BANK INDONESIA CONSIDERS SWITCH TO OVERNIGHT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001128 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND EB/IFD/OMA TREASURY FOR IA-SETH SEARLS SINGAPORE FOR SUSAN BAKER COMMERCE FOR 4430 - BERLINGUETTE DEPARTMENT PASS FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO FOR FINEMAN DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM BANK E.O. 12598: N/A TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON PGOV ID SUBJECT: BANK INDONESIA CONSIDERS SWITCH TO OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATE AS BENCHMARK REF: A) JAKARTA 486 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Bank Indonesia (BI) seems likely to move to targeting the overnight interest rate rather than its one-month Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) rate as its policy rate for targeting inflation. This duration shift will have the benefit of addressing anomalies (some self-induced) in the short-term yield curve which currently has a 500 basis points (bps) gap between the overnight and one-month interest rate. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) plans to begin issuing short-term T-bills, which may eventually become the primary instrument for BI?s open market operations. The switch from SBIs to T-bills has the benefit of putting excess funds in the financial system to work in the Government budget rather than simply sitting on deposit at BI, potentially reducing pressure on BI to encourage banks to increase lending. Under current plans, however, BI would be financing the government directly since it and the MOF have struck a deal to allow BI to purchase up to 50% of T-bill auctions in order to build up an initial stock of T-bills with which to conduct monetary policy. End Summary. Inflation Targeting Impacts on Yield Curve -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to Bank Indonesia contacts, when BI implemented its inflation targeting policy in 2005, it decided to use the one-month SBI rate as its policy interest rate. At the time, BI only issued SBIs in one and three-month durations and had no shorter-term instruments. Despite technical advice to the contrary, BI chose to use the one-month rate as its benchmark rather than launch new one-week or 14-day SBIs partly due to familiarity of market participants with the one-month instrument and partly due to concerns about high volatility in the overnight interbank rate. ¶3. (SBI) Meanwhile, BI has maintained its overnight facility (known by its Indonesian acronym FASBI) at about 500 basis points below the one-month SBI rate since late ¶2005. The FASBI rate has set the floor for the overnight inter-bank market. Market participants argued that this arrangement created an incentive for a ?domestic carry trade? whereby banks borrowed on the short-term interbank market to buy one-month SBIs due to the wide spread between the two rates. The ease of making money in risk- free SBIs under this strategy did not help increase incentives of banks to lend more to the real economy. ¶4. (SBU) However, the buildup of large holdings of SBIs in many banks proved politically uncomfortable for BI, since it faces political pressure from many quarters to encourage Indonesia?s commercial banks to increase lending, according to both market participants and BI officials. When auctions for one-month SBIs began to face large demands from the highly liquid bank sector, BI officials in charge of implementing monetary policy began to ration issuances. Allocations for auction participants were running around 10-25% of indicated interest, leading to an escalation of indications and even more restrictive rationing, according to a Citigroup analyst. In the March 21 SBI auction, however, BI changed course and decided to accept 62.4% of indicated interest, sending banks scrambling to find funds to pay for their allocations. This sent the overnight interbank rates up to 20% from their previous level of around 4.25%. ¶5. (SBU) The rationing of one-month SBIs also led to higher than necessary one-month interest rates, and created a temporary ?hump? in the Indonesian yield curve whereby one-month rates were higher than three-month rates. The higher one-month rate has short-lived but real effects on the economy because lending in Indonesia JAKARTA 00001128 002 OF 004 usually prices off a spread to one-month SBI rates. -------------- Table 1: SBI Rates (%) -------------- 1-month SBI 3-month SBI -------------- April 2006 12.75 12.64 May 2006 12.50 June 2006 12.50 July 2006 12.25 12.15 August 2006 11.75 September 2006 11.25 October 2006 10.75 11.36 November 2006 10.25 December 2006 9.75 January 2007 9.50 9.50 February 2007 9.25 March 2007 9.00 April 2007 9.00 8.10 Source: Bank Indonesia -------------- Table 2: Benchmark Government Securities -------------- Term to Maturity Seri Yield Coupon -------------- 5 years FR0023 9.16 11.00 7 years FR0026 9.45 11.00 10 years FR0028 9.82 10.00 15 years FR0043 10.36 10.25 20 years FR0042 10.46 10.25 Source: Surabaya Stock Exchange Impact on Overnight Rates -------------- ¶6. (SBU) As a result of episodes like this, market participants and BI acknowledge that the effective one- month interest rate is not the one-month SBI, but rather a weighted average of the allocation bankers receive in the SBI and the rest of the funds they are forced to put into the overnight market. Market participants argued that it would improve transparency for BI to move to actually targeting the overnight rate (rather than rationing one-month issuances). ¶7. (SBU) Many market participants believe that the switch to overnight targeting would cause overnight rates to rise by more than the one-month rate would fall. Fixed income analysts believed that the overnight rate should reflect a real rate of around 0%, and so would likely rise by at least 300 bps to around 6.5 to 7.0% based on inflation expectations of 6.0 to 6.5%. One-month SBI rates would probably fall by less than this, they argued. These analysts were not concerned about BI creating confusion in the market by raising overnight rates. (Note: BI?s official prediction is for interest