PREPARING FOR NAWAZ SHARIF'S RETURN TO PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003901 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PK SUBJECT: PREPARING FOR NAWAZ SHARIF'S RETURN TO PAKISTAN REF: A. ISLAMABAD 3873 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 3706 ¶C. ISLAMABAD 3692 ¶D. LAHORE 524 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Musharraf's government is planning to deport Nawaz Sharif upon his expected arrival September 10, although some of his advisors continue to try to dissaude him of this. Saudi emissary Saad Hariri will be here today (September 8) to talk to Musharraf and reportedly make a public appeal on behalf of Saudi leaders to persuade Nawaz to stay away. If the GOP deports Nawaz, it will be in contempt of the Supreme Court's August 23 decision allowing Nawaz to return, but the consequences of a contempt citation are not yet clear. A Lahore terrorism court has issued an arrest warrant for Nawaz's brother Shahbaz on murder charges, accountability courts have set a September 13 hearing date for corruption charges against Nawaz, and the security forces continue to round up Nawaz supporters. The government has also put in place elaborate contingency plans to avoid unrest and control crowds but, as we have reported earlier, demonstrations are likely. While Nawaz is publicly committed to return and is invariably described as "stubborn," the government is also hoping to discourage his return by putting out a consistent message. They hope Nawaz may ultimately calculate that exile in Saudi Arabia would be worse politically than remaining in London. ¶2. (C) Summary contd. The government continues to reach out to the Chaudhry power-brokers in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League to convince them to soften their opposition to a deal with Bhutto. Senior government officials tell us that the ruling Pakistan Muslim League will be more tractable to a deal with Bhutto once Nawaz is "no longer in the picture." End Summary. NAWAZ SHARIF'S RETURN PLANS -------------- ¶3. (U) Although it is unclear exactly where he will land, Nawaz Sharif reportedly plans to arrive on September 10 in Islamabad Airport (Rawalpindi) with a planeload of media. His supporters are planning to assemble crowds to welcome the former Prime Minister home. Nawaz's party is mobilizing its forces across Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and parts of Sindh to bring supporters to the Islamabad airport and to line the streets on his expected journey to Lahore. The heartland of Nawaz support is urban Punjab, where party workers are anticipating huge welcome crowds in every city. Party leaders claim that the turnout will be in the hundreds of thousands, though tens of thousands strikes us as a more accurate estimate. MUSHARRAF'S GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO NAWAZ -------------- ¶4. (C) Sources close to President Musharraf have made it clear they are planning to deport Nawaz Sharif if he returns on September 10. Musharraf has rejected arresting Nawaz because he fears the Supreme Court will release him, and in jail Nawaz would become a rallying point for the opposition. Some of Musharraf's advisers continue to try to dissuade him from deporting Nawaz because of the potential for protests and Supreme Court retaliation. ¶5. (C) On September 8, Saad Hariri arrived in Islamabad to meet with President Musharraf. Hariri is reportedly planning to make a public appeal on behalf of the Saudi government to persuade the Sharif brothers to stay away from Pakistan. ¶6. (C) Police in Punjab province have jailed over 1,000 party activists but have left alone the senior leadership of Nawaz's party. Papers report the harassment and arrests of hundreds of Nawaz party activists all over Punjab. Nawaz party leadership is claiming raids on many of its offices and ISLAMABAD 00003901 002 OF 003 police intimidation to prevent large crowds from welcoming him. The roundup of party activists -- using the legal authority of the Maintenance of Public Order Act -- is a common (if regrettable) political tactic in Pakistan, and most activists are released after a few days. ¶7. (U) Security authorities in Rawalpindi have imposed restrictions, including prohibitions on the assembly of five or more persons in public places, to control the law and order situation. Rawalpindi has been placed on high alert for September 10, with an overall increase in checkpoints and security blocks. Police plan to block all routes that lead to Rawalpindi and Islamabad from the NWFP and Punjab. Government sources tell us that the security plans are very elaborate and more thorough than those for the Chief Justice rallies. The government estimates that protests will last no longer than a few days, but the chances for miscalculation by the parties and the government are considerable. ¶8. (U) A special anti-terrorism court in Lahore September 7 ordered police to arrest Shahbaz Sharif (Nawaz's brother) on his return to Pakistan. Arrest warrants were issued for an outstanding case accusing Shahbaz of ordering five extra-judicial killings when he was chief minister of Punjab. ¶9. (U) On September 7, the National Accountability Bureau court set September 13 as the hearing date for three pending corruption cases against Nawaz Sharif and his family. The accountability court refused to issue arrest warrants until Nawaz Sharif actually arrives in Pakistan. NAWAZ'S STATUS AND THE BENAZIR-MUSHARRAF DEAL -------------- ¶10. (C) Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's meeting with National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz dominated the news and had political pundits arguing over the status of the proposed Musharraf-Bhutto alliance. Aziz and Bhutto met on September 4 in Dubai to try to overcome the last sticking points blocking the deal. On September 7, newspapers carried stories of a potential breakdown of deal talks. Most political commentators remain silent on the prospects of the deal, waiting to see the post-Nawaz arrival landscape. ¶11. (C) High level ruling Pakistan Muslim League officials including Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain are worried about the deal and fear potential defections to Nawaz's party. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Pakistan Muslim League leaders continue to meet with their party members to boost morale and reassure them of a strong party infrastructure. Opinion concerning the potential for defections to Nawaz's party is divided; however, the deportation of Nawaz Sharif, if it is politically successful, may effectively stop any defections from the ruling party. ¶12. (U) On September 7, the Supreme Court rejected a petition by Benazir Bhutto challenging the court's ability to seek documents from Swiss authorities regarding money laundering cases against Bhutto. The Supreme Court has remanded the pending corruption cases against Bhutto to the Sindh High Court for a decision on the merits. According to the Supreme Court, the Sindh High Court can seek any documents it needs to decide the case. ¶13. (C) Comment: We believe that Musharraf's decision to proceed with the deportation is virtually final. We recognize that sticking to this position also has the virtue of potentially dissuading Nawaz from returning, since the prospect of years in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be a politically appealing one. Still, our sources invariably describe Nawaz as a "stubborn man" and do not believe he can be persuaded to stay in London. ¶14. (C) Deporting Nawaz will put the government in contempt of the August 23 Supreme Court decision to allow him to return, but we do not yet know the consequences of a contempt citation. While the government is taking prudent measures to ISLAMABAD 00003901 003 OF 003 control demonstrations, the possibility of violence is always present in Pakistan. If the government manages to deport Nawaz without paying a heavy political price -- and this is a huge unknown -- it will calm the fears of Musharraf and his party and improve prospects for a proposed alliance with Bhutto. End Comment. PATTERSON