A/S MULL UPDATES BILATERAL POLITICAL-MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001656 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, PM MULL, PM/RSAT PILCHER DOD FOR USDP/ISA/AP IPSEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PARM MARR PHUM PGOV ID SUBJECT: A/S MULL UPDATES BILATERAL POLITICAL-MILITARY AGENDA WITH INDONESIAN OFFICIALS Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In meetings with Indonesian foreign-affairs and defense counterparts in Jakarta on June 4-5, Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull pressed for Indonesian accession to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),proposed a reciprocal Article 98 agreement, urged negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and solicited support for the Ahtisaari proposal on Kosovo. He welcomed Indonesian participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the Center of Excellence for Police Stabilization Units (CoESPU). Mull stressed the Administration's commitment to mil-mil cooperation but stressed the need for continued progress on reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Mull was accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy James Clad, who conveyed a similar message. ¶2. (C) Indonesian officials said the GOI was "sandwiched" between domestic Islamic circles favoring Kosovo and nationalists opposing the resolution as a threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity. They demurred on the idea of a SOFA, indicated the GOI would review PSI obligations against the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and seemed open to further discussion of a reciprocal Article 98 agreement. Indonesian defense officials confirmed the Indonesian Armed Forces intended to incorporate U.S. assistance under the GPOI into instruction at the planned PKO training center. The Indonesian Police underscored its intention to continue sending trainees to the CoESPU in Vicenza, Italy but signaled a need for English-language refresher-course assistance and emphasized Mobile Brigade troops were the best prepared and most suitable Indonesian force for CoESPU training. GOI officials noted China was continuing to extend its influence into the region bilaterally and through arrangements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). All GOI interlocutors welcomed mil-mil cooperation and reiterated the commitment to TNI reform. End summary. U.S. MESSAGE ¶3. (C) Mull met with Director General for Defense Strategy Dadi Susanto, Chief of the Navy Admiral Slamet Soebijanto, Deputy Foreign Minister (Secretary General) Imron Cotan and Director of Personnel in the Interpol Division of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) General Hendy. In those meetings, Mull stressed Indonesia was an important strategic partner for the United States and President Bush had worked hard to put this relationship back on track. He congratulated Indonesia on its achievements in the transition to democracy and pledged that the United States would work together with Indonesia to surmount whatever difficulties arose between the two countries. The decision to suspend military cooperation with Indonesia had been counterproductive, and the Bush Administration opposed new attempts to impose restrictions on bilateral cooperation. Mull urged his GOI interlocutors to do what they could to make continued progress on reform. It was important for members of Congress to visit Indonesia and see for themselves the progress Indonesia was making. KOSOVO ¶4. (C) In a brief discussion on Kosovo and the pending United Nations Security Council Resolution, Mull conveyed appreciation for the open communication between Secretary Rice and FM Wirajuda on this and other UNSC issues over the past several months during Indonesia's tenure on the UNSC. He noted that the solution proposed by Finnish President Ahtisaari was not perfect, but was the best possible. ¶5. (C) Cotan said the GOI was "sandwiched" between domestic Islamic circles favoring Kosovo and nationalists opposing the resolution as a threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity, which made it difficult for the GOI to take a clear position one way or the other. It was essential in any case that the Serbs accept the proposal; otherwise Indonesia would find it very difficult to support it. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) ¶6. (C) Mull and Clad recalled the large assistance operations JAKARTA 00001656 002 OF 005 the U.S. military had mobilized after the tsunami in 2004 and to airlift the Indonesian peacekeeping battalion to Lebanon in 2006 and suggested there would be more such occasions in the future. A standing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would facilitate such cooperation. It was understandable if Indonesia was sensitive to the presence of foreign troops on its soil. The United States had no intention of establishing a military base in Indonesia, however, and the purpose of a SOFA was simply to facilitate access for providing assistance. It might be possible to insert language primarily geared to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Washington preferred, however, to have a standing agreement which would be ready when needed. ¶7. (C) Navy Chief Soebijanto agreed the idea was good but stressed Indonesian sovereignty concerns. Indonesia wanted to cooperate with the United States but, as a small and weaker country, wanted to maintain a balanced relationship with all of its neighbors. The long U.S. embargo had decimated the Indonesian navy, and Indonesia could never allow itself to become so dependent on one country again. ¶8. (C) On SOFA, Defense Strategy Director General Susanto said Indonesia was studying a detailed Philippine-proposed text for a SOFA and noted Indonesia already had a defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines. Indonesia had DCAs with India and Singapore as well, was in negotiations for DCAs with Australia and New Zealand and eventually could also have DCAs with China and South Korea. These agreements were facilitated by the ASEAN/ARF framework. There was no uniform text, and agreements were tailored to the respective interests in each case. With Malaysia, Indonesia had a General Cooperation Commission instead because the two countries shared common borders. