Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD2107
2007-05-10 12:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

FOREIGN SECRETARY AND TURKISH AMBASSADOR REFLECT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PK AF 
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VZCZCXRO1211
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2107/01 1301252
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101252Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9032
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3845
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2370
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0137
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4177
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1292
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2061
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7099
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0903
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 3103
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 5942
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 2261
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0587
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2288
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002107 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PK AF
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY AND TURKISH AMBASSADOR REFLECT
ON ANKARA TRILATERAL

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1994


B. KABUL 1506

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002107 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PK AF SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY AND TURKISH AMBASSADOR REFLECT ON ANKARA TRILATERAL REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1994 ¶B. KABUL 1506 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary. Charge d'Affaires met with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan May 7 and Turkisk Ambassador Engin Soysal SIPDIS May 8 to hear their reflections on the April 29-30 Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey trilateral in Ankara. Both Khan and Soysal were in Ankara for the meetings -- Khan as the undersecretary-level negotiator and Soysal advising the Prime Minister on Pakistan. Both reported that the atmosphere between Musharraf and Karzai was tense at the outset, despite a very positive and collaborative spirit at the working level. Musharraf did deliver a long, "frank" response to Karzai's opening statement. Musharraf took Karzai to task when he admitted to harboring Balochistan separatists, but the summit ended on a more positive note, with commitments to stop the "blame game", hold another summit in late 2007/early 2008, and form a Joint Working Group on substantive issues. Soysal concluded that Turkey was satisfied with the trilateral's outcome but that building on this momentum through the Joint Working Group on border issues and economic ties would be a challenge. End summary. -------------- -------------- Foreign Secretary Khan briefs Charge on Ankara Trilateral -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) At a May 7 meeting with Charge d'Affaires, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan gave a read out of the April 29-30 Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey trilateral in Ankara. Khan traveled with President Musharraf's delegation and negotiated the joint statement (the Anakara Declaration) after the April 29 dinner. (Note: Khan said "nothing of substance" occurred at the dinner. End note.) Musharraf briefed Khan and the rest of the delegation after the April 30 summit meeting with President Karzai, President Sezer, and Prime Minister Erdogan. ¶3. (C) Khan said that Musharraf ceded the floor to Karzai at the beginning of the meeting because Karzai had initiated the trilateral by suggestng it to Erdogan last year. Karzai led off by saying that Pakistan and Afghanistan should realize the common threats they faced and leave some of the issues between them in the past. Khan quoted Karzai as saying "we're brothers". Karzai alluded to Islamabad's fear of a &#
x000A;"Pashtunistan" as one such issue to leave behind. (Note: Pashtun nationalists use this term to refer to Pakistan's Pashtun-majority border areas that wanted independence from Pakistan at the time of partition from India. End note.) -------------- -------------- Musharraf: Afghanistan's problems come from within -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Khan described Musharraf's "long monologue" response as "frank". Musharraf began by asking: "Where is the problem?" He explained that Pakistan has long suffered the fall-out from problems originating in Afghanistan and has helped millions of Afghan refugees. Musharraf argued that Karzai's simplified portrayal of Pakistan as the source of Afghanistan's problems was wrong -- the problems must also be addressed "over there" in Afghanistan. He then dismissed the outdated notion that Pakistan is worried about a possible "Pashtunistan". He added that if Karzai really thought that Pakistan wanted to destabilize and dominate Afghanistan, then there was little use in having this type of discussion. ¶5. (S) Musharraf raised the issue of Afghanistan giving refuge to Balochistan separatists. Karzai conceded that such people were in Afghanistan. He said he had approached the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to ask what would happen ISLAMABAD 00002107 002 OF 003 if the separatists were returned to Pakistan. The response from UNHCR was unclear, so Afghanistan decided to keep them. Musharraf replied that Afghanistan had denied the presence of Baloch separatist leaders when he had raised the issue before. He told Karzai that this turnaround exemplified how "you say something but don't mean it on the ground." -------------- Positive ending: Stop the "blame game" -------------- ¶6. (C) Khan said that Musharraf closed by stating that Pakistan and Afghanistan should have very good relations and by quoting the famous Islamic poet Muhammad Iqbal: "If there is strife in Afghanistan, there will be strife in Asia, and if there is peace in Afghanistan, Asia too will be at peace." Khan said that by the end of the meeting, Musharraf and Karzai agreed they should stop the "blame game" and focus on cooperation. Musharraf agreed to another Presidential meeting later in 2007 as well as the formation of a Joint Working Group of senior officials, leaving it to Turkey to make the arrangements. -------------- -------------- Turkish Ambassador: "Satisfactory" result in Anakara -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Charge met May 8 with Turkish Ambassador Engin Soysal to hear his version of what transpired in Ankara. Soysal attended President Sezer's pre-meeting briefing, participated in the April 29 dinner and joint statement working session, and was actively involved in handling the Pakistani and Afghan delegations. Soysal thanked Charge for the input and suggestions post provided him in advance of the summit, saying these were helpful. ¶8. (S) Turkey's two main objectives for the summit, according to Soysal, were to facilitate a productive Pak-Afghan dialogue in an unobtrusive manner ("we didn't impose an agenda") and to protect carefully its bilateral relationships with Pakistan and Afghanistan, depite the "asymmetry" between them. (Note: Soysal elaborated that Musharraf's relationship with Turkey is much closer than Karzai's. End note.) Soysal said that by these measures, Ankara found the summit's final result "satisfactory". ¶9. (C) Despite the tepid mood between Musharraf and Karzai at the April 29 dinner, Soysal said that the atmosphere among the Pakistani and Afghan delegations at the foreign secretary level was "excellent". This gave Soysal confidence about the prospects for the Joint Working Group moving forward. Soysal observed that the two delegations were clearly on familiar terms and worked well together. Each side had its own ideas about the joint statement (border monitoring and refugee repatriation being the main sticking points),but they resolved their differences cordially and agreed to another summit in late 2007 or early 2008. Soysal described Turkey's presence at the table as "calm, helpful, and ready to accept whatever the two sides came up with." Soysal felt that "the U.S. can't be such a quiet presence in the room" as Turkey. ¶10. (C) According to Soysal's briefing with President Sezer's advisor after the summit meeting, the atmosphere in the room was "tense" at the beginning. He said the Turks' impression was that Musharraf -- after hearing the same generalities from Karzai he had heard often before -- spoke at length because he was far better prepared to discuss policy issues in detail. Soysal said that the leaders appeared more relaxed at the lunch after the summit meeting, when the discussion revolved around foreign investment and privatization. ISLAMABAD 00002107 003 OF 003 -------------- Turkey committed to follow up -------------- ¶11. (C) Soysal said that Turkey "thinks there is momentum" coming out of the trilateral and is very serious about following up on the commitments coming out of the meeting. Turkey is looking for opportunities to encourage support for the Ankara Delcaration, including at NATO and the OIC. Soysal conceded that it will not be easy to get the Joint Working Group off the ground. Turkey is seeking tangible steps it can take to boost Pak-Afghan economic ties -- such as projects in the border areas, disaster management, health, and Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry involvement. BODDE

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