F-16 SECURITY NOTES: REQUEST FOR TWO SPECIFIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002794 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017 TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL SUBJECT: F-16 SECURITY NOTES: REQUEST FOR TWO SPECIFIC CHANGES THAT WILL BENEFIT COALITION OPERATIONS. Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Pakistan's September 2006 agreement to purchase 18 new F-16 aircraft marked an important milestone in our alliance. The agreement signaled Pakistan's and the United States' intent to continue strengthening our security relationship. We are grateful for both State's and DoD's enormous efforts to facilitate both this sale and the separate transfer of Excess Defense Article F-16s. SECURITY ISSUES ¶2. (C) For the sake of our own national security, as well as to safeguard the long-term viability of our security assistance relationship with Pakistan, maintaining the security of technology related to F-16s is preeminently important. We understand and support most of the security notes that accompany the September 2006 Letter of Offer and Acceptance for new F-16s. That said, we believe two specific provisions of the security notes will harm Pakistan's operational effectiveness and may negatively impact Coalition operations in Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) Paragraph 9 of the security notes place two unusual requirements on Pakistan: --The F-16 Aircraft, armaments, and related equipment and technical data must be housed on separate pre-designated Pakistan Air Force bases to ensure no unauthorized access. Furthermore, Pakistan may not have non-U.S./non-Pakistan origin aircraft or personnel at any of the bases with these F-16 aircraft and related equipment. --No foreign units or personnel may be permanently or temporarily assigned at the bases where F-16 aircraft are assigned, parked, maintained, or stored, or while deployed. ¶4. (C) Post understands the importance of ensuring that non-Pakistani, non-U.S. personnel do not have access to restricted U.S. technology. That said, requiring separate bases for the F-16s does not necessarily further this goal beyond what would be possible using other techniques. Indeed, restricting the access of Pakistani-owned foreign aircraft to F-16 bases does not directly correlate to restricting the access of foreign nationals to those bases. Meanwhile, the above-noted restrictions could cause serious humanitarian, safety, logistical, and operational difficulties for Pakistan. Not incidentally, the requirement that third countries, including our NATO allies, be denied access to special F-16 bases could impede our own operational effectiveness. ¶5. (C) We note that: --Pakistan's search and rescue helicopters are primarily of Russian and French origin. Some of Pakistan's air lift capacity is European-manufactured Casa 235s. If Pakistan cannot base these aircraft with the F-16s, Pakistani personnel (and U.S. trainers) could be unnecessarily endangered. At the very least, operational effectiveness would be hurt by lack of access to Casa 235 capabilities. --Not allowing foreign units or personnel to deploy to F-16 bases would deny non-U.S. Coalition aircraft operating in Afghanistan access to those facilities. Such a policy would be counterproductive to our interests in the region. Similarly, our Long War needs require Pakistan to be flexible in its deployment capabilities. Restricting Pakistan's access to its own bases would limit this flexibility, as would denying Pakistan access to Coalition bases outside of Pakistan. ISLAMABAD 00002794 002 OF 002 --The basing restrictions prevent Pakistan from launching a unified strike package of U.S. and non-U.S. aircraft from a single air base. As pre-mission briefings are essential to safety and effectiveness, this would be a serious handicap for the Pakistan Air Force. --Currently, all Pakistan Air Force fighter pilots train employment tactics at a single air base. Under the F-16 security restrictions, F-16 pilots would be required to train at a separate facility, an expensive and inefficient proposition. RECOMMENDATIONS ¶6. (C) In light of the potential for paragraph 9 of the current security notes to adversely impact both Pakistan's and the United States' operational effectiveness, we propose that the note be changed so that the F-16s can be stored in "separate but co-located" portions of existing air bases. Under such a plan, the U.S. would establish stringent requirements for the foundation and maintenance of "separate but co-located" basing facilities for the F-16s. We believe that, so long as the U.S. ensures adequate attention to detail as we establish requirements for co-located facilities, we could ensure as much security for our technology as at a dedicated air base. ¶7. (C) Other recommendations: --There should be a waiver process for more of the F-16 security requirements. Currently, many of the requirements can only be waived or changed by amending the Letter of Offer and Acceptance. A waiver requiring "the written permission of the Department of State" is available for some of the requirements; we believe it would be appropriate for many of the others. Authorizing such waivers would enable Coalition or third country (NATO ally) access to bases during humanitarian emergencies and other urgent situations. --The U.S. should begin security training regarding the F-16 program as soon as possible. The more Pakistani personnel familiar with security requirements at an early date, the better. BODDE