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ¶9. (C) Mull and Clad appealed for Indonesia's cooperation through the Proliferation Strategy Initiative (PSI) to help interdict nuclear and other contraband that threaten Indonesian and U.S. security interests. Over 80 nations had signed up. All countries were threatened by WMD proliferation, and it was essential to prevent transport over international waterways. Mull emphasized Indonesia would conduct any interdiction in Indonesian waters, while PSI facilitated the sharing of information that could lead to an interdiction. Any operations in Indonesian waters would be fully coordinated with Indonesian authorities. PSI was a voluntary organization of countries which wanted to cooperate to prevent the smuggling of goods which could endanger populations. Indonesia should consider observing exercises even if it had not accepted the Statement of Principles, he stressed. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which had concerns similar to Indonesia's, had joined recently. ¶10. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Cotan noted that Indonesia had signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and was committed to nonproliferation. The GOI would consider an invitation to observe, and would review its potential obligations under PSI for their compatibility with the UNCLOS. In particular, it was not clear that UNCLOS supported any action which interrupted the free flow of goods on the seas. Despite these concerns, there were over 200 cases annually of Indonesian fishing vessels being apprehended by Australia. The DPR, and particularly its more nationalistic elements, was a serious obstacle, as they regarded such arrangements as encroaching on Indonesian sovereignty. It was also important to avoid creating the impression that the United States was imposing its will on Indonesia. ¶11. (C) Admiral Soebijanto said Indonesia did not want foreign nations interdicting ships in Indonesian waters. The very use of the word "initiative" in the program's name suggested a freewheeling approach. However, he said Indonesia would not object to sharing information, and said that the Indonesian Navy would be ready to act against smugglers if the U.S. provided information on any suspected transshipments through Indonesian waters. On PSI, Susanto said the idea was good, but Indonesia was sensitive to the notion of interdiction. ARTICLE 98 JAKARTA 00001656 003 OF 005 ¶12. (C) Mull asked DFM Cotan whether Indonesia was preparing to accede to the Rome Statute and that Congress had established restrictions on signatories to that statute. The United States would be willing to conclude a reciprocal agreement with Indonesia which would stipulate the same obligations for both sides. Indonesia might well share U.S. concerns, as the International Criminal Court (ICC) potentially could seek to adjudicate cases involving Indonesian soldiers. ¶13. (C) Cotan said any such agreement between Indonesia and the United States should be on a reciprocal basis. In addition, parenthetically, Indonesia would want to prohibit extradition of its soldiers to the United States. He was unsure of GOI views but promised to check. The timing of Indonesian accession was not yet clear: possibly by the end of 2008. PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE ¶14. (C) Mull welcomed Indonesia's participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Indonesia's plans to participate in KHAAN QUEST, the upcoming peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia. Mull said the United States had allocated a significant amount of assistance for a training center in Indonesia and asked for an update on plans to establish one. Susanto said the ministerial order had been issued to construct a PKO training center in Bandung and Indonesia had sent a letter to the United Nations requesting endorsement and guidelines for instruction. Initial training operations might be set up in Cilangkap but eventually would move to Bandung. Budgetary allocations for the center, however, probably would not be forthcoming until 2008. ¶15. (C) On the Indonesian UNIFIL deployment, Mull related that Israel had been reluctant to accept Garuda XXIII but had accepted U.S. arguments on the importance of including Indonesia. If Indonesia planned to rotate new troops into its deployment, the United States would work with Indonesia and the United Nations as before to make this possible. Cotan said it was important to expose the TNI to the outside world, so that it would "open up" and transform more quickly. Restrictions would do the opposite by cutting the TNI off from those positive influences and turning them away. Susanto said the deployment was going well and indicated the TNI planned to send a rotational deployment toward the end of the year. ¶16. (C) Police Human Resources Director Hendy noted that Indonesia was sending two groups of trainees to the Center of Excellence for the training of stabilization police units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy and asserted POLRI wanted to send larger groups in the future consisting primarily of Mobile Brigade members. The Mobile Brigade was one of Indonesia's most capable police forces the was the best suited for peacekeeping operations. They were already trained, had much experience in conflict areas such as Aceh, Ambon and Sulawesi, and could more readily adapt to PKO requirements. Indonesia's first senior-level trainee group contained one Mobile Brigade officer, and he would lead the training at POLRI's main facility in Kelapa Dua upon his return. ¶17. (C) The one weak point, Hendy asserted, was English-language proficiency, and most Indonesian trainees would benefit from one month of English brush-up instruction in Indonesia before going to Vicenza. Indonesia would welcome any assistance which could be provided in this area. Generally, Indonesia's PKO police also needed technical equipment for their missions. Indonesia had made much progress in combating terrorism, and had an international-standard police training center, JCLEC, in Semarang, but still was short of its budgetary targets. ¶18. (C) Mull stressed Indonesia's importance as a strategic partner in this area and said he would ask Washington to review Hendy's proposal to train Mobile Brigade police. An assessment of how such police would be used after training would be critical to