SECURITY SURVEY: ISTANBUL BASED ECUMENICAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000164 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND DS/IP/EUR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM TU SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY: ISTANBUL BASED ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE REF: ISTANBUL 0162 ¶1. (SBU) Subsequent to reported threats (reftel) against the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates in Istanbul, Ecumenical Patriarchate administrative staffer Paul Gikas contacted us on February 15 to accept Consulate's previous offers to provide security improvement recommendations. In response, Consulate RSO visited the Patriarchate's Fener headquarters on February 20 and submitted the below observations and recommendations. During a follow-up visit on February 28, RSO staff provided security training for Patriarchate employees. -------------- OBSERVATIONS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Approximately five uniformed Turkish National Police were stationed outside the main entrance, which leads to the church, apartments and administrative building. The security staff has noticed additional plainclothes police in the area as well, which may be in response to recent threats against the Patriarch. A police booth located at the East end of the road in front of the facility was unmanned. A private security guard is located at the foot of the steps leading to the main entry gate and controls visitor access. Once through the gate, there is a guard room with an additional person who monitors the security cameras. Currently, there is no screening in place for visitors or bags that enter the facility. The police congregate in booths directly across from the main entrance. The result is that all security personnel, including the Patriarch's, are concentrated in one small area. ¶3. (SBU) The entire compound is surrounded by a significant brick and mortar wall at least 8-10 feet high. In certain sections, housing, not controlled by the Patriarch, abuts the compound and in other areas apartments, built on the higher part of the hill, rise above the wall. In front of those apartments is a small road that runs the length of the Patriarch's back wall. One police booth is on top of the wall and is manned. In 1999, a hand grenade was thrown over the back wall of the facility at night either from the road or an apartment. Protective mesh and wire were installed to keep these objects from entering the compound. With recent renovations, a state of the art camera system was deployed with infrared and video capability. -------------- RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The recommendations made below will require funding and supervision to be successful. The goal is to build concentric rings of security to deter an attack, protect facilities and provide an early warning system for personnel. For example, the facility in effect has one ring of security since all security personnel (TNP and Patriarch) are located at the steps leading up to the main entrance. Once past this group, the only obstacle remaining is the person manning the cameras. Presently, the guards and police have no emergency button or alarm to warn those inside of an attack, nor are there emergency action plans or drills to instruct personnel on how to respond if such an incident were to occur. Establishing concentric rings of security (vehicle access controls, screening procedures, expanding the perimeter, etc) along with emergency planning will make it more difficult for an individual or group to successfully target personnel and the facility. ¶5. (SBU) The RSO's recommendation is to hire a consultant who can write an emergency action plan after surveying the facility. This plan would be for earthquake, attack and emergency response for security and non-security personnel. More importantly, the expert would allow the Patriarchate to tailor its security plan to fit its unique access needs and provide guidance on implementing the recommendations below. The RSO is available to further discuss these recommendations and if requested provide the names of security consultants in Istanbul. ¶6. (SBU) Security Concern: The facility has no screening procedures for visitors or bags. -- Recommendations: Immediately install a walk through metal detector and instruct security personnel to visually check bags and packages of visitors before entering the church courtyard. Mail should also be screened to prevent the introduction of a letter/package bomb into the facility. ISTANBUL 00000164 002 OF 002 -- Long Term: Establish a location and build a screening area with a walk through metal detector, X-ray machine and camera monitors. This location should be enclosed to protect the machinery and big enough to handle the natural flow of visitors. The X-ray machine will not only be able to effectively screen bags it will also be able to screen for explosives in mail deliveries. ¶7. (SBU) Security Concern: Windows do not have Mylar (Shatter Resistant Window Film). -- Recommendation: Immediately install protective Mylar on all glass in the church (where feasible) and in the adjoining offices and apartments. This would include all interior glass. Glass normally placed on top of desk tops should be removed. The US Government has learned that the majority of injuries or deaths resulting from an explosion are from flying glass. Although the glass may leave the window frame, Mylar prevents it from breaking into shards in the event of an explosion or an earthquake. The key is to use a company that knows how to install it. ¶8. (SBU) Security Concern: The offices and church have nominal setback from a vehicle borne improvised explosive (VBIED) attack. Vehicles, which are not screened, can enter the area and stop directly in front of the facility. -- Recommendation: By establishing vehicle controls at the beginning of both entrances to the street, valuable setback will be gained to mitigate the impact of a VBIED. On the East end of the street (currently blocked with a chain) bollards can be installed. These bollards should be secured but also have the capability to be manually removed to allow an alternate means for the Patriarch to vary his routes. On the West end of the street, Guards, a booth, bollards and a delta barrier are needed to control vehicle access. This expanded perimeter would not only increase setback, it would put personnel in a better position to possibly detect surveillance and alert other security personnel and employees of an attack. ¶9. (SBU) Security Concern: Entry doors to the administrative facilities are not a deterrent. Current doors remain open and even if they were locked, the glass could be broken and access gained with minimal delay to attackers. -- Recommendation: Install more substantial security doors on all entrances to further delay any potential attacker who bypasses the other rings of security. Each security door, which may require a new frame, could be outfitted with a Unicam or other type device to facilitate entry during working hours. ¶10. (SBU) Security Concern: Safe Haven for Patriarch/fellow priests and employees. Note: The inside of his office was not visited nor was time available to tour the living quarters for priests or other offices. End Note. -- Recommendation: Install security doors or harden all existing interior doors that lead directly to the Patriarch's Office in order to provide additional security in case attackers breach all lines of defense. If there is an interior bathroom in his office, that can be made into an additional secure location (a safe haven). Other safe havens can be established in other parts of the buildings for employees and priests. An emergency action plan and drills would teach priests and employees on what measures they should take to protect themselves and how to react to alarms. JONES