VISIT OF INDONESIAN POLICE CHIEF SUTANTO TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000168 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/CC DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017 TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS ID SUBJECT: VISIT OF INDONESIAN POLICE CHIEF SUTANTO TO WASHINGTON REF: JAKARTA 92 Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Indonesian National Police Chief General Sutanto's January 22-25 visit to Washington provides an excellent opportunity to reiterate U.S. support for his efforts to develop a more professional, effective, and transparent police force and to express appreciation for his close cooperation on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and other important transnational security issues. He is well aware of the need for increased INP transparency and professionalization and has positioned the INP on the side of democracy. Due to the extensive on-going cooperation, any requests for new assistance during the visit will require close interagency coordination. Sutanto's visit is an opportunity to stress privately the importance of the Munir case. End Summary. REFORM AGENDA ¶2. (C) Since he assumed command over the Indonesian National Police (INP) in July 2005, Sutanto has promoted internal police reform and more effective law enforcement and taken a firm line on corruption in the public sector. The Indonesian police remain something of a stepchild institutionally and are still trying to shed a reputation of brutality and politicization from the past. Soon after installation as Chief of the Indonesian Police in July 2005, Sutanto called for an acceleration of efforts to create a professional, modern force with high moral standards, one able to create real conditions of security and one deserving of the public's trust. He introduced structural and procedural reforms aimed at establishing consistency and transparency. ANTI-TERROR SUCCESSES AND COOPERATION ¶3. (C) Since taking over, Sutanto has intensified the hunt for domestic terrorists. He responded to the Bali II bombings in 2005 by calling for new tougher legislation in line with U.S. and other models which would allow the Indonesian police to "move quickly and effectively" against terrorists. A major raid on terrorist leader Azahari's house in November 2005, coordinated with the FBI, killed the terrorist and produced valuable new leads and evidence. A similar raid in Wonosobo, Central Java in April 2006 killed �0A;suspected terrorists Jabir and Abdul Hadi. The absence of a major terrorism incident in 2006, breaking a four-year annual cycle, was at least in part the result of vigilant police work by the DS/ATA-supported Detachment 88 Antiterrorism Unit and CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") investigators. The INP has made significant progress in identifying and capturing terrorist instigators behind the ethnic violence in Central Sulawesi. Since 2005, INP officials have facilitated FBI interviews of several high-level Indonesian terrorist detainees and have assisted U.S. investigations into the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Marriott bombing, and the 2005 Bali bombings, all events in which U.S. citizens were killed or injured. ¶4. (C) There have been some important setbacks, such as the inability to capture key terrorist operator Noordin Top and the exoneration of terrorist leader Abu Bakar Baasyir. At least publicly, Sutanto remains firm. Responding to Baasyir's exoneration by the Supreme Court in December 2006, the INP spokesman asserted the police had conclusive proof of Baasyir's complicity in the Bali bombings. Sutanto said he accepted the court decision but the verdict would not impact ongoing CT investigations. HIGH-STAKES MUNIR CASE A TEST ¶5. (C) The case of the suspected murder of human-rights activist Munir, recently given new impetus by President Yudhoyono, will be a test of Sutanto's resolve in pressing the prosecution in the face of resistance from intelligence and other agencies. Promising new evidence from the U.S. laboratories on key cell phones in the case should give prosecutors a stronger hand. How Sutanto plays that hand will in this high-stakes case will reflect on his commitment JAKARTA 00000168 002 OF 003 to reform. He will face lots of pressure to go through the motions of prosecution without actually bringing any high-level culprits to justice. STRONG COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION ¶6. (C) For the last several years, the INP has been a strong proponent of counternarcotics cooperation, and Sutanto has continued this trend. The U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) maintains several robust assistance programs with both the INP's Narcotics Division and the Indonesian Narcotics Agency (BNN). JIATF-W-sponsored