Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA1972
2007-07-20 08:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

ISLAMIC PARTY CANDIDATE MAKES STRIDES IN JAKARTA

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL PHUM ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 200807Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5493
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0922
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 3369
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1603
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 0187
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001972 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PHUM ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY CANDIDATE MAKES STRIDES IN JAKARTA
GOVERNOR'S RACE

REF: A. JAKARTA 1157


B. 06 JAKARTA 13419

C. 06 JAKARTA 11376

JAKARTA 00001972 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: (U) Classified By: Joseph L. Novak, Counselor for Politi
cal Affairs, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001972

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PHUM ID
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY CANDIDATE MAKES STRIDES IN JAKARTA
GOVERNOR'S RACE

REF: A. JAKARTA 1157


B. 06 JAKARTA 13419

C. 06 JAKARTA 11376

JAKARTA 00001972 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: (U) Classified By: Joseph L. Novak, Counselor for Politi
cal Affairs, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In what is shaping up to be a closer race for Jakarta
governor than initially anticipated, former Jakarta Deputy
Police Chief and PKS (the fastest growing Islamist party in
Indonesia) candidate Adang Daradjatun has reportedly narrowed
the gap on Vice Governor Fauzi Bowo, the coalition party
candidate. According to contacts, Adang's gubernatorial bid
was progressing to the point that many believed that he could
win the August 8 election. Though a July 19 poll gave Fauzi
a sizeable lead, another reputable poll indicated that Adang
was viewed more favorably than Fauzi on a number of key
issues like corruption. Even a close loss would allow PKS to
claim a moral victory, while outright victory would likely
give the party -- and political Islam in Indonesia more
generally -- an infusion of momentum and confidence. END
SUMMARY.

WHY FAUZI STARTED AS THE FAVORITE
--------------


2. (C) As reported in Ref A, until very recently,
conventional wisdom in Jakarta held that Vice Governor Fauzi
Bowo would resoundingly defeat Adang Daradjatun and capture
the governorship of this city of nearly 10 million people.
Fauzi secured the loyalty of 18 of the 19 largest parties in
Jakarta, snuffed out other potential competitors, leveraged
the advantages inherent in running as a virtual incumbent,
and had a level of name recognition that Adang could not
match. Though PKS constituted the largest party in Jakarta,
having secured 25 percent of the local legislative seats in
the 2004 election, party contacts told us PKS endorsed
Adang's candidacy primarily because he gave the party between
15 and 25 billion rupiah ($1,666,666 - $2,750,000),not
because of any compelling ideological overlap. Most people
believed that by purportedly auctioning off its support to

the highest bidder, PKS, the party that made its mark through
its self-proclaimed dedication to clean governance, had
forfeited its primary advantage in the election: the moral
high ground.

PKS GAINING GROUND?
--------------


3. (C) In recent weeks, our contacts have reported a palpable
shift in the race. Poempida Hidayatulloh, the Golkar party's
Deputy Treasurer, told us that Golkar officials viewed the
race as a virtual "toss-up." (Note: Golkar is the fourth
largest party in Jakarta.) When we pressed Poempida for his
own best guess on the outcome, Poempida predicted that heavy
turnout would result in a Fauzi Bowo victory, while anything
below 50 percent would translate into victory for Adang and
PKS. Low voter turnout would favor PKS, he reasoned, because
the party's sophisticated grassroots network would mobilize
most of the party's eligible voters to cast a ballot for
Adang on election-day. While non-PKS party members would
vote in disproportionate numbers for Fauzi, Fauzi would not
be able to count on the same base level of support that Adang
could bank on. As a result, Poempida asserted, Fauzi would
have to hope for a high voter turnout to counterbalance PKS's
energized base. Mobilizing voters from the 18 parties
unified behind Fauzi Bowo's candidacy had proven difficult,
he added, because none of the parties that had endorsed Fauzi
viewed him as "their candidate" in the way that PKS
identified with Adang. The net result was that no one had
taken ownership of Fauzi's campaign, and coordination between
the parties had proven difficult.


