ALWI SHIHAB DISCUSSES IRAQ, UNSC ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001074 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC YI IZ IR ID SUBJECT: ALWI SHIHAB DISCUSSES IRAQ, UNSC ISSUES REF: A. JAKARTA 993 (RELIGIOUS LEADERS MEET IN BOGOR) ¶B. STATE 48180 (BRINGING INDONESIA ALONG ON KOSOVO) ¶C. JAKARTA 930 (FORMIN WIRAJUDA GRILLED) Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge d'affaires. Reason: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In an April 13 meeting with the Charge, Indonesian Special Envoy to the Mideast Alwi Shihab outlined the GOI's efforts to promote reconciliation among Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. Following the Bogor reconciliation conference earlier this month (reftel A),Shihab said that GOI figures would travel to the region to promote reconciliation. He acknowledged that U.S. input on this was crucial, and stressed that the GOI recognized the U.S. could not withdraw its troops from Iraq unless a settlement among the parties were in place. Shihab said that President Yudhoyono was still dealing with political fallout over Indonesia's vote for UNSCR 1747 on Iran's nuclear program. He noted that President Ahmadinejad was extremely inflexible, and said that the U.S. might not make any headway with Iran until he had left office. End summary Indonesia Promotes Iraqi Reconciliation -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an April 13 meeting with Charge, Indonesian Special Envoy to the Middle East (and former Foreign Minister) Alwi Shihab offered further insight into the April 3 - 4 Bogor conference on bridging the Sunni-Shia division (ref A). He said that the debate had been very harsh, and that the organizers had worked hard to tone down the final statement. Shihab said that Iraq's local Charge had attended, but had not spoken because he did "not consider himself a scholar." Instead, he had at times approached Shihab to complain about extreme and unfair statements made by some participants. ¶3. (SBU) Shihab stressed that the conference outcome was consistent with Indonesia's approach to the Iraq problem to date, which is to focus on reconciliation. President Yudhoyono will continue to pursue this, he said, because not engaging on the Iraq question would carry a significant domestic political cost. Indonesia, he said, has credibility in this area because it has no stake in territorial disputes or oil issues. After the Bogor conference, Shihab said, the next step is to travel to the region to continue to promote reconciliation. ¶4. (SBU) Shihab said that he valued U.S. input in this process, and that while Indonesia hopes for the U.S. to be able withdraw its troops from Iraq, it recognizes that it cannot do so unless a settlement between the country's factions is in place. This assumption, he said, he was implicit behind President Yudhoyono's three-track approach announced during his summit with President Bush in Bogor last November. ¶5. (SBU) Shihab said that the GOI was also reviewing the question of debt forgiveness for Iraq. He personally believed that the matter could be resolved through a barter arrangement of some kind. Tough UNSC Votes On Iran, Kosovo -------------- ¶6. (C) Charge asked about political fallout from Indonesia's UNSC vote on Iran, and how this might impact Indonesia's position on upcoming UNSC action on Kosovo (refs B, C). Shihab said that President Yudhoyono was now in "a bad mood" over the Iran issue, and that a Parliamentary petition to interpellate the President had now gathered 300 signatures. He noted that Indonesia has a pending deal for Iranian fertilizer and was concerned that this might be affected by the U.N. sanctions. He asked the Charge for clarification, saying that banks involved might pull out otherwise. ¶7. (C) Charge said that the U.S. had supported a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear program for many months, including offering incentives, but the Iranians had remained inflexible. He urged that the GOI repeat publicly its opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons in statemenst supporting peaceful nuclear energy for Iran. Shihab observed that the U.S. might not make any progress on relations with Iran until President Ahmadinejad left office. He said he had warned the Iranian Foreign Minister that Ahmadinejad should tone down his rhetoric on the sanctions issue, and that the U.S. "wasn't messing around." JAKARTA 00001074 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Shihab said that he did not have a sense for how the GOI's experience with the Iran vote would affect its position on Kosovo. Drawing on ref C, Charge made the case for supporting Ahtisaari's recommendations. Shihab did not comment HEFFERN