AHTISAARI MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001150 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK SR ZL ID SUBJECT: AHTISAARI MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ON KOSOVO REF: JAKARTA 1098 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: A/DCM Michael Anderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari told A/DCM April 24 that President Yudhoyono (SBY) said that Indonesia would try to decide on the future of Kosovo rationally. Citing domestic concerns and the need to consult the legislature, SBY did not state a position. The Indonesians seemed to be looking for reasons to support Ahtisaari's plan. Ahtisaari met with Vice-President Kalla and several ministers over dinner. Kalla reportedly phoned Yudhoyono in support of the plan. Ahtisaari gave a personal tone to all of his discussions to emphasize to the Indonesians that they owed him one, given his previous role in the Aceh peace negotiations. Ahtisaari was more optimistic about his Indonesia stop than the ones in Ghana and South Africa. End Summary ¶2. (C) The morning of April 24, UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari briefed A/DCM on his talks with President Yudhoyono and other senior leaders about the future status of Kosovo. Ahtisaari had dinner at Vice-President Kalla's home the evening of April 22, met with President Yudhoyono April 23 and was scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Wirajuda the afternoon of April 24. He was scheduled to meet EU representatives before departing that evening for Vienna. Three of Ahtisaari's aides attended our meeting as did PolCouns. SBY Wants to Make a "Rational" Decision -------------- ¶3. (C) Ahtisaari spoke positively about the April 23 meeting with SBY, whose comments were reassuring. SBY told Ahtisaari that the Indonesians were trying to be rational in their decision-making. SBY acknowledged the differences between Kosovo and other territories. SBY said he would have to consult within the government and with the legislature, but left Ahtisaari with the impression that he could control the process. SBY said that Islamists would be supportive but that others would be critical. Although SBY was unwilling to say what exactly he would do about a UN Security Council resolution, Ahtisaari told us that he would be very disappointed if the Indonesians did not support. Ahtisaari felt much more positive about his Indonesia visit than he had after his recent Ghana and South Africa visits: in those countries he did not know what to make of their positions, he said. ¶4. (C) During the conversation, SBY discussed possible EU incentives to Serbia and Kosovo at length. Ahtisaari said that the Indonesians clearly did not understand the mechanics of EU membership nor had they internalized that Kosovo would have to be independent in order to join the EU. The hand-over of wanted war criminals by Serbia had to be resolved as well. Hopefully, he added, the Indonesians understood better EU membership procedures. Ahtisaari said that SBY had promised to call after the visit of a Serb envoy, who was scheduled to arrive in Jakarta April 24, to provide a readout of that conversation. SBY was accompanied in the meeting by Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi and foreign affairs adviser Dino Djalal. Dinner with VP Kalla and Cabinet Members -------------- ¶5. (C) Ahtisaari was received the previous evening by VP Kalla for dinner. In attendance were several Cabinet members including Coordinating Minister for Security, Political, and Legal Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, and Minister of Justice and Human Rights Awaluddin. Also in attendance was the former rector of Jakarta's Islamic Univerity, Azaruddin Azra, who is a well-known religious moderate. Ahtisaari said he made his "sales pitch" and that there were extensive questions and answers. Uncharacteristically, Vice-President Kalla was silent during most of the discussion while the Foreign Minister probed with many questions. Azra asked questions about the kind of state that would emerge in Kosovo. Ahtisaari expected his formal call on Minister Wirajuda would not cover any new ground. Minister Awaluddin told Ahtisaari at an April 24 dinner that Kalla had telephoned SBY with a recommendation to support the Kosovo plan. No Press -------------- ¶6. (C) Before the Presidential meeting, Ahtisaari agreed not to make a statement to the press at the request of Dino Djalal. Apparently, the Indonesians wanted to avoid any appearance that SBY was being lobbied, as opposed to receiving an explanation of the recommendations. Ahtisaari said that he was comfortable with that approach and suggested that any further interactions by the Kosovo plan's supporters with the Indonesians be low-key. He did not plan to hold any press event before his departure. With respect to his own tactics, Ahtisaari said that he made sure that all his interlocutors understood that he would be personally disappointed if they did not support his plan, leaving unsaid that the Indonesians owed him for his assistance with the Aceh peace talks. He noted that the Indonesians seemed most interested in the position of Qatar, presumably due to the religious factor surrounding Kosovo's future. ¶7. (C) Comment: We are happy that Ahtisaari had a good round of meetings in Jakarta, and have no doubt that his visit will be an important contribution to Indonesian thinking. The references by SBY to his domestic audience probably reflect a real concern, given the parliamentary outcry over the Iran vote. We believe that he will want to make sure his bases are covered before the GOI makes a final decision on the Kosovo resolution. Based on Ahtisaari's relative optimism, that decision could bode well for his plan. End Comment HEFFERN