Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
07ISLAMABAD5085 | 2007-11-29 12:41:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO8806 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #5085/01 3331241 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291241Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3546 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7841 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6815 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2365 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 5711 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8226 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 4219 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 2786 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005085 |
1. (C) Summary. With his retirement as Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) November 28 and his inauguration November 29 as a civilian president, Pervez Musharraf begins another chapter in Pakistan's rocky road to democracy. By ceding control of Pakistan's strongest institution, Musharraf knows he faces a decline in both his power and prestige. Although Musharraf plans to continue influencing policy, he has admitted publicly that he is returning Pakistan to its traditional power troika of Army, President and Prime Minister. The Army appears ready to return to barracks and hopefully now can concentrate on the battle with extremist militants. Musharraf continues to align himself as President with the Army side of this equation. But the balance of power between President and Prime Minister will depend on the outcome of upcoming general elections. Although marred by the continuing state of emergency, the big story here is the institutional one of a military dictator voluntarily turning over power to civilian governance. Post's sources indicate Musharraf will announce November 29 that he will lift the state of emergency and restore the constitution on December 16, the last day candidates can withdraw from elections. 2. (C) Pakistanis continually are looking to the USG for signs of which candidate/party we are supporting and will be watching to see whether we take seriously Musharraf's decision to govern as a civilian. We recommend continuing to stress the "free, fair and transparent elections" message which is being well-received by the Pakistani people and by meeting with all Pakistani candidates/parties. End Summary. The Embattled President -------------------------- 3. (C) While he still sees himself as Pakistan's savior, Musharraf today is not the same popular, secure leader who felt confident enough in 2006 to appear on "The Daily Show" to sell his auto-biography. To his credit, over eight years Musharraf provided Pakistan with more than five years of seven percent economic growth, encouraged women's rights, increased press freedom, tightened controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, provided extensively bilateral intelligence cooperation, and forced the Army to change its myopic focus on India as Pakistan's sole existential threat. In a society rife with corruption, Musharraf remains personally untainted, and he deeply believes he is moving Pakistan on a slow but deliberate path to democracy. 4. (C) When Musharraf made his ill-conceived decision to fire the former Chief Justice in March, his popularity at home and abroad was high, and he probably has been bewildered at how quickly everything has unraveled. In retrospect, it is clear that economic growth had not filtered down to offset growing food and rent inflation among the poorer majority. Musharraf's own reforms had encouraged a critical and freer press as well as the development of bolder civil society groups The former Chief Justice's popular rallies tapped a surprisingly deep well of economic discontent and a broad sense that the government was not delivering justice/law and order. 5. (C) Musharraf's personal fixation with the former Chief Justice distorted his political judgment as he compounded his initial mistake of firing the Chief Justice with a succession of bad decisions informed by a narrowing circle of advisors. Musharraf's delayed action over the Red Mosque operation and his decision to defy domestic and international warnings by suspending the constitution and imposing a state of emergency have weakened his popularity and his power. What should, according to his master plan for Pakistan's democracy, have been a crowning moment of a transition to civilian leadership has been marred by criticism over firing the judiciary, arrests of politicians and civil society activists, and counter-productive media restrictions. However, post's sources close to the presidency indicate Musharraf will announce to the nation November 29 that he will lift the state of emergency and restore the constitution on December 16, the last day candidates can withdraw from elections. 