antinarcotics training includes the recently completed Fusion Iron maritime law enforcement training in the triborder area (reftel) and the development of the Indonesian National Joint Interagency Counterdrug Operations Center (JIACDOC) linked to a network of outstations. Earlier this month, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) sponsored a practical applications training course in Jakarta for Indonesian counternarcotics operators. DEA plans additional training later this year will include courses on investigating clandestine labs, and a management course for drug unit commanders. DOMESTIC LAW AND ORDER: REFORM, CORRUPTION, ORGANIZED CRIME ¶7. (U) On law enforcement issues domestically, Sutanto has taken a tough line against organized crime, notably drug trafficking, gambling and illegal logging. A number of highly publicized raids have shut down large ecstasy and methamphetamine manufacturing factories and illicit gambling centers. An illegal logging kingpin in Sumatra was arrested in September 9 in Beijing, through coordinated efforts of the Indonesian and Chinese police. Many others remain at large, however. ¶8. (U) In pressing President Yudhoyono's anti-corruption drive, Sutanto has not spared the police, demonstrating the seriousness of his intent to clean up the police force. Police officials who have been dismissed or arrested for wrongdoing during Sutanto's tenure include the a district police chief in July 2005, reportedly for smuggling; the former director of the INP's Special Economic Division and the former head of the INP's Detective and Criminal Division, on charges of accepting bribes; a senior inspector in the INP's General Monitoring Office, for smuggling; the chief for Southeast Sulawesi, for alleged sexual harassment; the chief for East Kalimantan, on suspected illegal logging; and a deputy police chief in Central Java, for the beating of subordinates. HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES ¶9. (U) Other noteworthy examples of bilateral collaboration include the following: -- Since 2004, the INP has cooperated in the extradition of eight felons wanted in the United States, including four pedophiles and a Tamil Tiger terrorism facilitator extradited earlier this month. -- In 2006, the United States facilitated the return of to Indonesia of two top Indonesian public corruption suspects, David Wijaya and Adrian Waworuntu. -- As a result of strong INP support, the DS/ATA training program in Indonesia is regarded as a model for effective CT tactical training. Kenyan police officers visited Indonesia to observe the ATA-sponsored program in 2006, and Pakistani police officers will visit Indonesia in late January specifically to observe the ATA-sponsored dog handling training program. -- Sutanto and his staff have been consistently willing to integrate INL funded DOJ ICITAP projects and assistance into organizational, operational and institutional practice through an entire range of areas: Marine Police Special Boat Units, cyber crime, forensics, civil disorder management, corruption, and management reforms. JAKARTA 00000168 003 OF 003 SBY ALLY ¶10. (C) Sutanto is an ally, if not a close associate of President Yudhoyono and the two share a commitment to reform and democracy. Sutanto graduated from the Indonesian Police Academy in 1973, the same year SBY graduated from the military academy, and from the College for Advanced Police Studies in 1983. He worked his way up through the ranks in East Java, including Deputy Police Chief of Jakarta (1998-2000) and Police Chief for East Java (2000- 2002). Prior to his current appointment he was the Head of the Police Education and Training Institute (2002-2005) and Executive Director of the National Narcotics Board (2005). ¶11. (U) Sutanto will be accompanied by Deputy INP Chief Investigator Inspector General Gories Mere, INP Intelligence Chief Inspector General Saleh Saaf, INP Commander of Team Bomb Brigadier General Surya Dharma, INP Counternarcotics Chief Brigadier General Indradi Thanos, INP Interpol Chief Brigadier General Iskandar Hasan, and lead INP cybercrime and terrorism investigator Lieutenant Colonel Petrus Golose. RESPONDING TO ASSISTANCE REQUESTS ¶12. (C) Washington officials should be mindful that INP officials likely will use their visit to request additional training and equipment. Some of the requests could easily be unrealistic and inconsistent with USG priorities. Sutanto's predecessor, retired INP General Dai Bachtiar, acquired the impression during a visit a few years ago that the USG had promised the INP C-130 aircraft. Although we can find no evidence of any such discussion, Sutanto periodically raises the issue with us. Due to the extensive on-going cooperation, any requests for new assistance during the visit will require close interagency coordination. PASCOE