Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD2378
2007-05-30 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
DISARMING KARACHI: A WORTHY BUT CURRENTLY UNLIKELY GOAL
how-toVZCZCXRO9809 PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #2378 1501116 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301116Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9407 INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2472 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0167 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4213 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1323 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2090 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7144 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 8347 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1023 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 3204 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 6148 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 2424 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0781 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2385 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002378
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: DISARMING KARACHI: A WORTHY BUT CURRENTLY UNLIKELY
GOAL
REF: ISLAMABAD 2344
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002378
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: DISARMING KARACHI: A WORTHY BUT CURRENTLY UNLIKELY
GOAL
REF: ISLAMABAD 2344
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Karachi remains calm in the aftermath of May 12, in
which at least 45 people were killed in political-related
violence (reftel). On May 29, the paramilitary Sindh Rangers
returned to their original deployments in interior Sindh.
(Note: Approximately 4000 Rangers had been called to Karachi
to keep the peace after the May 12 violence. End Note.)
2. (U) On May 25, President Musharraf publicly asked the
Sindh provincial government to enact a comprehensive strategy
to disarm Karachi. The President addressed a high-level
meeting at the Sindh Chief Minister's house and called upon
the provincial officials to start a campaign to make Karachi
and its political parties "weapons free". He also directed
officials to maintain religious harmony and to improve
security in the provincial capital. Musharraf noted that
previous attempts to disarm failed because only ordinary
law-abiding citizens gave up their weapons, while
"anti-social" individuals eluded authorities.
3. (C) Reactions to Musharraf's statements have been
generally skeptical. Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Raheem
called the plan to disarm Karachi flatly impossible. Most
political commentators and journalists cited the disastrous
failure of the 2001 call to disarm Karachi. Many
editorialists claimed that after the bloody late 1980s and
early 1990s, when at least 10,000 Karachites died in
political and sectarian violence, Karachi only found
equilibrium through various parties being equally well armed.
The commentators worry that disarming only one party--
perhaps the Muttahida Quami Movement-- could lead to an
emboldened (and already armed) Jamaat-i-Islaami.
4. (C) Comment. Karachi is a stark reminder of the preeminent
importance of our law enforcement training programs. Some
political parties in Sindh are better trained and equipped
than the police. The only organization that currently would
be capable of taking on Karachi's political parties is the
Army -- an option antithetical to our and Musharraf's goals
of encouraging a civilian-led government and culture.
Civilian law enforcement agencies must develop their capacity
to take on violent elements whether religious, political, or
criminal. Helping them improve this capacity is an important
goal for all donor countries, including the US. End Comment.
BODDE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: DISARMING KARACHI: A WORTHY BUT CURRENTLY UNLIKELY
GOAL
REF: ISLAMABAD 2344
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Karachi remains calm in the aftermath of May 12, in
which at least 45 people were killed in political-related
violence (reftel). On May 29, the paramilitary Sindh Rangers
returned to their original deployments in interior Sindh.
(Note: Approximately 4000 Rangers had been called to Karachi
to keep the peace after the May 12 violence. End Note.)
2. (U) On May 25, President Musharraf publicly asked the
Sindh provincial government to enact a comprehensive strategy
to disarm Karachi. The President addressed a high-level
meeting at the Sindh Chief Minister's house and called upon
the provincial officials to start a campaign to make Karachi
and its political parties "weapons free". He also directed
officials to maintain religious harmony and to improve
security in the provincial capital. Musharraf noted that
previous attempts to disarm failed because only ordinary
law-abiding citizens gave up their weapons, while
"anti-social" individuals eluded authorities.
3. (C) Reactions to Musharraf's statements have been
generally skeptical. Sindh Chief Minister Arbab Ghulam Raheem
called the plan to disarm Karachi flatly impossible. Most
political commentators and journalists cited the disastrous
failure of the 2001 call to disarm Karachi. Many
editorialists claimed that after the bloody late 1980s and
early 1990s, when at least 10,000 Karachites died in
political and sectarian violence, Karachi only found
equilibrium through various parties being equally well armed.
The commentators worry that disarming only one party--
perhaps the Muttahida Quami Movement-- could lead to an
emboldened (and already armed) Jamaat-i-Islaami.
4. (C) Comment. Karachi is a stark reminder of the preeminent
importance of our law enforcement training programs. Some
political parties in Sindh are better trained and equipped
than the police. The only organization that currently would
be capable of taking on Karachi's political parties is the
Army -- an option antithetical to our and Musharraf's goals
of encouraging a civilian-led government and culture.
Civilian law enforcement agencies must develop their capacity
to take on violent elements whether religious, political, or
criminal. Helping them improve this capacity is an important
goal for all donor countries, including the US. End Comment.
BODDE