6. (C) Although we view Musharraf's decision to join with the U.S. after 9/11 as necessary and pragmatic, it was a ISLAMABAD 00005085 002 OF 003 courageous step at home that has been a mixed blessing for him politically. Musharraf tried, with only limited success, to reverse the pro-Islamic tendencies that former President General Zia al-Haq introduced into Pakistan. Plans to control extremist madrassas have been only marginally successful, while Musharraf devoted insufficient resources to basic health, education and law enforcement programs. Musharraf's efforts to overcome the effect of twenty plus years of Pakistani ties with the pro-Taliban elements fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remain a work in progress. As the local reaction to the July Red Mosque operation and continued widespread anti-Americanism show, Pakistanis remain deeply ambivalent about what still is viewed as an American war on Islamic militants. A growing number of suicide bombings and the recent militant takeover in the settled areas of Swat have begun to alter public opinion, and Musharraf now has an opportunity as a civilian leader to develop the political support the Army needs to win this battle. Back to Barracks -------------------------- 7. (C) The Army is viewing Musharraf's departure with mixed emotions. On one hand, they technically are losing someone who has been a powerful ally in the office of the President. However, Musharraf's growing political unpopularity tainted the Army itself, which has come under unprecedented public criticism. The Army's declining reputation has been affected by allegations of questionable land acquisitions and unfair economic influence by current and/or retired Army officers. Within the institution itself, morale has dropped over reports of inadequate equipment and logistical support for troops in the field and embarrassment over soldiers who are surrendering to militants without a fight. 8. (C) The new COAS, General Ashfaq Kayani, is a long-time and trusted Musharraf ally who is uncomfortable with the sudden glare of international attention and speculation about his future role in the power troika. In recent meetings with us, Kayani has been at pains to state his continued loyalty to Musharraf, but Kayani has also gone to some lengths to express his loyalty as a soldier to a leader (the President) and the rule of constitutional law. Interestingly, restating the military's loyalty was a major theme at the farewell dinner for Musharraf hosted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for Musharraf on November 27. 9. (C) For the next few months, this undercurrent of nervousness will persist as both the Army and Musharraf revert to their traditional bureaucratic norms after eight years of Musharraf being both President and COAS. Gradually, however, we expect Kayani to assert himself as defender of Pakistan's national interests. When Musharraf lifts the state of emergency and returns Pakistan to normal governance, there should be little divergence between Musharraf's interests and those of the Army. 10. (C) For months, Musharraf has been preoccupied with his own political future and has either ignored or paid insufficient attention to the deteriorating security situation in the tribal areas and Swat. It is encouraging, therefore, that with his appointment as Vice Chief, Kayani immediately visited troops in the tribal areas and is implementing a more robust offensive against militants. (Note: It is still unclear if the Amry's new strategy will be effective, but at least Kayani appears fully engaged.) In Kayani, we believe we have a committed partner and will pursue with him efforts to redouble GOP actions against militants. The Next Prime Minister? -------------------------- 11. (C) The third leg of the Pakistan power troika is, at the moment, very uncertain. The return from exile of Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League-N leader Nawaz Sharif will level the playing field if, as we expect, they both agree to contest the election. In the campaign, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League party will be led by Pervaiz Elahi, the former Chief Minister of Punjab. The government retains a significant ability both ISLAMABAD 00005085 003 OF 003 to sway the electorate through traditional spoils or determine the outcome through behind the scenes manipulation. But it appears that none of the three major parties will win a sufficient majority in the January elections to form a new government. The political horse trading over possible coalitions has begun even before serious campaigning gets underway. It is simply too soon to call a winner or predict how stable the next coalition government will be. 12. (C) Neither Bhutto nor Sharif can become Prime Minister until the constitution is amended to lift the current two-term limit on prime ministers. With convictions on the books, both also face scrutiny over their ability to even qualify as candidates for the National Assembly. To avoid possible charges of treason, Musharraf will need a two-thirds vote in the next National Assembly to approve his Provisional Constitutional Order. 13. (C) Constitutionally, the President still retains the power to fire the Prime Minister, and the Parliament has the power to remove (with a two-thirds majority) the President. Given the animosities among Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif, the constitutional order could yield surprises for any of them, including the new civilian President. The key will be how well these three and their parties perform in the January elections. 14. (C) Comment: Although marred by the continuing state of emergency, the big story here is that a military dictator voluntarily turned over power to civilian governance. In the coming days, Pakistanis will be looking to the USG for signs of which candidate/party we are supporting and whether we take seriously Musharraf's decision to govern as a civilian. We recommend, therefore, that the USG continue to press publicly for free, fair and transparent elections and be in contact with all Pakistan's parties and candidates. PATTERSON |