INDONESIAN POLICE TAKE DOWN KEY JI OPERATORS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001620 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT, EAP/MTS, INL FOR BOULDIN DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ, OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH NCTC WASHDC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS ASEC CASC KVPR CVIS ID SUBJECT: INDONESIAN POLICE TAKE DOWN KEY JI OPERATORS Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ). ¶1. (S) Summary. On-going Indonesian National Police (INP) counterterrorism operations in Central Java since Saturday, June 9, have netted the senior-most Indonesian terrorists arrested in the last several years. Among those arrested were Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka Mbah aka Nu'im aka Abu Irsyad) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal Bahri),according to an INP investigator. As the JI Emir, Afghan-veteran Syahroni was the former JI Mantiqi II leader and is thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI hierarchy. Dujana, also an Afghan-veteran, has been involved in JI's central command and involved in several of the main JI attacks in recent years. The same INP contact privately confirmed that four others were among those arrested in Yogyakarta: Tri, Aris Widodo, Aziz, and possibly Mahfud (aka Yusron). (Note. Press reports suggest that Mahfud may be an alias for Abu Dujana but we are unable to confirm this yet.) While these arrests are tremendous news, recent information uncovered in these operations suggests that the JI's structure remains formidable. End summary. ¶2. (S) In on-going INP operations that began June 9, CT units in Central Java have netted several key Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka Mbah aka Nu'im aka Abu Irsyad) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal Bahri),according to an INP investigator. Syahroni, arrested in Yogyakarta, and Dujana, arrested in Purwokerto, were being held at an INP safehouse near Yogyakarta. As the JI Emir, Afghan-veteran Syahroni was the former JI Mantiqi II leader and was thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI hierarchy. Dujana, also an Afghan-veteran, has been involved in JI's central command and involved in several of the main JI attacks in recent years. INP contacts have privately confirmed that four others were among those arrested in Yogyakarta: Tri, Aris Widodo, Mahfud (aka Yusron),and Aziz. ¶3. (S) Scant information has been available on the arrests, suggesting that the INP has probably imposed a general press blackout to allow investigators additional time to follow-up on leads from the on-going interrogation of these key figures. Media reports identified Mahfud as an aide to Dujana and reported that he was shot in the leg while trying to evade capture. The INP told us both Mahfud and Widodo were fairly new members of Dujana's circle. They said that the computer savvy Tri facilitated Dujana's liaison with other JI leaders, including Dulmatin. The INP said Aziz was with Parawijayanto on a motorcycle at the time of the arrest but said Parawijayanto, another key INP target, managed to escape. (Note: Based on our meetings with INP investigators, the recent INP operations as well as the operations in March appeared to have been carried out by the INP's CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") and it is unclear the extent of the involvement of the INP's CT unit Detachment 88.) JI Still Kicking Despite INP Successes -------------- ¶4. (S) INP operations over the past six months reflect the INP's continued focus on JI's operational leadership and their success suggests improved INP capabilities in location and surveillance of terrorist suspects. Troublingly, evidence from the raids have indicated that the JI network has retained its overall commitment to plan and carry out violent attacks and may have lost little of its overall capacity to do so despite numerous CT victories. INP CT investigators were concerned that the recent arrests may trigger terrorist attacks by their underlings. In particular, they said JI cells in Palembang, South Sumatra may be acquiring detonators in advanced operational planning, according to the same INP contact, who said INP CT units were turning their attention there. ¶5. (S) INP operations against terrorist havens in Central Sulawesi in January forced several JI members to retreat to the shelter of the group's Java-based network. The late January arrest in Poso of Wiwin Kalahe (aka Tomo) exposed details of the Sulawesi-Java links and he led investigators JAKARTA 00001620 002 OF 002 to several JI safe houses in Java and identified several JI members. Subsequent INP surveillance of the people and sites identified by Wiwin led to the March raids and uncovered a previously unknown Java-based JI military wing led by Dujana and seized JI plans and significant weapons and explosives caches. ¶6. (C) The JI structure laid out in the seized documents was different than the one identified in previously obtained JI material. Benny Mamoto, a lead INP CT investigator, told us in April that the structure appeared to have been adapted from one mentioned in the JI's original operational handbook (the Pupji),but he emphasized that it should be seen as a model rather than a description. Mamoto and other INP contacts confirmed that Dujana was identified as the head of JI's military section ('Qoid Sariyah' or 'Qoryah'),one of five sections under the JI's senior council (Majelis Qiyadah Markaziyah). Other sections included Missionary Work, Education, Economics, and Information. Dujana managed a logistics element (Qisn) and four area operational components (Ishobah) on Java: - Ishobah I (called "Zaid bin Haristah") in Surakarta, - Ishobah II (called "Jafar bin Abi Tholib") in Semarang, - Ishobah III (called "Abdullah bin Rowahah") in Surabaya, and - Ishobah IV (called "Kholid bin Walid") in Jakarta ¶7. (S) An INP contact close to the investigations has told us that the on-going Dujana interrogations have so far revealed additional details of JI's structure. Dujana has told the INP that JI's core structure consists of four mantiqis: Mantiqi I covered Central Java to Western Indonesia, Mantiqi II covered Central Java to Eastern Indonesia, Mantiqi III was a specially designated mantiqi over Central Sulawesi, and Mantiqi IV, also referred to as "Laskar Khos," was Dujana's military wing. Little else was known of these structures and only one leader, Abu Fatih, had so far been identified as the head of Mantiqi III. Comment: -------------- ¶8. (C) Much remains unclear about the precise structure of the JI terrorist network, but the recent string of arrests will undoubtedly take its toll. The intelligence coming out of the Dujana and Syahroni arrests will also likely contribute to our understanding of the network. For now, INP CT investigators told us in April that the arrests of hundreds of JI operators and an increasingly less hospitable operating environment for the terrorists may have had less of an effect on the JI network's overall structure than the INP had previously assessed. HEFFERN