MUSHARRAF'S LEGACY AND THE RETURN OF THE TROIKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005085



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PK

SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF'S LEGACY AND THE RETURN OF THE TROIKA



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (C) Summary. With his retirement as Chief of Army Staff

(COAS) November 28 and his inauguration November 29 as a

civilian president, Pervez Musharraf begins another chapter

in Pakistan's rocky road to democracy. By ceding control of

Pakistan's strongest institution, Musharraf knows he faces a

decline in both his power and prestige. Although Musharraf

plans to continue influencing policy, he has admitted

publicly that he is returning Pakistan to its traditional

power troika of Army, President and Prime Minister. The Army

appears ready to return to barracks and hopefully now can

concentrate on the battle with extremist militants. Musharraf

continues to align himself as President with the Army side of

this equation. But the balance of power between President

and Prime Minister will depend on the outcome of upcoming

general elections. Although marred by the continuing state

of emergency, the big story here is the institutional one of

a military dictator voluntarily turning over power to

civilian governance. Post's sources indicate Musharraf will

announce November 29 that he will lift the state of emergency

and restore the constitution on December 16, the last day

candidates can withdraw from elections.



2. (C) Pakistanis continually are looking to the USG for

signs of which candidate/party we are supporting and will be

watching to see whether we take seriously Musharraf's

decision to govern as a civilian. We recommend continuing to

stress the "free, fair and transparent elections" message

which is being well-received by the Pakistani people and by

meeting with all Pakistani candidates/parties. End Summary.



The Embattled President

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3. (C) While he still sees himself as Pakistan's savior,

Musharraf today is not the same popular, secure leader who

felt confident enough in 2006 to appear on "The Daily Show"

to sell his auto-biography. To his credit, over eight years

Musharraf provided Pakistan with more than five years of

seven percent economic growth, encouraged women's rights,

increased press freedom, tightened controls over Pakistan's

nuclear weapons, provided extensively bilateral intelligence

cooperation, and forced the Army to change its myopic focus

on India as Pakistan's sole existential threat. In a society

rife with corruption, Musharraf remains personally untainted,

and he deeply believes he is moving Pakistan on a slow but

deliberate path to democracy.



4. (C) When Musharraf made his ill-conceived decision to

fire the former Chief Justice in March, his popularity at

home and abroad was high, and he probably has been bewildered

at how quickly everything has unraveled. In retrospect, it

is clear that economic growth had not filtered down to offset

growing food and rent inflation among the poorer majority.

Musharraf's own reforms had encouraged a critical and freer

press as well as the development of bolder civil society

groups The former Chief Justice's popular rallies tapped a

surprisingly deep well of economic discontent and a broad

sense that the government was not delivering justice/law and

order.



5. (C) Musharraf's personal fixation with the former Chief

Justice distorted his political judgment as he compounded his

initial mistake of firing the Chief Justice with a succession

of bad decisions informed by a narrowing circle of advisors.

Musharraf's delayed action over the Red Mosque operation and

his decision to defy domestic and international warnings by

suspending the constitution and imposing a state of emergency

have weakened his popularity and his power. What should,

according to his master plan for Pakistan's democracy, have

been a crowning moment of a transition to civilian leadership

has been marred by criticism over firing the judiciary,

arrests of politicians and civil society activists, and

counter-productive media restrictions. However, post's

sources close to the presidency indicate Musharraf will

announce to the nation November 29 that he will lift the

state of emergency and restore the constitution on December

16, the last day candidates can withdraw from elections.



6. (C) Although we view Musharraf's decision to join with

the U.S. after 9/11 as necessary and pragmatic, it was a



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courageous step at home that has been a mixed blessing for

him politically. Musharraf tried, with only limited success,

to reverse the pro-Islamic tendencies that former President

General Zia al-Haq introduced into Pakistan. Plans to

control extremist madrassas have been only marginally

successful, while Musharraf devoted insufficient resources to

basic health, education and law enforcement programs.

