FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DAVUTOGLU'S MEETING WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000346 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2022 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IZ XF SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DAVUTOGLU'S MEETING WITH IRAQ COORDINATOR SATTERFIELD Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Senior Advisor and Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield met with Prime Minister Erdogan,s senior foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu on Saturday, April 21, 2007, to discuss U.S. and Turkish policy toward Iraq and related issues. Ambassador Oguz Celikkol, special representative for Iraq and Istanbul CG Deborah Jones joined the meeting. Davutoglu commented on the challenges Turkey faced as Iraq,s neighbor, including issues related to bilateral and regional dialogue, the PKK and Kirkuk. End Summary. PM MALIKI AND THE NEIGHBOR'S CONFERENCE -------------- ¶2. (S) At the outset, Davutoglu said that Iran was playing an unhelpful role in Iraq and elsewhere in the region; Saudi Arabia had also taken positions that made finding a resolution to Iraq,s problems more difficult. The Saudis had no representation in and did not travel to Baghdad; King Abdullah is harshly critical of Prime Minister Maliki and sees Iraq through the prism of Sunni-Shia sectarian differences. For its part, Iran was not cooperating - including with Turkey - in working toward solutions. Turkey, Davutoglu underscored, understood the importance of a meaningful neighbors process, whether in Baghdad or elsewhere, as vital for the region. ¶3. (S) Davutoglu reflected upon PM Maliki,s shortcomings as a critical factor in delaying progress in Iraq. Davutoglu complained that Maliki never consults with Turkey; that had to change. Maliki,s attitude toward neighboring countries is terrible. Emotional and reactive, Maliki was not good in crisis management. He lacks consistency and open-mindedness. By contrast, Davutoglu asserted, VP Adel Abd al-Mehdi was a much more impressive leader. Davutoglu also praised former PM Jaafari (whom the GOT had considered inviting to Ankara, until dissuaded by Satterfield in earlier meetings - see septel). Satterfield took issue with Davutoglu,s characterizations, noting that Jaafari was pleasant but wholly ineffective and closed to meaningful reconciliation efforts. Maliki could be a difficult and often frustrating interlocutor, but the U.S. has seen that he was capable of growth as a national leader. Davutoglu said "someone of vision" was needed as PM; Turkey is a friend, but Maliki must be willing to engage and show signs of positive progress towards friends in the region. ¶4. (S) Davutoglu said the prime example of Maliki,s poor judgment and/or inexperience was his decision and handling of the location and timing of the neighbors, conference. Turkey,s efforts for such a meeting extended back to January 2003, before the war when the Turks had worked hard to hammer out a communique that remains valid today with the security of Baghdad its vital element. The problem of holding the meeting in Egypt was not one of pride but of confidence. Iraq,s prime minister had demonstrated an absence of commitment. After all of Turkey,s work, the plan had blown up in one aggravating weekend. Expecting a call from Secretary Rice, Foreign Minister Gul had instead heard from SIPDIS Zebari who told him he had decided the meeting would be held in Cairo at a time, May 3-4, extremely inopportune for Turkey given its own presidential politics. Iraqi President Barzani coincidently (it seemed at the time) had made menacing remarks regarding the PKK, making reference to Turkey,s own southeastern city of Diyarbakir. Maliki,s evident absence of commitment "frightens" Turkey, Davutoglu said. Other regional countries would take advantage of this flaw, he said. Iraqis needed a lesson in governance and diplomacy. Only a positive attitude on Maliki,s part will be helpful. Satterfield acknowledged the difficulties in the situation, but underscored that Maliki was the democratically chosen PM and the U.S. gave him its full support to pursue a national agenda. ¶5. (S) Satterfield noted that the goal of the current surge in Baghdad was to provide security in order to give space for political reconciliation to advance. The question is whether the process would unfold rapidly enough. Lacking visible progress, the patience of the American people clearly was limited. The Administration strongly opposed the setting of any timeline for U.S. force presence or rigid benchmarks that limited our ability to provide needed military or civilian assistance. What was needed was visible, concrete, progress on the ground. The U.S., including the direct engagement of the President with Maliki, was doing all it could to press all sides toward political reconciliation and execution by the Iraqi government of a truly national agenda. Knowing that time was limited, the U.S. was working to force the pace. ¶6. (S) Satterfield acknowledged the duality inherent in the ISTANBUL 00000346 002 OF 003 Iraqi Shia leadership worldview. While historic (and Saddam-era in particular) relations with Iran were close for many Shia political figures - although significantly less so for Maliki - these same leaders were concerned at Iran,s aggressive political agenda in Iraq and wanted to maintain their independence of action. None, including SCIRI leader Hakim, really wished to be left alone by the U.S. with Iran. Davutoglu noted that Iraqi Shia were different from other Iraqis in that they never revolted against Ottoman Turkey, despite British inducements "to collaborators" in the First World War. Turkey, he said, had "given" Mosul of its own grace and volition to Iraq and had "never been militarily defeated or compelled" to do so. Satterfield encouraged the GOT to reach out to Iraq,s Shia leadership and Maliki in particular to help move them to a more positive position. The U.S. had found that consulting with Maliki on the sensitive issue of outreach to the Sunni insurgency had been helpful in assuring Maliki that there was no conspiracy to restore the Ba,ath or Sunni rule. In this regard, Satterfield underscored Maliki,s very negative reaction to unilateral and "surprise" GOT and Turkish NGO invitations to Sunni figures. Prior consultation and explanation on the nature of the contacts