YARGITAY'S RULING ON ECUMENICITY: WHAT DOES IT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000638 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU SUBJECT: YARGITAY'S RULING ON ECUMENICITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE PATRIARCHATE? REF: A. ISTANBUL 0550 ¶B. ISTANBUL 0607 ¶C. 06 ISTANBUL 0524 Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ecumenical Patriarchate attorney Kezban Hatemi and Ecumenical Patriarch senior advisor Metropolitan Meliton, separately, gave us very different assessments of the implications of the Turkish Higher Court of Appeals' (Yargitay) recent rejection of the ecumenicity of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. Hatemi expected the decree would not affect future legal or political decisions related to the patriarchate, while Meliton contended the ruling would be used to justify the government's intransigence. Though analysts continue to study the court's decision, its ultimate impact on the patriarchate will largely depend on the intentions of the post-July 22 government. End summary. -------------- -------------- ONE ATTORNEY'S PERSPECTIVE: DECISION IS IRRELEVANT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ecumenical Patriarchate attorney Kezban Hatemi expressed to us on July 12 her opinion that the Yargitay's June 26 rejection of the ecumenicity of the Greek Orthodox patriarch was just another in a string of "strange" rulings by that court which only serve to polarize the judiciary. Hatemi recounted the judicial proceedings associated with the case (ref A) and dismissed the ecumenicity rejection as the court's irrelevant attempt to placate those upset that the Yargitay upheld a lower court ruling to acquit the patriarchate defendants on charges of obstructing the religious freedom of a Bulgarian Orthodox priest. Ironically, she agreed in part with the Yargitay's rejection, noting that there is no legal basis for the ecumenicity of the Patriarch -- only a spiritual one. "In a truly secular society," Hatemi asserted, "the law would not be involved." The patriarchate has long argued that it is not seeking the government's recognition of its ecumenicity. At the same time, it is not the government's place to say that the patriarchate is not ecumenical, she said. ¶3. (C) Despite ultra-nationalist attorney Kemal Kerencsiz's unsuccessful attempt to block the July 7-10 Holy Synod meeting because it included non-Turkish members (ref B), Hatemi doubted the government would interpret the Yargitay's ecumenicity rejection as a precedent to be used against the patriarchate (e.g., in such matters as the re-opening of Halki Seminary or the inclusion of non-Turkish voters and/or candidates in the election of the Patriarch). Nevertheless, she was considering filing a complaint in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against the Yargitay for "putting pressure on the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate." ¶4. (C) Hatemi praised the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Istanbul Governor for being tolerant and helpful, pointing out that Kerencsiz's application to the Governor to stop the Synod meeting had had the opposite of the effect intended. The Governor facilitated the meeting by providing six body guards for each member, she said. Hatemi recalled that PM Erdogan and the Ministry of Education made positive statements two years ago regarding the possibility of re-opening Halki Seminary. She noted that Justice and Development Party (AKP) member and incumbent Istanbul MP Egemen Bagis asked Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for the Greek Orthodox community's support during the upcoming elections. Bartholomew agreed, remarked Hatemi, but stressed that if Bagis doesn't do anything to assist the patriarchate, the community will ask why. -------------- METROPOLITAN MELITON: AN OMINOUS RULING -------------- ¶5. (C) In a separate July 12 meeting, Ecumenical Patriarch senior advisor Metropolitan Meliton expressed his appreciation for the Consul General's July 5 visit to the Istanbul Governor in which she reiterated the USG's and American people's interest in the concerns of the patriarchate. He bemoaned the Yargitay's unexpected pronouncement, noting that it represented the first time in the Republic's 84-year history that a court had ruled on the legal status of the ecumenicity of the patriarchate. He expressed particular concern that the Yargitay had interpreted an Istanbul Governorship document dated December ISTANBUL 00000638 002 OF 002 6, 1923, stating that "the people who will participate in the religious and clerical elections in the patriarchate and who will be elected should be Turkish citizens and to (sic) be in charge in Turkey at the time of the election" as legally binding. (Note: An excerpt of the Yargitay's decision applying to the ecumenicity of the patriarchate will be reported septel. End note.) ¶6. (C) Meliton dismissed Hatemi's assessment as overly optimistic and stated lawyers in Ankara warned him that all courts will use the Yargitay's decision as a precedent and, more importantly, politicians will use the ruling as a way to say "no" to future patriarchate requests. He posited that the case was a calculated attempt by the "deep state" to retaliate against a June 12 ECHR decision to agree to hear the critical Buyukada Orphanage case (ref C). Meliton considered the timing of the Yargitay's ruling, which was officially made the day after the ECHR decision (but not announced until June 26),suspicious. Furthermore, he believed the ecumenicity rejection was strategically incorporated into a decision in favor of the patriarchate so that the latter would have no recourse to appeal the decision to the ECHR. -------------- WHAT THE GOVERNOR DID AND DIDN'T DO... -------------- ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, patriarchate representative Paul Gikas confirmed the patriarchate had previously mis-reported that the Istanbul Governor rejected, in a televised appearance, a patriarchate request to approve work permits for foreign staff (ref B). According to Gikas, the report was due to an internal miscommunication; the Governor has actually not yet responded to the letter the patriarchate sent two months ago, making the request. Gikas also affirmed Hatemi's account of the Governor providing extra security for Holy Synod members during their July 7-10 meeting. ¶8. (SBU) Separately, press widely reported this week on the cancellation of a patriachate-sponsored concert by Greek artist George Dalaras on July 14. According to an embargoed copy of a press statement the patriarchate had yet to release as of July 17, the Istanbul Governor's Security Directorate cancelled the concert at the last minute, claiming it had not been informed about the concert within the necessary timeframe. The patriarchate asserted it had obtained approval to hold the concert as part of the 2nd Orthodox Youth Conference from the Istanbul Governor's City Culture and Tourism Directorate on May 28. Some press reports surmised the decision to cancel the concert may have been linked to a statement Dalaras made six months ago during a Greek television interview, "if Cyprus cannot be Greek, then I'm not setting foot in Turkey." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Comment. Though Meliton takes a consistently pessimistic view on all developments affecting the patriarchate, Hatemi's dismissal of the possible negative implications of the Yargitay's ruling seems overly optimistic. While analysts continue to assess the court's decision, Kerencsiz's attempt to block the Holy Synod meeting is an example of the types of challenges the patriarchate can expect to face in the future: a report in today's edition of Hurriyet claimed that one of the litigants in the case associated with the Yargitay's ruling has filed a complaint with the Beyoglu Chief Public Prosecutor against Bartholomew for continuing to use the ecumenical title. How these challenges play out largely depends on the "tolerance" of the post-July 22 government. We will follow up with the Istanbul Deputy Governor for minority affairs to gain insight into the government's initial interpretation of the ruling. End comment. OUDKIRK