Musharraf's efforts to overcome the effect of twenty plus

years of Pakistani ties with the pro-Taliban elements

fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remain a work in

progress. As the local reaction to the July Red Mosque

operation and continued widespread anti-Americanism show,

Pakistanis remain deeply ambivalent about what still is

viewed as an American war on Islamic militants. A growing

number of suicide bombings and the recent militant takeover

in the settled areas of Swat have begun to alter public

opinion, and Musharraf now has an opportunity as a civilian

leader to develop the political support the Army needs to win

this battle.



Back to Barracks

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7. (C) The Army is viewing Musharraf's departure with mixed

emotions. On one hand, they technically are losing someone

who has been a powerful ally in the office of the President.

However, Musharraf's growing political unpopularity tainted

the Army itself, which has come under unprecedented public

criticism. The Army's declining reputation has been affected

by allegations of questionable land acquisitions and unfair

economic influence by current and/or retired Army officers.

Within the institution itself, morale has dropped over

reports of inadequate equipment and logistical support for

troops in the field and embarrassment over soldiers who are

surrendering to militants without a fight.



8. (C) The new COAS, General Ashfaq Kayani, is a long-time

and trusted Musharraf ally who is uncomfortable with the

sudden glare of international attention and speculation about

his future role in the power troika. In recent meetings with

us, Kayani has been at pains to state his continued loyalty

to Musharraf, but Kayani has also gone to some lengths to

express his loyalty as a soldier to a leader (the President)

and the rule of constitutional law. Interestingly, restating

the military's loyalty was a major theme at the farewell

dinner for Musharraf hosted by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs for Musharraf on November 27.



9. (C) For the next few months, this undercurrent of

nervousness will persist as both the Army and Musharraf

revert to their traditional bureaucratic norms after eight

years of Musharraf being both President and COAS. Gradually,

however, we expect Kayani to assert himself as defender of

Pakistan's national interests. When Musharraf lifts the

state of emergency and returns Pakistan to normal governance,

there should be little divergence between Musharraf's

interests and those of the Army.



10. (C) For months, Musharraf has been preoccupied with his

own political future and has either ignored or paid

insufficient attention to the deteriorating security

situation in the tribal areas and Swat. It is encouraging,

therefore, that with his appointment as Vice Chief, Kayani

immediately visited troops in the tribal areas and is

implementing a more robust offensive against militants.

(Note: It is still unclear if the Amry's new strategy will be

effective, but at least Kayani appears fully engaged.) In

Kayani, we believe we have a committed partner and will

pursue with him efforts to redouble GOP actions against

militants.



The Next Prime Minister?

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11. (C) The third leg of the Pakistan power troika is, at

the moment, very uncertain. The return from exile of

Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan

Muslim League-N leader Nawaz Sharif will level the playing

field if, as we expect, they both agree to contest the

election. In the campaign, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League

party will be led by Pervaiz Elahi, the former Chief Minister

of Punjab. The government retains a significant ability both



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to sway the electorate through traditional spoils or

determine the outcome through behind the scenes manipulation.

But it appears that none of the three major parties will win

a sufficient majority in the January elections to form a new

government. The political horse trading over possible

coalitions has begun even before serious campaigning gets

underway. It is simply too soon to call a winner or predict

how stable the next coalition government will be.



12. (C) Neither Bhutto nor Sharif can become Prime Minister

until the constitution is amended to lift the current

two-term limit on prime ministers. With convictions on the

books, both also face scrutiny over their ability to even

qualify as candidates for the National Assembly. To avoid

possible charges of treason, Musharraf will need a two-thirds

vote in the next National Assembly to approve his Provisional

Constitutional Order.



13. (C) Constitutionally, the President still retains the

power to fire the Prime Minister, and the Parliament has the

power to remove (with a two-thirds majority) the President.

Given the animosities among Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif, the

constitutional order could yield surprises for any of them,

including the new civilian President. The key will be how

well these three and their parties perform in the January

elections.



14. (C) Comment: Although marred by the continuing state of

emergency, the big story here is that a military dictator

voluntarily turned over power to civilian governance. In the

coming days, Pakistanis will be looking to the USG for signs

of which candidate/party we are supporting and whether we

take seriously Musharraf's decision to govern as a civilian.

We recommend, therefore, that the USG continue to press

publicly for free, fair and transparent elections and be in

contact with all Pakistan's parties and candidates.

PATTERSON