this decision. MARITIME SECURITY AND REGIONAL COOPERATION ¶19. (C) Admiral Soebijanto said Indonesia welcomed U.S. assistance in building maritime capability, including through JAKARTA 00001656 004 OF 005 Section 1206. Although the plan for emplacing radars in the Sulawesi Sea had merits, Indonesia wanted to extent that network further southward along the Makassar Strait and also wanted to place similar radars along the northern coast of Jawa. Indonesia wanted all of its seas to have equally strong coverage. The Navy wanted to have an operational fleet of 275 ships by 2025 as part of its effort to develop a blue-water navy. The Navy was trying to persuade the government to allocate additional money for this purpose. There was a massive need for assistance in providing the sort of equipment that would make Indonesia's waters safe. The biggest strategic challenges facing the Navy, Soebijanto said, were terrorism, illegal fishing, transport of illicit goods (e.g. shipments of lumber from illegal logging) and unauthorized salvage of sunken treasure. ¶20. (C) DG Susanto said China took a "clever" approach toward other countries in the region by offering help and refraining from criticism. Since China had signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Indonesia could no longer consider China an enemy. Indonesia wanted to maintain a balance between India and China. DASD Clad pointed out that China had not conceded anything for its ties and urged Susanto to consider a briefing from U.S. analysts concerning China's objectives in the region. Susanto welcomed China's participation in ASEAN and noted China had proposed holding ASEAN 1 maritime exercises. ¶21. (C) DASD Clad told Susanto and other GOI interlocutors that Washington had a more mixed assessment of China's intentions in the region and urged them to consider receiving a briefing from Washington analysts on this. Susanto said he would consider such a briefing. TNI SHOOTING IN EAST JAVA ¶22. (C) Mull congratulated the Navy on its response so far to the shooting of civilians in East Jawa on May 30. He noted that similar events had occurred in the United States in the past. TNI leaders had pledged to cooperate with the police investigation and provide compensation to the victims. It was important to continue responding constructively to the event. This accountability was important to TNI reform efforts and would help to deflect criticism in Washington. In the U.S. experience, the shooting at Kent STATE during the Vietnam War had triggered a review of national guard procedures. Indonesia might consider doing the same. ¶23. (C) Admiral Soebijanto asserted the marines had sought to mollify the villagers, including offering land, but the villagers had dispersed and then returned with stones, sticks and knives. The villagers heavily outnumbered the marines, and had put women and children in the front, as though coached by outsiders. The marines had first fired warning shots into the air, but then had fired at the ground to make clear their guns were loaded. Some of the shells had splintered and hit bystanders. Thirty-five shells were fired, he stressed; if the marines had targeted the crowd, there should have been far than four casualties. ¶24. (C) Susanto noted most military training areas throughout the country lacked land titles; the military had simply been given the land decades ago, during the Suharto era, and held it on a de facto basis. Land disputes were particularly endemic to East Java. The TNI's budget for land acquisition was very small. He noted that the Marines traditionally had a better reputation than the Army did for dealing with the public and were therefore more popular. Cotan suggested that the TNI was taking the right steps in responding to the shooting. CONSTRAINTS ON REFORM ¶25. (C) Susanto pointed to the TNI's modest budget and logistical bottlenecks as two obstacles to fuller cooperation. English-language capability was still very limited, although the interest among younger officers was rising. Indonesia understood that, in the end, democracies were stronger and more successful than other forms of government, and wanted to be among the winners. Reform was a criterion of success. Not to reform meant being left behind. ¶26. (C) The next steps in reform included the eradication of JAKARTA 00001656 005 OF 005 TNI businesses. A presidential decree was in preparation to formally transfer the major businesses to the Ministry of State Enterprises. On the other hand, the TNI had no budget for a social insurance fund in order to provide pensions, housing and children's educational expenses to widows. Many of the TNI's businesses had served this purpose in the past, and the TNI wanted to allow the smaller collectives to continue for this purpose. Soldiers typically received 250 rupiah per day but needed 600, while calorie intake was 2500 calories per day when it should be 3500. Many soldiers had to supplement their income by working as pedicab drivers and the like. The military's top priority, therefore, was soldiers' welfare. The current TNI needs were $7.8 billion annually, while only $3.7 billion had been budgeted. MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ¶27. (C) Mull and Clad met with representatives of Kontras and Imparsial, two leading human-rights monitors, concerning reform of the TNI and progress on human rights. The activists acknowledged that the TNI was more cognizant of human rights today than in the past, but insisted it still fell short of standards consistent with democracy. While conceding that it was more important to effect change for the future than to settle past scores, they agreed with Mull that coming to terms with past excesses would be instructive for the military. While welcoming the exit of the TNI from politics, they said the influence of the military on the civilian population remained too strong. Laws had changed but attitudes had not. The perpetuation of the territorial system impeded reform by keeping the soldiers dispersed throughout the population and allowing old habits and relationships to remain. They expressed support for the training of civilian expertise in the defense area, in order to assert civilian authority and contribute to the development of a more professional military. ¶28. (C) This message has been cleared by Acting Assistant Secretary Mull. SIPDIS HEFFERN