INDONESIA - NEW PACKAGES ON INVESTMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 JAKARTA 001878 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/IFD/OMA TREASURY FOR IA-BAUKOL COMMERCE FOR 4430/GOLIKE DEPT PASS FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO/FINEMAN DEPT PASS EXIM BANK E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EINV ECON EAIR EFIN PGOV ID SUBJECT: INDONESIA - NEW PACKAGES ON INVESTMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE REF: A) JAKARTA 13236; B) 06 JAKARTA 10361; C) JAKARTA 978; D) JAKARTA 1282; E) 06 JAKARTA 13236 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On June 8, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) issued a new Presidential Instruction with four components: investment climate improvement; infrastructure development; empowerment of micro, small, and medium enterprises; and financial sector reform. These are updates to packages that were announced at various times in 2006 by Coordinating Minister for the Economy Boediono (reftels). They are now being issued simultaneously under one umbrella Presidential Instruction to move the economic reform agenda forward for the next twelve months. End Summary. Four New Packages -------------- ¶2. (U) The GOI issued four broad packages of financial and investment-related regulations on June 8 under Presidential Instruction (InPres) 6/2007. The investment, financial sector, and infrastructure packages are continuations of the same packages issued by Coordinating Minister for the Economy Boediono in 2006. The package for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is an expansion of several programs previously issued under the 2006 investment package. Minister Boediono used these packages to help to push through economic policy goals and coordinate the 16 Ministries under his purview. He has also uses them to encourage other ministries outside his purvey to move in the reformist direction as well. Investment Policy Package -------------- ¶3. (U) The GOI claims it implemented 80 of the 85 actions in the 2006 package, the most important being the passage of the new investment law in March 2007. This year's Investment Climate Policy (ICP) package consists of three sections: Institutions, Customs Clearance and Taxation. Section I focuses on institutional reform goals intended to improve Indonesia's institutional capacity to facilitate increased investment, including: -- Formulating clearer distinctions of authority between the Central Government and Regional Government in regard to investment; -- Reduction of taxes and tariffs for investors; -- Simplifying procedures for establishing a business. 
 The second section addresses customs reform, and outlines various objectives, including: -- Development of an online investment licensing system; -- Establishment of a National Single Window for customs and cargo clearance; -- Streamlining of customs clearance procedures to allow non-suspect goods to be released within 30 minutes. The final section, Taxation, proposes to improve tax service through: -- Increasing the number of taxpayer offices; -- Establishing a code of ethics for tax officials. The GOI's record on implementing reforms remains decidedly mixed. However independent observers tell us they appreciate GOI's ambitious goal-setting and are impressed to see responsibilities specifically tasked to particular ministries. The ICP also provides valuable insight into GOI's own assessment of its progress. It also has potential to serve as an effective tool of reform, despite its status as a non-binding Presidential Instruction. Unrelated to New Investment Law -------------- ¶4. (U) The ICP package serves as a political document that has no JAKARTA 00001878 002 OF 006 direct relationship to the new 2007 Investment Law. It is neither part of the law, nor part of the law's implementing regulations. The package of initiatives is, however, a useful policy analysis guide in that it serves as a separate, independent document designed to outline President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's vision to improve the investment climate, as well as his reform agenda. The package is related to the investment roadmap originally conceived by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) during SBY's election campaign and has since been institutionalized by the President as an annual report. It serves primarily as a strategic paper intended to establish goals and influence policy direction, but lacks the legal standing of a Presidential Decree. What's New for 2007 -------------- ¶5. (U) The ICP 2007 package reflects several updates from last year, including realigned milestones and target dates, but also lists some goals that have already been achieved (most likely as a means to document "easy" successes in the run up to the 2009 Presidential election.) The most noteworthy difference from 2006 is that the new package more clearly designates responsibilities for specific outcomes among competing government agencies and ministries. This is significant because rivalries within the GOI are often blamed for the slow pace of investment climate reforms. The most often cited example is the bitter divisions between the Ministry of Trade and the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). Delineating responsibilities with greater precision may also signal the ICP package becoming more of an implementing document than a strategy paper. Not Perfect, but Better -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Local expat consultants familiar with the ICP package expressed admiration for the document's intentions but remain concerned with quality control issues. "Just because the package identifies reforms as completed does not mean they were done well," one widely respected expat consultant told us. Impressed to see the 2007 document identify ministries responsible for specific outcomes, some experts defended the document's lack of detail, arguing that strategically "less is more." As one senior expat consultant with over 20 years of experience in Indonesia explained, "In Jakarta's Javanese, consensus-driven culture, publishing a goal with too much precision can weaken the ability to reach that goal." In his view, deliberate vagueness is a virtue that serves to avoid hardening the positions of potential adversaries. Some analysts told us this is particularly important for the credibility of a document with no force of law behind it. Indonesia's local media has been less impressed, dubbing the package "SBY's wish list" and describing it as "ineffective" and "lacking priorities". More specifically, local