4. (C) When we asked Pramono Anung, the Secretary General of
the Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P),how he
saw the race shaping up, he expressed grave concerns about
the possibility of an Adang victory. Pramono emphasized that
while PDI-P believed Adang had run an impressive race and
clearly put a dent in Fauzi's lead, party officials from

JAKARTA 00001972 002.2 OF 003


former president Megawati on down still believed that Fauzi
would win. Nevertheless, according to Pramono, Megawati was
monitoring the election very closely, and had even gone so
far as to appear in a series of television campaign spots for
Fauzi. Where Golkar, the Democratic Party, and many of the
junior partners in the Fauzi coalition were perhaps not
overly invested in the outcome of the race, PDI-P viewed the
prospect of a PKS victory as a serious threat not only to
Jakarta, but to the nation as a whole. Universally viewed as
an ascendant Islamic political powerhouse after registering
impressive results in the 2004 legislative elections, PKS had
come back down to earth after joining SBY's coalition and
becoming "just another political party" in the eyes of many.
Pramono told us that PDI-P liked it that way, and feared a
victory in the governor's race would revitalize PKS and give
the party a high profile platform on which to campaign for
the national legislative elections in 2009. Almost as if to
underscore the point, Megawati called Pramono during Poloff's
one-on-one meeting, and could be overheard on the cellphone
expressing in Bahasa Indonesia her concerns about a Kompas
newspaper poll showing Adang with higher favorability
ratings. For PDI-P, as the most secular nationalist party in
the country, the objective was clear: stop PKS in its tracks.



5. (C) According to a contact with President Yudhoyono's
Democratic Party, the second largest party in Jakarta, Adang
could no longer be considered the underdog in the election.
Indonesian legislator Vera Febyanthy told us that Adang's
willingness to spend seemingly limitless amounts of money to
raise his profile had clearly put him in contention. Adang
also came across as a far more charismatic figure than Fauzi
(Fauzi is considered a bit stolid). According to Vera, the
election would be very close, and everyone within the
Democratic Party feared the repercussions of a PKS victory.
(Note: President Yudhoyono has not expressed a preference for
either candidate. End Note).


6. (C) Gembong Priyono, a senior aide to Vice President
Kalla, echoed the belief that Adang had put himself in
position to win with his late surge. He reported to us that
Vice President Kalla was watching the race very closely in
his capacity as the Chairman of Golkar and an interested
observer, but Kalla did not think the results would impact
the national electoral map in any meaningful way. Gembong,
like Kalla, believed the election would turn on local issues
and not national political trends, and suggested the results
should be interpreted accordingly.

PKS WARY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF WINNING
--------------


7. (C) PKS legislator Zulkieflimansyah told us internal PKS
polling indicated that Adang had pulled to within seven
percentage points of Fauzi Bowo. Adang had surprised PKS
party leaders with his campaigning skills and his ability to
broaden his appeal beyond PKS party cadre. Even more
unexpected, according to Zulkieflimansyah, was Adang's
willingness to bankroll the campaign. Zulkieflimansyah said
that Adang had already spent 80-100 billion rupiah
($9,000,000 - $11,000,000) million) of his own money on the
campaign, an inordinate amount for a local campaign, even in
Jakarta. Fauzi Bowo, he was quick to add, had undoubtedly
spent more however.


8. (C) Reiterating the comments he made to us in Refs A and
C, Zulkieflimansyah noted that PKS had selected Adang as its
candidate because he was able to provide the party with a
much needed infusion of cash. PKS leadership never thought
Adang, who was recruited by the Prosperous Justice Party
(PKS) from outside the party ranks, could win. His sudden
surge in the polls had made some factions within the party
uneasy. If Adang were to win the election, he would quickly
become the national face of the party, and PKS would be held
accountable for his inevitable missteps as the chief
executive of Indonesia's least governable city. The genie
was out of the bottle to a certain extent, and though the PKS
machinery would turn out the vote for Adang on August 8, more
than a few members of the party discreetly hoped his
gubernatorial bid would ultimately come up short. When we
jokingly asked whether some senior PKS leaders might end up

JAKARTA 00001972 003.2 OF 003


voting for Fauzi Bowo, he told us without a trace of humor
that undoubtedly many would.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Even a close loss would allow PKS to claim a moral
victory, while an outright win would provide the party with a
much needed infusion of momentum and confidence. Although
Adang is by no means considered an ardent Islamist, his
victory would give PKS a signature electoral triumph in
Indonesia's highest profile local election ever. PKS may
have mixed emotions about the desirability of governing
Jakarta, but as the capital city and media hub for this
sprawling country of nearly a quarter of a billion people,
Jakarta would give PKS the perfect strategic foothold to
advance its ambitious plans for expansion.
HUME