or the lack of GOT association with those sponsoring such meetings would go far to build a relationship of trust with Maliki and the Shia leadership. ¶7. (S) While Maliki, coming from the introverted world of Dawa "dishasha" politics, could be very reactive and suspicious, he had shown the capacity for genuine growth as a national leader. He listens and responds. In his relative independence from Iran and lack of association with a party militia he is more able to move on issues such as security measures against all armed elements engaged in violence than other Shia leaders. But it was important, Satterfield noted, to recognize that all/all Shia leaders functioned within certain "Shia" parameters drawn from their sectarian narrative and reinforced by the continuation of Sunni insurgent and al-Qaida violence. NORTHERN IRAQ AND THE PKK -------------- ¶8. (S) Moving to northern Iraq and the PKK, Ambassador Satterfield said that we had pressed KRG President Barzani forcefully to act in a meaningful manner against the PKK. Barzani,s responses had not been encouraging. As General Ralston and other U.S. officials had assured the GOT, we found continuation of the present situation unacceptable. The U.S. did not want Turkey to carry out a cross-border operation - and the Turkish DCHOD had told Satterfield that while this was a military necessity, the decision was entirely up to the political leadership - but we well understood the magnitude of the PKK terror issue in Turkey. The past pattern had been for Barzani to put the issue of the PKK into the "too hard" box, preferring limited Turkish CBO,s to taking action against the PKK himself. In Iraq,s present critical situation such actions would only contribute to greater instability within Iraq and complicate efforts as stabilization and mobilization of needed Kurdish support for the GOI,s reconciliation agenda. ¶9. (S) Davutoglu described Turkey,s encouragement last year following Prime Minister Erdogan,s call to President Bush asking for concrete results in combating the PKK following the death of 20 Turkish soldiers in one weekend. But it had taken two months to even appoint General Ralston as coordinator and still there are no substantial results. It is spring and again the PKK is threatening. Despite this, at a critical meeting of Turkey,s National Security Council on February 23, all sides favored dialogue with Northern Iraq, not a cross-border strike. Shortly thereafter, at the start of the presidential campaign season in Turkey, Barzani,s threatening statements toward Turkey were released, 10 Turkish soldiers lost their lives, retired U.S. General Richard Meyrs had publicly called Northern Iraq and the PKK a low U.S. priority and the neighbors, meeting had been cancelled for Istanbul. Davutoglu described the PKK as an existential threat for Turkey. Neither the government of Turkey nor the Turkish General Staff wants a cross-border operation into Iraq, but there may be no choice. "We cannot take another summer of wait and see with dying soldiers," Davutoglu said. Satterfield pledged continued U.S. efforts with Turkey and the Kurdish leadership toward meaningful steps against PKK terrorism. In this regard, Satterfield pressed Davutoglu (as with other Turkish officials the previous day) both to use KRG PM Nachirvan Barzani as an interlocutor and initiate TGS dialogue with Iraqi Kurdish officials. KIRKUK -------------- ISTANBUL 00000346 003 OF 003 ¶10. (S) On Kirkuk, Satterfield said there were indications that Massoud and Nachirvan Barzani understood the difficulties inherent in pressing for a referendum this year. Acknowledging overarching Kurdish ambitions to increase control south of the Green Line, Satterfield said we perceived a KRG leadership recognition that forcing a confrontation with Turkey, the U.S., or the rest of Iraq over Kirkuk was not in Kurdish interest. Kirkuk was a sovereign Iraqi issue for decision, but the U.S. believed Article 140 implementation should be approached on a consensual basis, with resolution achieved in a manner that would contribute to national reconciliation and unity in Iraq. Moreover, the friends of Iraq, including Turkey, had the right to express their opinions. Responding, Davutoglu said Turkey championed three principles: economic interdependence, cultural codependence and political dialogue - even though political dialogue was lacking in the Middle East. ¶11. (S) City life was important. There should be no "purified" cities. Kirkuk is a symbol, Davutoglu said, of the Middle East with all communities presently represented. Even assuming Kurds get 60% of the vote in the referendum, that would still leave a sizeable dissatisfied minority. This situation would draw Shiites to target Kirkuk and Erbil as well, bringing unrest to the area. Instead, Turkey argued for a safe, secure Kirkuk with all sides represented in a multicultural city. This zone is critical to Iraq. Fighting in Kirkuk would spread to Mosul and elsewhere, Davutoglu argued. After a referendum, Talibani and Barzani would even fight one another. Celikkol noted that the Maliki government had wisely decided to send the decision on approving a referendum for Kirkuk to the Parliament instead of the Council of Ministers. This was intended to slow down the process and was a welcome signal of GOI understanding re the complexities and perils of unilateral action on Kirkuk. TWO REQUESTS OF TURKEY -------------- ¶13. (S) Satterfield closed making two requests of Turkey: debt relief for Iraq (in keeping with Turkey,s own IMF program) and the Foreign Minister,s attendance, even if brief, at the Neighbors ministerial in Sharm. Davutoglu thought debt forgiveness "would not be a great problem." Much more difficult was Foreign Minister Gul's attendance at the Neighbors' meeting. The next week and days were critical for Turkey, continuing until mid-May when the new president would be sworn in. The procedures for selecting the next president were clear, but psychologically, said Davutoglu, it was important for key people to remain in the country. Davutoglu acknowledged Turkey,s importance in the neighbors, process; other countries were asking Turkey what it was going to do. Besides, the meeting is "our baby" but Turkey,s participation would depend on its domestic political situation. "There may be surprises for which we must be present," Davutoglu said. ¶14. (U) Ambassador Satterfield cleared this text. JONES