UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001076 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR U/S BURNS FROM JOHN HEFFERN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK KFLU TBIO YI ID SUBJECT: UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES REF: A. STATE 49723 ¶B. JAKARTA 994 ¶C. JAKARTA 930 ¶D. JAKARTA 673 Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge d'affaires. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In response to Under Secretary Burns' request (ref A),I recommend that the Secretary, and even the President if necessary, contact their Indonesian counterparts to urge support for the Kosovo resolution. I have pressed the case with a former Foreign Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament, the President's foreign policy advisor, and a key think tanker. On April 18, I will meet with key Foreign Ministry official Desra Percaya, but these steps are insufficient. UNSC votes have become unhelpfully politicized in Indonesia's domestic context, and President Yudhoyono will want to avoid the appearance of caving to U.S. pressure. The factors most likely to sway the GOI in favor of Kosovo independence would be a P-5 consensus on the resolution, vocal support from other Muslim countries, and a strong and effective case for the plan by Matti Ahtisaari, who will meet with President Yudhoyono on April 23. End summary. ¶2. (C) We have seen no evolution in recent days on Indonesia's position on Kosovo (refs B - D). President Yudhoyono (SBY) is still contending with political fallout from Indonesia's vote in favor of UNSCR 1747; a parliamentary petition to interpellate SBY on this matter has reportedly gathered 300 signatures. While the Indonesian House of Representatives has little real authority in foreign affairs, its reactions to the Burma and Iran resolutions show that SBY's decisions carry a domestic political cost. Accordingly, SBY will be extremely reluctant to commit to supporting Kosovo independence. Even before the uproar over the Iran vote (ref C),Foreign Ministry officials indicated clearly and consistently that longstanding doctrinal concerns about territorial integrity and separatism predispose the GOI to oppose Kosovar independence over Belgrade's objections (ref D). ¶3. (C) On April 16, I raised Kosovo with Speaker Laksono and other parliamentarians, and received blank stares and shrugs in response. They had no knowledge of the issue. An influential Indonesian who made informal soundings on our behalf confirmed that the legislature and others who had strong views on Iran and Burma are not cognizant of Kosovo. He therefore recommended that the less the issue is publicized locally, the better our chances of persuading the GOI to join us. Nonetheless, the issue will be tough since the GOI will not want to open itself to criticism by nationalists for violating sacrosanct principles against separatism, which are ingrained in Indonesian foreign policy thinking. Ahtisaari Visit -------------- ¶4. (C) I have just learned that Special Representative Ahtisaari will meet President Yudhoyono on April 23. This is crucial. Ahtisaari is respected in Indonesia for his efforts in brokering the Aceh accord. SBY foreign policy advisor Dino Djalal told me today that SBY had no firm position on the issue. He said that the only consideration that might trump Indonesia's commitment to "territorial integrity" is war and peace. If Ahtisaari can convince the President that his plan has a better chance of bringing long-term peace to the Balkans than any alternative, then SBY might be convinced to support it. ¶5. (C) Another decisive factor in getting the Indonesians to vote "yes" would be a clear signal from Russia and China that they will support the resolution. In the absence of a P-5 consensus, we are certain that the best we can hope for is Indonesia's abstention. Calls from the Secretary and the President call to their Indonesian counterparts will be crucial to make the case for the Kosovo resolution. Call from Secretary Rice -------------- ¶6. (C) In her call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda, Secretary Rice should allay concerns that the Kosovo resolution creates a precedent for increased U.N. meddling in the internal affairs of its member states. Indonesia bitterly recalls the U.N.'s role in securing East Timor's independence, and is aware of calls from by NGOs and some foreign legislators for the U.N. to mediate between Jakarta and indigenous separatists in Papua province. The Secretary should stress the specificity of the Kosovo case, and explain that the unique history of the Balkans, including many years of Security Council involvement, means that the case of Kosovo does not constitute a precedent for U.N. involvement in Papua or any other part of Indonesia, and that the Ahtisaari plan is the best hope for peace. ¶7. (C) The Secretary should also be prepared to counter arguments that the U.S. is creating an artificial sense of urgency about this issue. We have heard some complaints that while the U.S. is seized of the Kosovo question, there has been little progress in moving the Mideast Peace Process. It would also be helpful if the Secretary could report any progress in securing support for Kosovo independence from Russia, China, or other Muslim states, especially fellow UNSC member Qatar. Call From POTUS -------------- ¶8. (C) The President should also telephone President Yudhoyono to raise Kosovo and other issues. In planning the call, we should be aware that SBY has faced criticism that he is overly deferential to the U.S. This means that the discussion should not consist solely of a full-court press on Kosovo, and that we should not expect SBY to clearly voice his position in the course of the conversation. We believe that the President should make the case for Kosovo independence in general terms, which should be sufficient to impress upon Yudhoyono the importance of the issue to us. ¶9. (C) Another topic the President could usefully raise during the call would be the sharing of samples of the avian influenza (AI) virus. Indonesia leads the world in reported human AI cases, but stopped sharing AI samples with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in December 2006 out of pique over the apparent development of commercial AI vaccines from Indonesian samples. After a series of negotiations with the World Health Organization (WHO), Indonesia won much praise when Minister of Health Fadillah Supari announced at a March 28 meeting in Jakarta that it would immediately resume sample sharing. However, almost three weeks have passed since that pledge, and no samples have left Indonesia, despite continuing human AI cases. It is unclear whether Indonesia intends to drag the issue into next month's World Health Assembly, or whether bureaucratic ineptitude is holding up sample sharing. A mention to SBY of the significant potential damage to Indonesia's public health interests, and reputation, from continuing to boycott the world influenza surveillance system could be extremely helpful. HEFFERN