SPEAKER CALLS OFF THE DOGS IN UNSCR IRAN VOTE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001919

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC IR ID
SUBJECT: SPEAKER CALLS OFF THE DOGS IN UNSCR IRAN VOTE
BATTLE

REF: A. JAKARTA 1629


B. JAKARTA 972

C. JAKARTA 930

Classified By: Joseph L. Novak, Counselor for Political Affairs, reason
s: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a hopeful sign for President Yudhoyono in his
three-month pitched battle with the House of Representatives
(DPR) over Indonesia's support for UNSCR 1747, DPR Speaker
Laksono has reportedly decided to let the interpellation
matter drop. The Speaker's party, Golkar, which controls the
largest DPR faction, has also halted its calls for the
President to explain the GOI's vote before a formal plenary
session. In a symbolic effort to strike a compromise and put
the matter to rest, President Yudhoyono visited the DPR on
July 3 to explain the government's position on the Iran vote
to a select gathering. On July 10, the President dispatched
a trusted minister to a half empty DPR plenary session to
once again explain the vote on his behalf. Though several
parliamentarians continued their frontal assault on the
President on the UNSCR vote, increasingly the issue appeared
to be running its course. According to a contact in the
Speaker's office, Iran's alleged DPR middleman tried
unsuccessfully to contact the Speaker in recent weeks, though
he could not confirm whether the Iranian government had
deliberately attempted to prolong the interpellation
standoff. End Summary.

A TEST OF WILLS
--------------


2. (C) As reported in reftels, President Yudhoyono has
consistently resisted the DPR's efforts to force him to
explain formally the Iran vote before a DPR plenary session,
arguing that he was not legally required to do so. Though
conventional wisdom held that the President could have put
the matter to rest at any point simply by delivering a speech
to a plenary session and delegating follow-on questions to a
Cabinet member, the President held to the view that
submitting to the DPR's request would have shown weakness.
Dadan Irawan, a Golkar contact, told us that Vice President
Kalla unsuccessfully made the case for the President to
appear before a plenary, warning that if the President did
not accede to the request to explain the Iran vote, he could
face repercussions down the road in the form of a concerted
push to query him in an interpellation over the Lapindo mud
situation (Note: This would potentially expose the President
to uncomfortable questions about the GOI's handling of the
toxic mud spill in Eastern Java. End Note). This, the Vice
President asserted, would undoubtedly have far more serious
political implications for the President than the Iran vote
interpellation outcry.


3. (S) On July 3, in an effort to settle the issue, the
President traveled to the DPR to explain the GOI's Iran vote
to a limited gathering. SBY briefed the Speaker, his three
deputies, the leaders of all 10 political factions, as well
as the Chairmen of all 11 DPR Commissions. Though at least
three parliamentarians walked out in protest during the
five-hour closed door briefing, the majority of those
assembled for the meeting publicly expressed satisfaction
with the President's explanation of the vote. According to
Speaker Laksono's top political aide, Arief Budiman (please
protect),Laksono was among those satisfied with the
President's explanation and content to allow the matter to
drop.


4. (C) With the Speaker's objections out of the way,
Coordinating Minister Widodo was able to represent the
President during a July 11 DPR plenary session on the Iran
issue, thereby satisfying the government's legal obligation
to respond to the interpellation request. In marked contrast
to the raucous June 5 plenary session, during which the DPR
refused to accept the testimony of any of SBY's seven
ministers sent to discuss the Iran vote (Ref A),this time

JAKARTA 00001919 002 OF 002


the DPR greeted Widodo's arrival with a collective yawn.
Only approximately half of the DPR's 550 parliamentarians
even bothered to attend the session, a clear sign that many
parliamentarians have already moved on.


5. (C) While momentum on the Iran interpellation issue has
clearly waned, the issue has not disappeared entirely. One
notable holdout was Abdillah Toha, a well-respected
parliamentarian from the Islamic National Mandate (PAN)
faction, who has signaled his desire to take the issue to the
Constitutional Court. Toha has continued to publicly blast
the President for the Iran vote and has doggedly maintained
that he would not rest until the President was forced to
appear before a plenary session. The Indonesian Democratic
Party - Struggle (PDI-P),the de facto opposition party in
the DPR, has also declined to relent on the issue, though the
party has reflexively opposed the President on virtually
every issue since he assumed office in 2004.

BUT IS IRAN HAPPY?
--------------


6. (S) As reported in Ref B, Speaker Laksono's aide, Arief
Budiman, told us that Iran played a major role in initiating
the outcry over the UNSCR 1747 vote. Arief reported that
Iran had offered unspecified future oil concessions to the
Speaker and several political party faction heads in exchange
for their loyalty to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program for
"peaceful purposes." When we asked Arief recently whether
Iran had explicitly pushed the Speaker and its other alleged
proxies in the DPR to maintain the interpellation pressure on
the President, Arief told us that he could not confirm
whether that was the case. Arief said that he believed the
Speaker and many of the faction heads kept the pressure on
the President in an effort to please the Iranian government
and hopefully salvage possible future business arrangements,
but he was not aware of any direct instruction from the
Iranian government on the matter to the Speaker. Arief
alleged the prominent Indonesian scholar and unofficial
Indonesian Shi'a spokesperson Jalaluddin Rahmat was Iran's
middleman in its communications with the DPR, and told us
that he had repeatedly deflected Jalaluddin's attempts to
contact the Speaker in recent weeks. Though he could not be
sure why Jalaluddin wanted to talk to the Speaker, he
suspected Jalaluddin sought to influence the Speaker's
thinking on the interpellation issue.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Speaker Laksono's decision to relent in the
interpellation battle appeared to have defanged the movement
and finally eased the pressure on President Yudhoyono.
Though five of the DPR's 10 factions remained at least
nominally inclined to continue to press the President on the
issue, our contacts reported the issue would likely fizzle
out. Laksono and the DPR clearly demonstrated their ability
to make life for the President unpleasant, but this effort
may have come at a public relations cost; most Indonesians
have struggled to understand what this test of wills
ultimately accomplished. As for how this issue will impact
Indonesia's behavior on the Security Council, the GOI most
assuredly will proceed only with great caution on any future
Iran votes.
HUME