INDONESIAN VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001161 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR ISN/MNSA S.DAVIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP ENRG NPT ID SUBJECT: INDONESIAN VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM REF: STATE 54147 Classified By: Political Officer Daniel E. Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b ,d). ¶1. (C) We discussed reftel nonpaper with Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director for Disarmament in the Directorate of International Security and Disarmament at the Department of Foreign Affairs, on April 25. Rachmianto said Indonesia would participate in the Prepcom with an open mind on substance and hoped the conference would not become mired in procedural issues such as occurred at the previous conference. He noted Indonesia was coordinator on disarmament for the Non-Aligned States. In regard to the conference chairman's proposal to list the results of previous conferences, Indonesia favored a brief reference to those results instead. ¶2. (C) Indonesia attached equal emphasis to all three pillars of the NPT--nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy--so that they would be mutually reinforcing, Rachmianto said. The majority of NPT states, he asserted, favored this approach. Likewise, compliance should apply evenly to all articles of the NPT. He noted that Indonesia had inserted a provision in UNSCR 1747 calling for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East and suggested this should be on the agenda for the Prepcom. ¶3. (C) Indonesia believed it was better not to address the issue of Iran in the upcoming Prepcom, Rachmianto explained, because that issue was currently being handled in the UN Security Council. The UNSC had set in motion a process which would be reviewed in 60 days, and raising the issue in another forum could complicate the UNSC process. We responded that the question for the Prepcom appeared to be on how to prevent a repeat of the developments in Iran in the future. In the case of North Korea, on the other hand, Rachmianto opined, the NPT was powerless to take action in response to withdrawal since North Korea was no longer a member, while a Permanent Member of the UNSC, such as China, could veto any proposed UNSC action. The Prepcom might instead want to consider providing for an emergency meeting of NPT member states and a three-month notification requirement before withdrawal. ¶4. (C) Indonesia had ratified the Safeguards and the Additional protocol and favored the universalization of both documents. The United States and Russia, in contrast, had not ratified these, Rachmianto noted, yet they applied with equal force to nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states. Disarmament, he continued, was Indonesia's priority, and Indonesia would push for more careful verification and for more transparency among nuclear-weapons states. One means might be to involve the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verification. The development of new types of weapons by nuclear-weapons states was a matter of great concern and was inconsistent with Article 6 of the treaty, which called for all member states to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament. ¶5. (C) Indonesia supported the peaceful use of nuclear energy and had plans to construct nuclear power reactors in Indonesia over the next decade, Rachmianto noted. However, Indonesia had difficulty understanding U.S. cooperation with India on nuclear power, given India's nonmember status in the NPT. HEFFERN