rates to fall over the course of 2007 as the inflation impacts of the October 2005 oil price increase continue to dissipate.) However, both market participants and BI officials noted that BI will need to properly communicate the policy shift to the market to avoid adverse impacts on the real economy or damage to BI?s policy credibility. ¶8. (SBU) Concerns over the implication of the shift have led BI officials to warn U.S. Treasury officials in Washington and in Jakarta that they are ?still studying? the switch from one-month to overnight rate targeting. One BI official noted that the market participants may be a little more ?forward leaning? than the BI team right now, and may have misinterpreted their consultations with the market on the topic. While BI officials now are generally persuaded by research showing that shorter term JAKARTA 00001128 003 OF 004 policy rates are more effective tools for inflation targeting, they remain concerned about possible misperceptions in the market of raising rates and want to make sure that the bank implements the transition at an appropriate time when the overnight market is less volatile. First T-Bill Auction Postponed -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The Ministry of Finance was planning to launch its new T-bill products with auctions for 9-month T-bills beginning April 4, but postponed the launch until April 24 or later. The MOF plans to auction the T-bills through its new primary dealer network of 18 banks and securities companies (ref A). The new primary dealers participated in their first government bond auction on March 20 without any glitches. According to officials, as the T-bill market develops, BI will begin to replace SBIs with T-bills as its instrument of choice for open market operations. ¶10. (SBU) T-Bills are typically issued at a discount and mature at par, requiring the GOI to sort out tax and accounting treatment, i.e. whether the ?capital appreciation? or ?interest? will be subject to taxation. The GOI first announced in January it would issue T-bills on April 3, July 10 and December 4, 2007. At first analysts believed the T-Bill auctions for all of 2007 would not exceed Rp 3 trillion ($330 million). For a variety of reasons including market development and budgetary demand, however, the MOF has decided to increase the size and frequency of the auctions. The goal is now to eventually offer regularly scheduled monthly T-Bill auctions, a goal a MOF debt advisor believes is realistic and achievable. The MOF now targets its first T-Bill auction for April 24. ¶11. (SBU) Both market participants and officials believe the eventual switch to T-bills will be economically and politically beneficial as banks will have to put excess liquidity in an instrument funding the government, rather than parking it at BI in the form of SBIs. In this way, the GOI can channel banks? excess funds back into the real economy through its fiscal policy. A smaller amount of outstanding SBIs also would make the central bank less of a target of Parliamentary and senior GOI officials, including Vice President Kalla, who have criticized BI for ?letting? banks invest in risk-free SBIs rather than lending to real economy. This criticism partially explains BI?s efforts to urge local and foreign banks to substantially accelerate their lending growth. Direct Central Bank Financing of the GOI Budget? -------------- --- ¶12. (SBU) One controversial part of the switch from SBIs to T-bills is an agreement between BI and MoF that BI will be able to purchase up to 50% of each auction on a ?non-competitive basis.? Under this arrangement, the private sector participants will set the interest rate in the auctions first. Then BI will be able to purchase bills worth up to a maximum of 50% of the total auction amount issued at that same market-determined rate. One problem is that the BI Law (Law 23/1999) stipulates clearly that BI may only buy bonds in the secondary market. It is unclear what kind of compromise arrangement will be made to get around this requirement. There is also the possibility that BI could print money to buy government debt and lead to irresponsible economic policy if abused in the future. However, the fact that BI maintains the prerogative to buy or not to buy T-bills may help mitigate this risk. ¶13. (SBU) One BI official suggested this deal was a temporary measure to ensure that BI could more quickly JAKARTA 00001128 004 OF 004 build a sufficient stock of the new T-bill to conduct monetary interventions such as open market operations and repo facilities. However, the same official argued that it would be inappropriate to put a specific expiration date on the deal as BI?s needs for monetary instruments will in part be a function of the outcomes of those auctions and other macro-economic events and trends. BI?s outstanding stock of SBIs stood at Rp 235 trillion ($25.8 billion) in January 2007, and weekly SBI issuances are currently approximately eight times larger than the originally planned 2007 T-Bill auction target of Rp 3 trillion ($330 million). It will thus take many months or even years for T-Bills to replace SBIs as Indonesia?s prime monetary policy instrument unless the MOF dramatically increases the size of T-Bill auctions. Comment -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The success of the MOF?s government bond market development program is encouraging and the shift to T- bills from SBIs is a step in the right direction for better transparency and the development of a government yield curve. It may also help to reduce political pressure on monetary and bank supervision policies. However, BI purchases of government paper could set a dangerous precedent for undue influence of the government on the central bank, especially in light of the reluctance among senior BI officials to resist political pressure to encourage faster bank lending. Improving communication strategies at BI also will be important to limit any adverse impact on the real economy from the shift from one-month to overnight rate targeting. ¶15. (U) Treasury Regional Attache in Singapore Susan Baker drafted this message. HEFFERN