media note the absence of incentives for government officials to implement the reform measures, which in many cases run in direct conflict with their own rent-seeking opportunities. In short, without significant accompanying bureaucratic reforms, local critics remain skeptical of the package's overall effectiveness. Meanwhile, local government observers acknowledge that although the ICP package is far from perfect, they appreciate the goal-setting and hope the newly-included designation of responsibilities will help forestall governmental rivalries that have slowed the pace of reform. Infrastructure and Transportation -------------- ¶7. (U) Last year's package purported to address several policy improvements, the major one being regulations for public-private partnerships for infrastructure development (ref E). However, many investors tell us that they will need to see significant reforms and improvements in investment climate before international investors bring financing for major infrastructure projects. The GOI said it plans to accelerate transportation infrastructure through the passage of four new bills in the transportation sector, establishment of a National Transportation Safety Board, and provision of institutional guidelines for mass rapid transit (MRT) management in Jakarta. ¶8. (U) Ministry of Transportation (MoT) sources tell us that it JAKARTA 00001878 003 OF 006 plans to send four bills to Parliament this year concerning Railway, Maritime, Aviation, and Land Transportation. Current legislation in the four sectors dates back to 1992 and does not provide for an effective mechanism for private investments in the transportation sector or regional transportation planning after decentralization. Transportation projects have attracted few investors despite the GOI's strong marketing efforts to attract investment during the 2006 Infrastructure conference (ref B). Despite the public relations blitz, the GOI has failed, for example, to provide tender documents for its model transportation projects, leaving private investors without the basic mechanism for participation. Still, in step with the ongoing decentralization process, many regional governments have implemented transportation projects, but they have done so in a piecemeal fashion with little consideration for capacity, other infrastructure links, or transportation projects in neighboring districts. Our MoT sources say the new legislation will focus on increasing opportunities for outside investment in the sector and streamlining the procedure to do so. However, they provided few specifics on how they hope to achieve these twin goals. The new bills also target better strategic planning and coordination for transportation links and infrastructure at the regional (provincial) level. Parliament passed the Railway Bill in May. They may pass the Maritime Bill by August 2007 and perhaps the Aviation Bill by the end of 2007, according to our MoT contacts. That high level of productivity would be a sharp break from recent years, however. Increased Foreign Investment for Air Carriers -------------- ¶9. (U) Heru Prasetyo, Director of the Legal and International Cooperation Bureau, stated that the Transportation sector will welcome increased foreign ownership under the new negative list (issued July 4),including increased foreign ownership of air carriers (49% under the new Negative List). However, he noted that foreign firms would have difficulty reaching that level of ownership under the current investment climate. Prasetyo also stated that over the next five-to-ten years the Department of Transportation will reduce the number of regional transportation ports (such as international maritime ports) and increase coordination of multi-region, large-scale infrastructure projects through dialog with regional governments. Prasetyo stated the actions will hopefully lead to a more efficient allocation of state and local budget resources. New Domestic Transportation Safety Board -------------- ¶10. (U) The MoT said it also intends to set up a new National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to improve land transportation safety throughout Indonesia. A National Transportation Safety Commission (KNKT) already exists under the MoT, but it is overburdened by the high number of transportation accidents, is understaffed, and lacks budgetary funding and authority for investigations. Unlike the Jakarta based KNKT, the NTSB will have offices throughout Indonesia and focus exclusively on road accidents at the provincial level. The provincial level will also be responsible for funding the NTSB, however, so it is unclear if it will have enough resources to do a credible job. Mass Transit for Jakarta -------------- ¶11. (U) Jakarta's choking traffic lowers both quality of life and economic growth. To remedy these twin maladies, the GOI infrastructure acceleration plan calls for the creation of an institution for Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) in Jakarta. Our GOI contacts express the hope that this institution will also serve as a role model for MRT development authorities in other large cities. The MRT authority's primary function will be to manage the controversial Jakarta monorail project (ref A),which is being built primarily by companies associated with Vice President Jusuf Kalla. The on-again-off-again monorail project is now underway again after a recently issued government regulation (No. 103/2006) granting minimum ridership guarantees to the monorail project. The monorail project is scheduled for completion in 2010. Prasetyo told us that the local Jakarta administration will be responsible for establishing this authority. JAKARTA 00001878 004 OF 006 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Package -------------- ¶12. (U) The new package for "Empowerment of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises" (MSME) consists of three major elements: Section I seeks improved access of MSME's to financing by: -- Improving MSME access to financial resources; -- Strengthening MSME credit insurance; -- Better use of non-bank funds to empower MSMEs. Section II aims to improve private entrepreneurship and human resources by: -- Better education and training including graduate school programs; -- Encouraging technology-based entrepreneurship; Section III's goal is enhancement of market opportunities for MSME products by: -- Expansion of MSME product promotional institutions; -- Encouraging partnerships between producers and both traditional markets and modern shops; expanding market synergy. -- Expanding information on shipping and transportation for