TURKISH ALEVIS HOPEFUL FOLLOWING ECHR DECISION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001088 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU SUBJECT: TURKISH ALEVIS HOPEFUL FOLLOWING ECHR DECISION ON RELIGIOUS EDUCATION REF: A. ISTANBUL 0015 ¶B. ANKARA 3016 Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Some 15 million Turkish Alevis have reason to be hopeful following an October 9 European Court of Human Rights ruling and press reports that the government may soon propose a plan to address their long-disputed grievances. Prominent Alevi advocate Izettin Dogan recently told us that the Court's decision in favor of an Alevi parent who argued his child should be exempt from mandatory religious courses was "very important." He expressed optimism that the decision would soon lead to favorable results in two other key Alevi cases currently before the Turkish Higher Court of Appeals. How the government responds to the ruling may have implications that go well beyond the Alevi community, testing the boundaries of Turkish secularism by loosening the government's control over religious education. End summary. ECHR Decision -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on October 9 that the Government of Turkey (GOT) had breached the rights -- accorded by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention),of which Turkey is a signatory -- of Alevis Hasan Zengin and his daughter Eylem when it denied Zengin's request to exempt his daughter from compulsory religious courses, which many Alevis claim have a Sunni bias. Specifically, Protocol No. 1 of the Convention (Article 2) provides: "In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions." The Court awarded the Zengin's 3,726.80 Euro in court costs minus 850 Euro already granted in legal aid and in addition -- somewhat ambiguously -- deemed it would be an "appropriate form of compensation" for Turkey to bring its educational system and domestic legislation into conformity with Article 2. ¶3. (SBU) The ECHR based its decision on three important conclusions. First, it determined that Alevism is distinct from the Sunni understanding of Islam and meets the definition of "religious conviction," as required by Article ¶2. GOT officials have long argued that Alevis are Muslims and thus not distinct from Sunnis in a manner that would allow exemption from compulsory religious education courses or eligibility for Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) funding that Sunnis receive to build mosques and pay imam salaries. Secondly, the Court concluded that the compulsory religious courses did not meet Article 2's criteria of objectivity and pluralism. The Court noted that if the courses did meet these criteria, there would be no need for current procedures that allow Jews and Christians to be exempt, pursuant to a 1990 Turkish Supreme Council for Education decision. The Court observed that the current exemption procedures seemed to conflict with the Turkish Constitution, which ensures that "no one shall be compelled...to reveal religious beliefs and convictions." Finally, the Court determined that given the Sunni-oriented curriculum of these courses, there was no appropriate exemption procedure in place to ensure the religious freedom rights of non-Sunni parents. Possible Implications -------------- ¶4. (C) Alevi Cem Foundation Chairman Izettin Dogan told us that the ruling was "very important," though it was not yet clear how the government would respond. The government could attempt to argue it would be complying with the ECHR decision simply by exempting Zengin's (now 17-year old) daughter from having to attend religious courses, he said. He had heard however, that the Education Ministry had already added 10 pages of instruction on Alevism in year 12 -- the final year -- of the religious course curriculum. Though this would be a positive step, it would not go far enough to meet Alevi demands because the Alewite community had not been consulted in developing course materials. ¶5. (C) Dogan was more optimistic about the ruling's effect on two prominent Cem Foundation cases against the government (ref A),including one against the Prime Ministry requesting proportional government funding and one against the Ministry of Education requesting Alevi principles be included in ISTANBUL 00001088 002 OF 002 religious education. He hoped the decision would encourage the Turkish courts to rule in the Foundation's favor, if for nothing else, to avoid the risk of an appeal to the ECHR, which Dogan expected would rule against the GOT. He noted a decision in the case against the Prime Ministry is long overdue according to court regulations and suspects the GOT is trying to pressure the court to delay so the government could argue the issue is being addressed in the new constitution. ¶6. (C) Recent press reports have highlighted ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) plans to reach out to Alevis, including an initiative proposed by AKP MP Reha Camuroglu, himself an Alevi (ref B). Camuroglu's proposal includes, among other goals, establishing a mechanism to build and maintain government-funded cem evis (Alevi places of worship) and reforming the religious course curriculum to include more information on the Alevi faith. According to Dogan, Alevis thus far remain skeptical of AKP overtures. He believed AKP's inclusion of four Alevis (including Camuroglu) on its party list for the July 22 parliamentary election was "only for show." Though the Cem Foundation leader has always had good personal relations with AKP leaders, he suspects they do not want to give in to Alevi demands out of fear that Sunni Turks would adopt the more tolerant Alewite interpretation of Islam. Other skeptical Alevi representatives, especially those who view Alevism as separate from Islam, have publicly argued that the recent AKP proposals are intended to "Sunnify" the diverse Alevi community. ¶7. (C) Comment. The ambiguity of the ECHR decision stating it would be an "appropriate form of compensation" for Turkey to align its education system with Article 2, seems to allow the government some room to maneuver. Camuroglu's proposal suggests the government has taken note and is trying to take matters into its own hands before future potential Court rulings limit its ability to do so. ¶8. (C) Comment continued. Truly complying with Article 2 would involve a solution that extends to Turks of all faiths: one that uses the existing curriculum but grants exemption rights to all who choose, without requiring proof of allegiance to a non-Sunni faith; or one that significantly modifies the religious course curriculum to remove any bias to a single faith. Adopting the latter solution could impact the government's control over religious education by prompting some Sunnis, whose study of their faith in public elementary and secondary schools would be diluted, to seek alternative, private means of religious education. Those who suspect the Islam-rooted AKP of having a "secret agenda" will closely scrutinize any attempts to liberalize age and participation regulations for existing, voluntary, extra-curricular "Koran courses" now closely regulated by the Diyanet. End comment. WIENER