INDONESIAN POLICE TAKE DOWN KEY JI OPERATORS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT, EAP/MTS, INL FOR BOULDIN
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ, OPDAT FOR
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS ASEC CASC KVPR CVIS ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLICE TAKE DOWN KEY JI OPERATORS

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).


1. (S) Summary. On-going Indonesian National Police (INP)
counterterrorism operations in Central Java since Saturday,
June 9, have netted the senior-most Indonesian terrorists
arrested in the last several years. Among those arrested
were Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka Mbah aka
Nu'im aka Abu Irsyad) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka
Ainal Bahri),according to an INP investigator. As the JI
Emir, Afghan-veteran Syahroni was the former JI Mantiqi II
leader and is thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI
hierarchy. Dujana, also an Afghan-veteran, has been involved
in JI's central command and involved in several of the main
JI attacks in recent years. The same INP contact privately
confirmed that four others were among those arrested in
Yogyakarta: Tri, Aris Widodo, Aziz, and possibly Mahfud (aka
Yusron). (Note. Press reports suggest that Mahfud may be an
alias for Abu Dujana but we are unable to confirm this yet.)
While these arrests are tremendous news, recent information
uncovered in these operations suggests that the JI's
structure remains formidable. End summary.


2. (S) In on-going INP operations that began June 9, CT units
in Central Java have netted several key Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
terrorist network operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad
Syahroni (aka Mbah aka Nu'im aka Abu Irsyad) and senior JI
operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal Bahri),according to an INP
investigator. Syahroni, arrested in Yogyakarta, and Dujana,
arrested in Purwokerto, were being held at an INP safehouse
near Yogyakarta. As the JI Emir, Afghan-veteran Syahroni was
the former JI Mantiqi II leader and was thought to be senior
to Dujana in the JI hierarchy. Dujana, also an
Afghan-veteran, has been involved in JI's central command and
involved in several of the main JI attacks in recent years.
INP contacts have privately confirmed that four others were
among those arrested in Yogyakarta: Tri, Aris Widodo, Mahfud
(aka Yusron),and Aziz.


3. (S) Scant information has been available on the arrests,
suggesting that the INP has probably imposed a general press
blackout to allow investigators additional time to follow-up
on leads from the on-going interrogation of these key
figures. Media reports identified Mahfud as an aide to
Dujana and reported that he was shot in the leg while trying
to evade capture. The INP told us both Mahfud and Widodo
were fairly new members of Dujana's circle. They said that
the computer savvy Tri facilitated Dujana's liaison with
other JI leaders, including Dulmatin. The INP said Aziz was
with Parawijayanto on a motorcycle at the time of the arrest
but said Parawijayanto, another key INP target, managed to
escape. (Note: Based on our meetings with INP investigators,
the recent INP operations as well as the operations in March
appeared to have been carried out by the INP's CT Taskforce
("Team Bomb") and it is unclear the extent of the involvement
of the INP's CT unit Detachment 88.)

JI Still Kicking Despite INP Successes
--------------

4. (S) INP operations over the past six months reflect the
INP's continued focus on JI's operational leadership and
their success suggests improved INP capabilities in location
and surveillance of terrorist suspects. Troublingly,
evidence from the raids have indicated that the JI network
has retained its overall commitment to plan and carry out
violent attacks and may have lost little of its overall
capacity to do so despite numerous CT victories. INP CT
investigators were concerned that the recent arrests may
trigger terrorist attacks by their underlings. In
particular, they said JI cells in Palembang, South Sumatra
may be acquiring detonators in advanced operational planning,
according to the same INP contact, who said INP CT units were
turning their attention there.


5. (S) INP operations against terrorist havens in Central
Sulawesi in January forced several JI members to retreat to
the shelter of the group's Java-based network. The late
January arrest in Poso of Wiwin Kalahe (aka Tomo) exposed
details of the Sulawesi-Java links and he led investigators

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to several JI safe houses in Java and identified several JI
members. Subsequent INP surveillance of the people and sites
identified by Wiwin led to the March raids and uncovered a
previously unknown Java-based JI military wing led by Dujana
and seized JI plans and significant weapons and explosives
caches.


6. (C) The JI structure laid out in the seized documents was
different than the one identified in previously obtained JI
material. Benny Mamoto, a lead INP CT investigator, told us
in April that the structure appeared to have been adapted
from one mentioned in the JI's original operational handbook
(the Pupji),but he emphasized that it should be seen as a
model rather than a description. Mamoto and other INP
contacts confirmed that Dujana was identified as the head of
JI's military section ('Qoid Sariyah' or 'Qoryah'),one of
five sections under the JI's senior council (Majelis Qiyadah
Markaziyah). Other sections included Missionary Work,
Education, Economics, and Information. Dujana managed a
logistics element (Qisn) and four area operational components
(Ishobah) on Java:

- Ishobah I (called "Zaid bin Haristah") in Surakarta,
- Ishobah II (called "Jafar bin Abi Tholib") in Semarang,
- Ishobah III (called "Abdullah bin Rowahah") in Surabaya, and
- Ishobah IV (called "Kholid bin Walid") in Jakarta


7. (S) An INP contact close to the investigations has told us
that the on-going Dujana interrogations have so far revealed
additional details of JI's structure. Dujana has told the
INP that JI's core structure consists of four mantiqis:
Mantiqi I covered Central Java to Western Indonesia, Mantiqi
II covered Central Java to Eastern Indonesia, Mantiqi III was
a specially designated mantiqi over Central Sulawesi, and
Mantiqi IV, also referred to as "Laskar Khos," was Dujana's
military wing. Little else was known of these structures and
only one leader, Abu Fatih, had so far been identified as the
head of Mantiqi III.

Comment:
--------------

8. (C) Much remains unclear about the precise structure of
the JI terrorist network, but the recent string of arrests
will undoubtedly take its toll. The intelligence coming out
of the Dujana and Syahroni arrests will also likely
contribute to our understanding of the network. For now, INP
CT investigators told us in April that the arrests of
hundreds of JI operators and an increasingly less hospitable
operating environment for the terrorists may have had less of
an effect on the JI network's overall structure than the INP
had previously assessed.

HEFFERN