goods. -- Tax incentives for MSMEs. -- Finalizing the preparation of a draft law on MSMEs for submission to Parliament by December 2007. ¶13. (SBU) The GOI has had several iterations of assistance packages for MSMEs, some of which have been successful. However, high interest rates, inadequate access to capital, corruption and bureaucratic red tape continue to hinder many entrepreneurs. An additional shortcoming for Indonesia's MSME development is a lack of good entrepreneurship training and only a handful of well-respected business schools. Indonesia's venture capital industry is also underdeveloped, and commercial banks lend directly to small-and-medium firms. According to the World Bank, few offshore venture capital compaiies have shown an interest in investing in the cu ntry due to transparency and corporate governance issues. One of the program elements in the financial sector reform package (see below) is to enhance the role of venture capital in MSMEs: it calls for an assessment report by November 2007. ¶14. (SBU) Tax incentives for MSMEs will likely face a slow battle through the Directorate General for Taxation (DG Tax): DG Tax still has insufficient capacity for good tax policy study, review and decision-making. According to an International Monetary Fund economist based in Jakarta, the parts of this MSME package with the best chances of success are the credit schemes and the educational improvements. One noteworthy positive development is the program element to develop a warehouse receipt system as a financing instrument for MSMEs. A system of designated warehouses providing officially, centrally registered receipts for commodities stored, allows MSME traders and farmers to store their goods for as long as needed without having to dispose of them, and use the receipts as collateral for loans. This was also a required program action under the third Development Policy Loan (December 2006) provided by the World Bank. Financial Sector Package -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The new financial sector package contains four main elements: -- Strengthening financial sector coordination; JAKARTA 00001878 005 OF 006 -- Restructuring state-owned banks and facilitating sharia banking; -- Strengthening non-bank financial institutions, especially insurance and pensions. -- Increasing stability, efficiency and liquidity of capital markets; -- Harmonization of laws and regulations governing the financial sector. ¶16. (SBU) The new financial sector package reflects the fact, though not stated, that many of last year's items were accomplished (ref B). The GOI has established a primary dealers market, and auctioned its first T-Bill auctions in 2007. We were also pleased that some of the problematic areas in the draft of this package (such as regulation of ratings agencies),discussed in a meeting with major donors (U.S., Australia, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and IMF) were removed or revised in response to donors' written comments. Financial Sector Safety Net Law: Postponed Again -------------- ¶17. (SBU) One item that was not accomplished, however, and reappears in this package again, is the establishment of the Financial Sector Safety Net Law. This bill was supposed to be submitted to Parliament by December 2006, but has been postponed again to October ¶2007. The law is in response to the 1997-98 financial crisis, to define the role of the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy in the event of another major shock. A senior manager at the State Asset Company (PPA) Raden Pardede told us that the power relationships between the key agencies are still complicated, "In the event of another crisis that presented a systemic risk, important decisions would probably be deferred to the President." The reason this draft has been delayed several times is that, given the fallout of the crisis and ongoing corruption investigations connected to the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency and Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI), "No one wants the responsibility for the really tough decisions in case of a new crisis actually put in writing. They're afraid they might end up in jail," Pardede told us. State Bank Governance -------------- ¶18. (SBU) One noteworthy element of the package is the development of materials for public education in the field of finance by September 2007. Commercial banks, mutual funds and credit card companies have been calling for this for years. A large majority of the banking and investing public is still poorly educated about basic banking and investment principles, though the private sector has been active in this area in a piecemeal way. A mandate for improvement of state-owned banks via a decree by the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was also postponed from last year (originally August 2006, now October 2007). A new Minister for SOEs Sofyan Djalil was appointed in a Cabinet reshuffle on May 7 (ref D) who may do more to support privatization, but management at state-owned banks has a history of being heavily subject to political interference. Indonesia's large state-owned banks are Bank Mandiri, Bank Nasional Indonesia (BNI),Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI),and BTN (which provides subsidized mortgages). Together they control about 40% of banking assets in the country. Insurance Regulation -------------- ¶19. (SBU) We were pleased to see that improvement of insurance regulation and supervision via an amended regulation was included in this package. Indonesia's insurance sector is in bad shape (ref C). It suffers from weak regulation; poor enforcement; inadequate training; low professional standards; and insufficient capital. The goal for the amended regulation is January 2008 and involves three agencies (Finance, Law and Human Rights, State Secretary). The foreign insurance companies in Indonesia have been lobbying the regulator for improved supervision for many months. JAKARTA 00001878 006 OF 006 Capital Markets, Sharia Bonds -------------- ¶20. (SBU) The merger of the Jakarta and Surabaya Stock Exchanges was postponed a year from October 2006 to October 2007. The Ministry of Finance hopes the merger will improve efficiency. The package also seeks to improve price discovery for bond trading and valuation of securities. Another goal added, which was not in last year's package, is the development of Islamic Sharia Government Bonds and other sharia financial instruments. This requires the issuance of government regulations under the Ministry of Finance, but no deadline was set in the new package. HUME