CHARGE URGES SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI KOSOVO PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001098 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK IR YI ID SUBJECT: CHARGE URGES SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI KOSOVO PLAN REF: A. SEOUL 1079 (NOTAL) ¶B. STATE 48180 ¶C. JAKARTA 673 ¶D. JAKARTA 930 ¶E. JAKARTA 1067 Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge d'affaires. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On April 18, a key Department of Foreign Affairs interlocutor articulated a more nuanced position on Kosovo, which we interpret as an indication that Jakarta might be looking for a way to support a UNSC Resolution based on the Ahtisaari plan. While reiterating that Indonesia opposes an independent Kosovo mandated by the UNSC over Serbian objections, he proposed instead a negotiated process that includes both a UNSC resolution and an offer of EU membership for both Serbia and an Independent Kosovo. Foreign Minister Wirajuda has suggested this approach in general terms to EU High Representative Solana and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, but received no EU response. This proposal will likely be a key part of President Yudhoyono's presentation when he meets Ahtisaari here on April 23. On a separate issue, Percaya explained the GOI's domestic outreach efforts to explain its controversial UNSC vote in favor of UNSCR 1747 on the Iranian nuclear program. End summary. ¶2. (C) Following up on Assistant Secretary Hill's call to Secretary General Cotan (ref A),Charge met April 18 with SIPDIS Desra Percaya, Director for International Security Affairs at Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs, to urge that the GOI support in the UNSC Special Envoy Ahtisaari's plan for supervised independence for Kosovo (ref B). ¶3. (C) Percaya said the GOI still has no firm position on the Ahtisaari Plan and that DG for Europe and America Eddy Haryadhi's March 1 stated opposition to Kosovo independence (Ref C) was "premature." He noted that Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda had recently discussed Kosovo with German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and EU High Representative Javier Solana. In addition, the GOI was now preparing for an expected April 23 meeting between President Yudhoyono and Ahtissari, as well as a visit by a high level (Muslim) Serbian special envoy. ¶4. (C) In preparation for these upcoming meetings, Indonesia has developed a position based on the following four points: -- While the GOI remains committed to the international legal principle on the territorial integrity of recognized states, it also recognizes that Kosovo is a special case. Kosovo is part of the unfinished process of stabilization of the Balkans region following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia into new states. -- Imposition of Kosovo's independence on Serbia could lead to a reaction in Belgrade that would increase tension and violence, including in the Serb portion of Bosnia. Over the longer term, such an imposed solution would create a precedent that would encourage separatist movements elsewhere in the world. -- The prospect of a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo also creates the potential for conflict. Jakarta is concerned that Kosovars might take this action if the Ahtissari plan stalls or is defeated by a Russian veto. Such Serbia-Kosovo conflict could play into Indonesian domestic politics, with nationalist politicians supporting Serbia and Muslims supporting Kosovo. -- The GOI continues, therefore, to look for a solution agreed by both Serbia and Kosovo. The GOI believes a key component of such a solution would be a process leading to EU membership for both states. (NOTE: This is apparently the "process" Secretary General Cotan was referring to in his conversation with A/S Hill.) The discussion should be shifted in this direction, Percaya said, and a more gradual approach should be taken. ¶5. (C) Charge welcomed the serious GOI attention to the issue, but countered that we agree with Ahtissari's assessment that more negotiations postponing independence only increases the potential for conflict. If there were to be a "process" leading to EU membership, it should follow adoption of the UNSC resolution, not precede the resolution. Percaya took the point on timing, but repeated that they envisioned that the "process" would precede the resolution. ¶6. (C) Noting Martti Ahtisaari's April 23 visit, Percaya said Aceh was on the formal agenda, but he was sure Kosovo would also be discussed. He said that in addition to approaches from A/S Hill, Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and High Representative Solana, the Foreign Ministry had also received embassy-level demarches on Kosovo from the U.K.(together with France and Belgium) and Russia. Percaya said that Russia and China both oppose independence for Kosovo, although the Chinese were not as outspoken as the Russians on the matter. Continuing Fallout On Iran UNSCR -------------- ¶7. (C) Percaya said that the Foreign Ministry was reaching out to Muslim groups, students, and youth groups in an effort to counter continuing domestic backlash over Indonesia's vote in favor of UNSCR 1747 (ref D). Percaya said that he had recently traveled to Bandung, Jogjakarta, Surabaya, and Lombok to explain the matter. He had given presentations together with an Indonesian physicist who had explained the exact nature of Iran's violations of IAEA protocols and its obligations under the NPT. He said the Department's outreach seemed to be having a effect, noting that a poll in Tempo magazine showed that 63 percent of respondents supported the GOI's decision. (Note: we have met very few Indonesians who support Indonesia's favorable Iran vote.) ¶8. (C) Charge said in his calls on leaders of the Muslim mass organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (ref E),he had made our case for the resolution, noting that it puts peaceful pressure on Iran to return to negotiations and sticks to the facts of Iran's non-compliance with IAEA and NPT obligations, without speculating about Tehran's ultimate intentions. ¶9. (C) Percaya added that DEPLU had convoked the Iranian Ambassador to complain about his agitation about the nuclear issue with Indonesian domestic groups. The Ambassador had been recalled to Tehran following the meeting for unknown reasons, Percaya said. ¶10. (C) Percaya urged that in the sixty-day timeframe contained in the UNSCR, Iran be permitted to "study" the resolution. He urged us not to "bilateralize" the issue or to conduct "provocative" military exercises during this time. Charge replied Iran's past behavior does not give much cause for optimism, and that UNSC members should consult in New York and elsewhere on next steps should these become necessary. HEFFERN