PAKISTAN: CODEL SPECTER MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CODEL SPECTER MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN OF
JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a December 27 meeting with General Tariq
Majid, Pakistan's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Senator Arlen Specter and Representative Patrick Kennedy
stressed the importance of U.S.-Pakistan military
cooperation, support for Pakistan's counter-terrorism
efforts, and the potential impact of recent domestic
political events, especially President Musharraf's November
dismissal of Pakistan's Supreme Court. END SUMMARY.

FINDING BIN LADEN AND COMBATING MILITANTS


2. (C) Specter asked Majid about the status of Pakistan's
efforts to capture Osama bin Laden. Majid replied that
Pakistan continued to focus on locating bin Laden, agreeing
that he could be in the remote Afghanistan-Pakistan border
area. Majid stressed the need for more accurate intelligence
in the hunt for bin Laden, as well as the importance of
integrated U.S.-Pakistan efforts to locate him.


3. (C) Specter said that he understood Pakistan's military
was experiencing increasing difficulty in exerting control
over some of the tribal areas. Majid acknowledged there were
challenges but pointed out there had been many successes as
well. Majid observed that prior to 9/11 these areas had
largely "managed themselves," but since then government
forces had increasingly extended their presence into these
areas, especially the paramilitary Frontier Corps. However,
he added, these forces could not be everywhere and some areas
were virtually inaccessible. The GoP had been steadily
expanding the Frontier Corps and would continue to do so.
Majid also noted that nearly 100,000 troops were supporting
Special Forces efforts in these areas and Pakistan had
increased the number of its border posts from 80-90 to
almost 1,000.


4. (C) The discussion then turned to the deployment and
sustainability of Pakistan's troops. Majid stated that of
190 infantry units, 146 were deployed in "hard" areas, such
as the disputed areas with India, the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas and Baluchistan. Majid acknowledged that
Pakistan found it difficult to sustain these long-term
deployments.

POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF IMET


5. (C) Kennedy praised Pakistan's close military cooperation
with the U.S., a key element in the war on terror. Majid
agreed, noting that he would like to see the relationship
become more broad-based, including participation injoint
training and exercises. Both Kennedy and Majid agreed the
International Military Exchange Training (IMET) program had
proven beneficial to both the U.S. and Pakistan, and served
as a critical tool in building relationships and developing
capacity. Kennedy said he supported expanding the IMET
program with Pakistan and would like to work with Majid to
make this happen.

MAJID DENIES SECURITY ASSISTANCE DIVERTED BY GOP


6. (C) Kennedy raised the issue of the U.S. attaching
conditions to Pakistan's use of some U.S. military
assistance. He stressed that one of the primary purposes of
such conditionality was to ensure the assistance reached the
Pakistan military. Referring to Majid's earlier remarks
regarding sustainability of deployed forces, Kennedy added
that it was critical to ensure Pakistan,s forces received
sufficient resources. Majid, however, dismissed the
suggestion that the central government was not directing all
U.S. assistance to support appropriate military operations.
He insisted that the funding went to support forces in the
field "indirectly.8 He added, referring to the policy the
UN uses to determine compensation for countries contributing
forces to UN operations, that the U.S. should use the UN
approach to improve U.S. CSF utility to compensate people
hurt by collateral damage during operations against
militants, provide compensatory expenses for soldiers,
families, etc.

MAJID URGES PASSING OF ROZ LEGISLATION


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7. (C) Kennedy observed that the struggle against extremists
was not just a military one, but a political one as well.
Majid agreed, saying that military action could only be one
element of a successful strategy in combating militants. He
pointed to the urgent need for improved social infrastructure
and economic opportunities in these areas, adding that the
proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) could prove
very helpful. He expressed his hope that U.S. legislation
authorizing the ROZs would soon be expedited.

PAKISTAN,S NUCLEAR ARSENAL SECURE


8. (C) Specter then raised the issue of the security of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Majid responded that Pakistan
engaged closely and systematically with the U.S. to ensure
effective custodial controls were in place and that the
National Command Authority was firmly in control of all
nuclear weapons. He added that only Pakistan's civilian
leadership had authority to order use of the weapons.


9. (C) Specter asked Majid if, in his opinion, Pakistan and
India could one day create a nuclear weapon-free zone on the
subcontinent. Majid said it was possible and Pakistan had
already "made the offer," but that India would need to take
the first step toward disarmament for Pakistan to follow
suit. Majid speculated, however, that India was unlikely to
do so as it had "a more global outlook" militarily, whereas
Pakistan's primary concern was defense (from India).


10. (C) Specter shared his concerns regarding Iran's
potential development of nuclear weapons and asked what
Pakistan's position would be regarding military options in
addressing the threat, should it arise. Majid indicated that
Pakistan had no problem with Iran developing a nuclear
program for peaceful purposes and would definitely oppose any
military action against Iran, saying that such action would
create dangerous instability in the region.

&IRRITANTS8 TO U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP


11. (C) Majid then asked to make a few remarks about the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship; he described it as excellent, but
noted that occasionally there were some irritants,
including:

-- Official U.S. statements that cast doubts on the sincerity
of Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts;
-- Media reports and commentators who suggest Pakistan's
nuclear weapons are not secure;
-- U.S. government decisions to withhold reimbursements and
to attach conditions, thus suggesting Pakistan is not a
trustworthy partner;
-- Criticisms of Pakistan's internal political decisions

Such comments and actions, Majid concluded, undermined the
relationship and reflected a lack of understanding of
Pakistan.

CODEL RAISES ISSUE OF MUSHARRAF,S ACTION AGAINST COURTS


12. (C) Specter and Kennedy thanked Majid for his frankness,
but pointed out that recent political events in Pakistan,
specifically Musharraf's removal of the Supreme Court and
detention of the Chief Justice, had prompted serious concerns
in the U.S. government regarding Pakistan's commitment to
democratization. Specter also pointed out that, while the
U.S. government sometimes had internal disagreements, they
did not result in dismissal of the Supreme Court.


13. (C) Majid countered that the U.S. Chief Justice was not
engaged in petty political maneuvers and that the U.S. had
taken 200 years to develop its current stable form of
government. Majid also observed that, in addition to
engaging in partisan politics, the Supreme Court had released
dangerous militants for political reasons. Sen. Specter
agreed that such militants should not be at large, but
pointed out that it appeared to many that Musharraf had taken
action primarily to preserve his political power.


14. (C) Majid disagreed with this analysis strenuously,
saying that the judiciary had reduced the government to a
state of paralysis with its politically motivated decisions.

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President Musharraf, he asserted, had been forced to take
action.


15. (C) Majid added that some in the U.S. did not see "the
big picture" in Pakistan, and how seemingly innocuous U.S.
actions could negatively impact Pakistan and its economy,
including security measures for U.S. officials in Pakistan
and the issuance of travel advisories. He said the USG
needed a fuller awareness of the many issues with which
Pakistan was grappling.


16. (U) This cable was drafted after the CODEL departed.

PATTERSON