigators of past violence would use the group for fundraising or other purposes. Leonardo and Amir are hopeful a factfinding team can now be established independent of local religious leaders and with police support. They also recommended evaluating the performance of the Malino Working Group (MWC),charged with implementing the Malino Peace Accords, the 2002 agreement intended to solve the sectarian conflict in Central Sulawesi. They accused the MWC leaders of receiving large amounts of money from the GOI and not working in an accountable or transparent manner and not providing any results to resolve the conflict or accelerate the recovery process. They said economic and social development is the key to ending the conflict. VICE PRESIDENT KALLA'S ROLE AND REACTION -------------- ¶5. (C) According to Dadan Irawan, a member of the Golkar central board and a contact with access to Vice President Kalla's inner circle, the Vice President personally authorized the Poso raid. Dadan told us that VP Kalla consulted with authorities, examined the evidence that clearly implicated terrorist elements, and then approved the raid, characterizing the decision as "a no-brainer." ¶6. (C) Shortly after the raid, when Presidential spokesperson Andi Mallarengeng expressed regret for the "loss of civilian life" resulting from the Poso raid, Vice President Kalla reportedly went apoplectic. Kalla thought the statement directly undermined his authority and would jeopardize public support for the raid. According to Dadan, Kalla also could not understand why the President would not endorse the raid unapologetically in light of the fact that "they were all terrorists." The incident, in Dadan's opinion, represented just the most recent illustration of the total lack of coordination between the President and the Vice President. ¶7. (C) President Yudhoyono strongly endorsed the raid and follow-up police action during a cabinet meeting held the day following the raid, saying we need to get the militants and also improve the bad public relations, according to a source at the meeting. ¶8. (SBU) Yet, both Kalla and Yudhoyono have shied away from public statements since the operation. Instead, Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs Widodo participated in a televised press conference saying the hunt would continue for the persons on the most wanted list who fled the scene. Deputy Police Chief Makbul Padmanegara took part in the press briefing, showing the media samples from the guns and ammunition seized: six guns, 14 handmade guns, over 3500 rounds of ammunition, 414 detonators, and 21 bombs. Police are telling the media that 13 militants and one policeman were killed in the raid, and that 20 terrorist suspects are being detained. ¶9. (SBU) Despite the authorities' detailed statements to the media, the media instead focused on the casualties and the use of violence. Jemaah Islamiya spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir was widely pictured entering the office of the national Human Rights Commission to file a human rights complaint. ¶10. (SBU) Hard-line Islamist leaders see the latest raids as further evidence that Central Sulawesi's Muslim community is being discriminated against and is under attack. Habib Rizieq from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) told the Islamist-leaning daily newspaper Republika that the individuals on the Most Wanted List (DPO) "want to surrender as long as Christians are also arrested." Rizieq, the police are only looking for the 29 Muslims who appear on the DPO, while the 16 (Christian) named masterminds of previous intercommunal violence are left alone. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia spokesman Ismail Yusanto, who has previously complained to us about the police's behavior in Central Sulawesi, accused the security forces of acting excessively this past week. "The police should be able to take a humanitarian approach to solving the Poso conflict," he told Republika. "including in confronting those who are called the 20 most wanted." ¶11. (C) But even moderate Muslim leaders could not resist the urge to jump on the anti-establishment bandwagon. Muhammadiyah Chairman Din Syamsuddin, while saying that "we support the fight against terrorism," drew the line at "repressive acts" that "will not solve the problem but could cause new wounds among the people." Somewhat incongruously, he contended that "the most important thing is for the police to uncover those responsible for the Poso conflicts." For his part, Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, took aim at President Yudhoyono, saying that "our President never takes over a problem. He will just set up a team. He should oversee this matter." In private, our contacts told us that they did not object to the police targeting individuals on the most wanted list or raiding suspected weapons caches. However, they wish the police would act more carefully to minimize civilian casualties. While stressing the need for Indonesia to have a professional, trained police force, they worry that civilian deaths, particularly within the Muslim community, will ratchet up sectarian tensions once again. ¶12. (C) A half dozen other moderate Muslim contacts we contacted expressed similar reservations about the use of violence and the sentiment that Muslims are being attacked by authorities. PASCOE