INDONESIAN VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001161

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR ISN/MNSA S.DAVIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP ENRG NPT ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

REF: STATE 54147

Classified By: Political Officer Daniel E. Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b
,d).


1. (C) We discussed reftel nonpaper with Andy Rachmianto,
Deputy Director for Disarmament in the Directorate of
International Security and Disarmament at the Department of
Foreign Affairs, on April 25. Rachmianto said Indonesia
would participate in the Prepcom with an open mind on
substance and hoped the conference would not become mired in
procedural issues such as occurred at the previous
conference. He noted Indonesia was coordinator on
disarmament for the Non-Aligned States. In regard to the
conference chairman's proposal to list the results of
previous conferences, Indonesia favored a brief reference to
those results instead.


2. (C) Indonesia attached equal emphasis to all three pillars
of the NPT--nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of
nuclear energy--so that they would be mutually reinforcing,
Rachmianto said. The majority of NPT states, he asserted,
favored this approach. Likewise, compliance should apply
evenly to all articles of the NPT. He noted that Indonesia
had inserted a provision in UNSCR 1747 calling for a
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East and suggested
this should be on the agenda for the Prepcom.


3. (C) Indonesia believed it was better not to address the
issue of Iran in the upcoming Prepcom, Rachmianto explained,
because that issue was currently being handled in the UN
Security Council. The UNSC had set in motion a process which
would be reviewed in 60 days, and raising the issue in
another forum could complicate the UNSC process. We
responded that the question for the Prepcom appeared to be on
how to prevent a repeat of the developments in Iran in the
future. In the case of North Korea, on the other hand,
Rachmianto opined, the NPT was powerless to take action in
response to withdrawal since North Korea was no longer a
member, while a Permanent Member of the UNSC, such as China,
could veto any proposed UNSC action. The Prepcom might
instead want to consider providing for an emergency meeting
of NPT member states and a three-month notification
requirement before withdrawal.


4. (C) Indonesia had ratified the Safeguards and the
Additional protocol and favored the universalization of both
documents. The United States and Russia, in contrast, had
not ratified these, Rachmianto noted, yet they applied with
equal force to nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons
states. Disarmament, he continued, was Indonesia's priority,
and Indonesia would push for more careful verification and
for more transparency among nuclear-weapons states. One
means might be to involve the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in verification. The development of new types
of weapons by nuclear-weapons states was a matter of great
concern and was inconsistent with Article 6 of the treaty,
which called for all member states to negotiate in good faith
toward disarmament.


5. (C) Indonesia supported the peaceful use of nuclear energy
and had plans to construct nuclear power reactors in
Indonesia over the next decade, Rachmianto noted. However,
Indonesia had difficulty understanding U.S. cooperation with
India on nuclear power, given India's nonmember status in the
NPT.
HEFFERN