REHABBING THE RADICALS? GOI OFFICIALS DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001962 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, S/P AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KISL ID SUBJECT: REHABBING THE RADICALS? GOI OFFICIALS DISCUSS THEIR CT APPROACH WITH S/P WAXMAN REF: A. 06 JAKARTA 13478 ¶B. JAKARTA 1011 Classified By: Joseph L. Novak, Counselor for Political Affairs, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During their June 27-29 visit to Jakarta, S/P Principal Deputy Director Matthew Waxman and S/P member James Green met with Government of Indonesia (GOI) counterterrorism officials to discuss their methods of combating radicalism, and notably Indonesia's deradicalization program. In frank sessions with the top Indonesian National Police (INP) counterterrorism investigators and the head of the counterterrorism desk at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (MENKOPOLHUKAM),the Indonesians emphasized the need to complement traditional law enforcement activities with counter-radicalization programs. They also decried the lack of political will within the GOI to tackle some of the thorrnier issues such as the relative weaknesses of Indonesia's CT laws, its judicial shortcomings, and ideological pathologies within the Muslim community for fear of causing offense. Finally, they laid out avenues for future CT cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia. End Summary. Weak Laws Hinder Prosecutions and Convictions -------------- - ¶2. (C) During their June 27-29 visit to Jakarta, S/P Principal Deputy Director Matthew Waxman and S/P member James Green met with GOI officials to discuss their CT programs, with special focus on Indonesia's deradicalization program. Ansyaad Mbai, the National Counterterrorism Coordination Desk Chief at MENKOPOLHUKAM told Waxman and Green that Indonesia's legal structure, which is modeled after the 19th century French penal code, is extremely outdated and ill-suited to trying terrorists. For example, although the police have a long list of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, they cannot act against them without strong evidence of participation in a terrorist act since there are no laws criminalizing conspiracy or provision of material support to terrorist networks. In addition, each suspected terrorist is tried individually and every incident tried separately, often with different judges for every case. This makes it nearly impossible for judges to discern links among individuals within a terrorist network. A further complication is the prohibition against using information obtained by intelligence services as evidence in court (which is why intelligence reports from the U.S., including information obtained from Guantanamo detainee Hambali, cannot be used). Law Enforcement Not Sufficient to Combat Radical Ideologies -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In the longer term, Mbai said, the GOI could not depend solely on "physical" opposition to terrorism, but should pursue rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs. However, he cautioned, these programs should be complementary to law enforcement and would only succeed if the GOI undertook significant legal reforms. Counterterrorism investigators within the Indonesian National Police (INP),by contrast, told Waxman that their existing rehabilitation and deradicalization programs should be significantly expanded as soon as possible. These programs are designed to bring the radicals on a passage ("hijra") back from "jihad world" to the real world, explained Criminal Investigative Division (CID) Deputy Inspector General Gories Mere, CID Directorate I Chief Brigadier General Surya Dharma and other top CT investigators. A key component is reuniting terrorism suspects with their families (as recently occurred following the arrest of JI leader Abu Dujana) so that familial and social connections deliberately severed by the jihadis can be reestablished and the radicals drawn back into society. Surya Dharma noted that Zarkasih, the JI emir arrested in early June, had initially been uncooperative with INP investigators but had warmed considerably after they reunited him with his mother and other immediate family members whom Zarkasih had not seen in over ten years. The police also advocate providing radicals' families and communities with tangible support to keep them on the police's side. In Poso, for example, the government built a new Islamic boarding school, which they claim undercut JI's regional stronghold. Unfortunately, Mere said, the GOI is JAKARTA 00001962 002 OF 003 not providing replacement services elsewhere, in part because of financial constraints. ¶4. (C) The police believe that another critical step in rehabilitating imprisoned terrorists is isolating them from the general population (they are currently integrated and associate freely with other extremists as well as the regular prison population). Once separated, the police would like to arrange meetings between the terrorists and Muslim leaders who could counsel them on the wrongness of their beliefs. Initially, Mere said, the rehabilitation program would focus on suspects in detention, but could later be expanded to reach individuals who have not yet been arrested. In Surya Dharma's opinion, the majority of terrorists can be rehabilitated. Reformed Terrorists' Cooperation Crucial to CT Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Mbai pointed out that the cooperation of ex-terrorists has been essential in almost all of the recent arrests in Indonesia. These individuals' personal histories of jihad command the respect of terrorist suspects, and helps them open up during questioning. A case in point is Nasir Abas, the former JI commander turned police collaborator whom Mbai credits with having been involved in the arrest of "every terrorist suspect in Indonesia, including Abu Dujana." But there is a problem, Mbai said; once reformed, former terrorists like Abas have difficulty getting their names off international terrorist lists, having their assets released, and travel bans lifted (ref A and previous). The police need assistance from their own governments and from the international community, therefore, in removing the rehabilitated terrorists' names from the consolidated lists. ¶6. (C) Mbai discounted the importance of interfaith dialogue, pointing out that the extremists, who "are too busy making bombs," do not participate. Instead, he suggested that the GOI should play up schisms within the radical community, which is divided over how to achieve an Islamic state. Mbai claimed that there are non-violent radical groups such as that led by former Laskar Jihad commander Ja'far Umar Thalib that would confront JI (ref B) over its advocacy of violence, which Thalib believes is destroying Islam. Mbai called for a "mapping" of radical groups that would identify which organizations and figures could be recruited as partners against the jihadis. While it might look dirty, radical groups who disagree with the use of violence should be empowered. Absent this help in discrediting violent jihadism, Mbai claimed, the moderate majority will not be effective in confronting the terrorists. Lack of Political Will Reduces CT Effectiveness -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Both Mbai and the INP CT investigators decried what they said was a lack of interest in and active support for their CT effortsfrom other parts of the GOI. Mbai said that there is strong- resistance within the GOI to amending CT laws and strengthening judicial tools, and he blamed the absence of a decisive policy to deal with the radicals for allowing this relatively small number of people to have such disproportionate influence. One glaring example is the GOI's continued unwillingness to ban JI, which has permitted JI-affiliated organizations like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI to spread the JI ideology. Gories Mere and Surya Dharma likewise complained about the GOI's exclusive focus on the "nuts and bolts" of arresting terrorists and its reluctance to deal with the ideological underpinnings of violent extremism. ¶8. (C) When asked why the GOI balks at taking stronger action, Mbai suggested that there is no political will to risk offending the Muslim community by opposing Muslim organizations, even if these groups do not represent the majority. He also pointed to the relative weakness of President Yudhoyono's political party and his need to rely on small Islamist parties to form a governing coalition. This has further reduced Yudhoyono's willingness and ability to take a stand against the radical groups, Mbai claimed. Gories Mere also pointed to politics, but identified a shortage of resources, lack of interest, and absence of opportunities for bureaucrats to benefit financially (i.e., JAKARTA 00001962 003 OF 003 through corruption) from anti-terrorism efforts as additional constraints. Avenues for Cooperation -------------- ¶9. (C) Mbai laid out several areas for future U.S.-Indonesian CT cooperation. Mbai asked for additional law enforcement training and technical cooperation, especially with regard to surveillance equipment (which he noted was particularly crucial in capturing Abu Dujana),and called for strengthened intelligence cooperation. Mbai believes that it would be useful for the U.S. and Indonesia to work closely together on counter-radicalization programs, although he cautioned that this cooperation would need to be "unseen" to ensure the programs' credibility. Finally, he called for the U.S. to push the GOI to comply at least minimally with international CT standards, including upholding UN conventions and implementing Security Council resolutions. ¶10. (U) S/P Waxman cleared this cable. HUME