Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD4728
2007-11-05 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR 
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RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 3921
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 2447
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004728 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS

REF: ISLAMABAD 4702

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004728 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS REF: ISLAMABAD 4702 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Pervaiz Musharraf spoke November 5 to the full diplomatic corps. The hour-long monologue was rambling and personalized, focused more on his reasons for the March 12 sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry than for his November 3 suspension of Pakistan's Constitution. The Ambassador raised USG concerns about the government's heavy-handed measures against civil society and the media; Musharraf railed against the head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (now under house arrest) and avoided discussing the recent curb on the press. Responding to the British High Commissioner's request for a date for parliamentary elections and for doffing his uniform, Musharraf would provide no schedule, only committing to "implement the third phase of (democratic) transition." End summary. "All because of March 12" -------------- ¶2. (C) Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf convoked the diplomatic corps in Islamabad on November 5. Joined by several ministers/advisors, including Foreign Minister Kasuri, the head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General Nadeem Taj, and the head of Military Intelligence (MI) General Nadeem Ejaz Ahmed, Musharraf launched an hour-long, rambling monologue before taking some questions from the assembled ambassadors. Though Musharraf said he would reiterate the points from his late night November 3 speech to the nation, he instead presented a highly personalized case against Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. ¶3. (C) Musharraf said he did not take lightly his November 3 decision to suspend Pakistan's Constitution, but the Chief Justice "placed me between a rock and a hard surface." He said the court threatened Pakistan's progress and development of the last seven years with its interference in legislative and executive decisions, using suo moto judgments. He claimed there were now thousands of petitioners before the Court trying to receive special treatment. Musharraf pleaded, instead, for unity among the three branches of government. ¶4. (C) Starting from before his March 12 suspension of the Chief Justice, Musharraf counted eight reasons for his decision: (1) he had no sense of justice, playing politics with the choice of Supreme Court panels an
d with vacancies on the Sharia Court and provincial high courts; (2) he violated judicial norms, suspiciously changing decisions and hampering privatization initiatives; (3) he inappropriately called on the chiefs of national intelligence agencies; (4) he pressed the President and Prime Minister to appoint his son to a civil service position; (5) he harassed civil servants working at his judicial chambers; (6) he entertained thousands of suo moto petitions; (7) he made fake reimbursement claims; and (8) he was driven by his ego. Musharraf concluded that his actions against Chaudhry were, therefore, justifiable and constitutional; in contrast, the Supreme Court's dismissal of the reference was not. Too Soft -------------- ¶5. (C) Musharraf then claimed to have been too lenient with the lawyers' movement and the press. "Things have snowballed" to the point that the Supreme Court now felt it could review his eligibility to remain president. He argued that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) had the constitutional authority to rule on this matter, and yet the Court entertained the opposition's petitions. He said the Court had dangerously put the country in "suspended animation" and had "semi-paralyzed" law enforcement by threatening contempt of court charges. Musharraf claimed he had sent numerous conciliatory messages to the Chief Justice, some of which were very public. ¶6. (C) Once assured of a negative judgment, however, ISLAMABAD 00004728 002 OF 003 Musharraf realized that his only constitutional option would be to resign, which "others convinced me against." Musharraf revealed that, before making this decision, he met with all of the corps commanders -- "my constituency." He also reported that he met with senior politicians, provincial governors and chief ministers, and his cabinet. "This option was not for myself," but for Pakistan, he repeated several times. Musharraf said that his demand that judges swear an oath under the new provisional constitutional order (PCO) was extra-constitutional; the suspension of fundamental rights under a state of emergency was not. "Bear with Us." -------------- ¶7. (C) Directly addressing ambassadors from the "developed world," Musharraf argued that every country is different in its level of civil rights. "If this were an ideal world, an ideal solution would be possible," Musharraf explained concerning the arrests of political party and civil society leaders and the curb on media freedoms. "Are we supposed to let everyone do what they want?," he asked. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador strongly reiterated with Musharraf the USG's concern over heavy-handed measures against civil society and the press. She further raised the detention in Lahore of 50 members of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, adding that it was "hard to imagine a group less of a threat to Pakistan's security." The Ambassador warned Musharraf that his internationally-recognized accomplishment of supporting a free and vigorous press was being undermined by the near complete suspension of the media. ¶9. (C) In reply, Musharraf ridiculed the leader of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jahangir, as "mentally unbalanced." The Foreign Minister confirmed with the Ambassador on the margins that Jahangir was not at a local police station, though some male workers might still be, but was under house arrest. Punjab Chief Minister Pervaiz Elahi told CG Lahore that he had offered Jahangir his chef and suggested she enjoy the time at home with her family. Musharraf did not address the Ambassador's point about media restrictions beyond repeating, "Please understand our society," implying that recent measures were acceptable to the general public. ... And then there are the terrorists. -------------- ¶10. (C) Saying some of his advisors described the Chief Justice's suo moto rulings as "judicial terrorism," Musharraf argued that, at the very least, Chaudhry had stymied the government's counterterrorism efforts. For example, the government has been in contempt of court, Musharraf said, since October 30 because the government had not complied with the Chief Justice's order to re-establish the red mosque or release terrorist suspects arrested without charge. ¶11. (C) In answering a question from Canadian High Commissioner David Collins on the government's plans in FATA and Swat, Musharraf promised, "We will come down more strongly there." Musharraf claimed to have opened another front against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and said the government had the support of the majority in these areas, who he described as moderate and scared. Parliamentary Elections; Uniform -------------- ¶12. (C) In response to a question from British High Commissioner Robert Brinkley on parliamentary elections and whether Musharraf would resign as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Musharraf committed to implementing "the third stage of (democratic) transition," but noted that "legal issues" related to the PCO may cause "minor changes" to the previous mid-January target for elections. ¶13. (C) Comment: Since his reinstatement, the Chief Justice increasingly opted to challenge Musharraf's rule and executive-judicial relations by intervening on a wide range ISLAMABAD 00004728 003 OF 003 of issues, from vegetable prices and zoning regulations to the voters list. The Supreme Court's rulings on political issues, including the Nawaz deportation, Musharraf's eligibility to be a candidate and the National Reconciliation Ordinance appeared designed to keep the proverbial sword of Damocles hanging over Musharraf's head. Today's harangue indicates just how much Musharraf has been preoccupied about the Chief Justice. Musharraf's dismissal of USG and other international concerns about civil liberties, and his refusal to confirm dates for parliamentary elections and his resignation as COAS are troubling. We have made the case privately and emphatically to GOP officials that the choice of individuals arrested seems designed to elicit stringent international condemnation. We will continue to deliver the message that failure to follow through on these issues threatens to damage US-Pakistan bilateral relations. End comment. PATTERSON

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