Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD2493
2007-06-05 12:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR REGULATORY COOPERATION
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002493
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: KNNP, PK, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR REGULATORY COOPERATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 01779
B. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 0118-07
Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002493
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: KNNP, PK, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR REGULATORY COOPERATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 01779
B. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 0118-07
Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Summary: On May 24 and May 31, PolOff met with
Kamran Akhtar, Director of the Disarmament Cell at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss cooperation between
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration and Pakistan's Nuclear Regulatory Agency.
Akhtar said the Ministry would consider supporting nuclear
cooperation between the two bodies, but that an interagency
discussion of specifics, which would need to precede any
formal cooperation, had not yet taken place. Akhtar also
noted Pakistan would consider participating in the Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group meeting in
Ume, Sweden in late June. End Summary.
Interagency discussion needed
--------------
2. (S) PolOff reviewed with Akhtar the Energy
Department/Nuclear Regulatory Agency discussions that took
place in March in Islamabad. Akhtar indicated that any draft
Memorandum of Understanding outlining specific areas of
cooperation between the two bodies would need to be vetted
through the Pakistan Military's Strategic Plans Division, the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and the Foreign Ministry
before the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, Jamshed
Hashmi, could sign the Memorandum. Akhtar understood the
purpose of the proposed June visit to Islamabad by Energy and
State officials was to finalize details of the draft
Memorandum and to discuss specific steps toward progress on a
proposed action plan for cooperation. That said, he was not
hopeful the internal Pakistani discussion would be far enough
along by then to merit such a visit.
The Ministry's concerns
--------------
3. (S) Akhtar noted his worry that some of the areas of
cooperation in the draft Memorandum of Understanding were not
under the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. It would
therefore be necessary to bring the Atomic Energy Commission
into discussions and follow-up activities. Akhtar was also
concerned about how the general public and nuclear community
would react to increased cooperation between the U.S. and
Pakistan. (Note: Pakistani officials frequently voice this
concern over the public's reaction to U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation on nonproliferation matters. The Foreign
Ministry recently asked that all State Department-sponsored
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) training
programs take place outside of Pakistan and under the public
radar. End Note.)
4. (S) According to Akhtar, the Government of Pakistan would
likely express concern over a proposal in the action plan to
conduct joint security assessments of certain sites. PolOff
stressed it would be helpful to convey these concerns in
writing.
5. (S) PolOff raised the possibility of U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation in removing U.S.-origin Highly Enriched Uranium
fuel assemblies from Pakistan's PARR-1 nuclear reactor.
Akhtar stated this proposal, like others, required
interagency consideration. (Note: Akhtar hinted that while
he understood Nuclear Regulatory Agency head Jamshed Hashmi
supported U.S.-Pakistan cooperation to remove the spent
assemblies, the opinion of the head of the Atomic Energy
Commission would matter equally or more during interagency
discussions. End Note.)
ISLAMABAD 00002493 002 OF 002
6. (S) Comment: The Foreign Ministry's concerns over
proposed U.S.-Pakistan nuclear cooperation are not new. The
Government of Pakistan would like to prove to the
international community that it is cooperating robustly in
training and other nonproliferation activities. At the same
time, the Pakistani bureaucracy is worried the public will
think increased nuclear cooperation with the U.S. compromises
Pakistan's national security interests. We should continue
to be sensitive to Pakistan's public affairs concerns on
nonproliferation cooperation. We will also ensure future
discussions on nuclear nonproliferation activities include
the Foreign Ministry and the Atomic Energy Commission to
avoid misunderstandings. Embassy looks forward to receiving
from Washington an interagency-cleared draft Memorandum of
Understanding on the terms of this cooperation. End Comment.
BODDE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: KNNP, PK, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR REGULATORY COOPERATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 01779
B. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 0118-07
Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Summary: On May 24 and May 31, PolOff met with
Kamran Akhtar, Director of the Disarmament Cell at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss cooperation between
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration and Pakistan's Nuclear Regulatory Agency.
Akhtar said the Ministry would consider supporting nuclear
cooperation between the two bodies, but that an interagency
discussion of specifics, which would need to precede any
formal cooperation, had not yet taken place. Akhtar also
noted Pakistan would consider participating in the Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group meeting in
Ume, Sweden in late June. End Summary.
Interagency discussion needed
--------------
2. (S) PolOff reviewed with Akhtar the Energy
Department/Nuclear Regulatory Agency discussions that took
place in March in Islamabad. Akhtar indicated that any draft
Memorandum of Understanding outlining specific areas of
cooperation between the two bodies would need to be vetted
through the Pakistan Military's Strategic Plans Division, the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and the Foreign Ministry
before the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, Jamshed
Hashmi, could sign the Memorandum. Akhtar understood the
purpose of the proposed June visit to Islamabad by Energy and
State officials was to finalize details of the draft
Memorandum and to discuss specific steps toward progress on a
proposed action plan for cooperation. That said, he was not
hopeful the internal Pakistani discussion would be far enough
along by then to merit such a visit.
The Ministry's concerns
--------------
3. (S) Akhtar noted his worry that some of the areas of
cooperation in the draft Memorandum of Understanding were not
under the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. It would
therefore be necessary to bring the Atomic Energy Commission
into discussions and follow-up activities. Akhtar was also
concerned about how the general public and nuclear community
would react to increased cooperation between the U.S. and
Pakistan. (Note: Pakistani officials frequently voice this
concern over the public's reaction to U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation on nonproliferation matters. The Foreign
Ministry recently asked that all State Department-sponsored
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) training
programs take place outside of Pakistan and under the public
radar. End Note.)
4. (S) According to Akhtar, the Government of Pakistan would
likely express concern over a proposal in the action plan to
conduct joint security assessments of certain sites. PolOff
stressed it would be helpful to convey these concerns in
writing.
5. (S) PolOff raised the possibility of U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation in removing U.S.-origin Highly Enriched Uranium
fuel assemblies from Pakistan's PARR-1 nuclear reactor.
Akhtar stated this proposal, like others, required
interagency consideration. (Note: Akhtar hinted that while
he understood Nuclear Regulatory Agency head Jamshed Hashmi
supported U.S.-Pakistan cooperation to remove the spent
assemblies, the opinion of the head of the Atomic Energy
Commission would matter equally or more during interagency
discussions. End Note.)
ISLAMABAD 00002493 002 OF 002
6. (S) Comment: The Foreign Ministry's concerns over
proposed U.S.-Pakistan nuclear cooperation are not new. The
Government of Pakistan would like to prove to the
international community that it is cooperating robustly in
training and other nonproliferation activities. At the same
time, the Pakistani bureaucracy is worried the public will
think increased nuclear cooperation with the U.S. compromises
Pakistan's national security interests. We should continue
to be sensitive to Pakistan's public affairs concerns on
nonproliferation cooperation. We will also ensure future
discussions on nuclear nonproliferation activities include
the Foreign Ministry and the Atomic Energy Commission to
avoid misunderstandings. Embassy looks forward to receiving
from Washington an interagency-cleared draft Memorandum of
Understanding on the terms of this cooperation. End Comment.
BODDE