PSI: JOINT DEMARCHE WITH AUSTRALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001185 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/CPI M.STUMPF E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP XC SUBJECT: PSI: JOINT DEMARCHE WITH AUSTRALIA REF: SECSTATE 17716 Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Officials from the U.S., New Zealand, Canadian, British and Japanese embassies in Jakarta joined Australian DCM and PolCouns for a joint demarche on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to Desra Percaya, Director for International Security and Disarmament at the Department of Foreign Affairs on April 26. Australian and U.S. representatives emphasized the need for PSI, its utility in support of UN Security Council resolutions and its place in the range of nonproliferation agreements, arrangements and initiatives. Percaya reiterated Indonesia's known concerns regarding PSI's compatability with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maintained that existing agreements and mechanisms were sufficient to control proliferation. Percaya proposed the creation of a working group which would meet to exchange perspectives on PSI with a view to finding a common way forward but stressed Indonesia was not prepared to attend PSI meetings. Embassy representatives accepted the proposal and the Australian Embassy will arrange an initial meeting, prospectively in June. Further details of the discussion follow. ¶2. (C) Percaya said Indonesia understood the need to ensure international security but believed PSI infringed the freedom of navigation on the high seas and in territorial waters of littoral states. The international community should focus on the causes of proliferation. Indonesia was in the process of implementing a number of other nonproliferation commitments, notably the drafting of national legislation on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons proliferation. Indonesia fully supported existing arrangements and could be relied upon to fulfil its obligations under them. However, Indonesia did not see a need for a new initiative and did not see why Indonesia's participation was so important. Indonesia was uncomfortable with the principle of interdiction because of its potential for misapplication and, psychologically, because of Indonesia's colonial experience. Indonesia might be more comfortable with a version of PSI within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ¶3. (C) In responding, embassies argued that existing arrangements, while important, were insufficient because violators were not signatories to existing arrangements, often were non-state actors and often were beyond the reach of national governments. The wide support PSI had received from other capitals indicated that there was a perceived need for such an initiative, beyond existing arrangements. Indonesia's participation was critical because Indonesia straddled some of the world's primary waterways, had numerous ports and, therefore, was a critical nexus of international shipping. National capitals were providing assistance to strengthen detection and enforcement capabilities of police, customs and other elements in Indonesia's ports. ¶4. (C) Embassies asked whether Indonesia had discussed its concerns with other recent signatories of PSI, particularly those from Southeast Asia. Percaya responded that Indonesia's position was geographically different, even from a country like Brunei, for instance, because of Indonesia's archipelagic character and that the implications of PSI might therefore be different. ¶5. (C) Comment: Post believes Indonesia's position is fairly well entrenched and is rooted in Indonesia's continued identification with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),its weak maritime capabilities and its concern that it would not be able to control PSI's application within Indonesia's territorial and archipelagic waters. Knowledgeable Indonesian officials also make unspecified references to the legal liability of interdicting their own or other states' ships under PSI, an apparent reference to a mistaken seizure of cargo at some point in the past for which the Indonesian government was sued. Embassies agreed to the formation of a working group in the knowledge that PSI has already been the subject of extensive policy and technical discussions but in the hope that continued dialogue on respective positions, including interpretations of the UNCLOS, might eventually offer a way forward. HEFFERN