DELEGATION ADVANCES NON-PRO DIALOGUE

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001779



SIPDIS



NOFORN

SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017

TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PGOV, PK, IN

SUBJECT: DELEGATION ADVANCES NON-PRO DIALOGUE



Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Peter W. Bodd per 1.4

(b),(d).



1. (C) Summary: A delegation from the Departments of State

and Energy advanced key U.S.-Pakistan nonproliferation

objectives during a late March visit to Islamabad. The

delegation aimed to put various nonproliferation initiatives

in the context of the overall bilateral relationship and to

encourage the Pakistanis to make progress in a number of

areas that have lagged in recent years, including

establishment of an independent export control authority and

cooperation on the U.S.-led Second Line of Defense/Megaports

initiative. The delegation also proposed new areas of

cooperation in radiological security and explored border

security systems training. The visit underscored Pakistan's

political commitment to a cooperative U.S.-Pakistan

nonproliferation relationship. It was also a reminder of the

importance of remaining closely engaged with the Pakistani

bureaucracy, especially at working levels, to maintain

progress on sensitive and technically complex issues. End

Summary.



2. (C) John Schlosser, Director of the Regional Affairs

office in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and

Kathryn Schultz, Senior Advisor in the International Security

and Nonproliferation Bureau, led a 7-person delegation for

meetings on nonproliferation in Islamabad March 19-23. The

Department of Energy was represented by the National Nuclear

Security Administration's Kelly Cummins, Jimmie Collins, Anne

Kohnen, Christopher Landers and Pacific Northwest National

Laboratory's Greg Herdes. The delegation met with officials

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Pakistan Nuclear

Regulatory Agency, the Central Board of Revenue, and the

Strategic Planning Directorate.



Pakistan committed to a broad-based non-pro relationship

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3. (C) On March 19 Additional Secretary for UN and Economic

Coordination Tariq Osman Hyder hosted the delegation for a

meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to kick-off the

working-level dialogue. Representatives from the Strategic

Planning Directorate also participated. Both sides stressed

the continuing commitment of their governments to a

broad-based nonproliferation relationship, as pledged in the

March 2006 joint statement issued by Presidents Bush and

Musharraf. Schlosser, while recognizing the significant

progress Pakistan made in the past five years, emphasized

that establishing a track record of consistent

nonproliferation cooperation was important to the strategic

partnership and could help open the door to broader bilateral

cooperation in the future. Hyder responded, somewhat

defensively, that Pakistan's commitment was clear and that

there was no reluctance on the Pakistani side to moving

forward in any area of nonproliferation cooperation.



Movement in establishing an Export Control Authority

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4. (C) Two and a half years after the passage of export

control legislation in Pakistan's Parliament, which also

called for the establishment of an independent export control

authority, Pakistan appeared to be taking concrete steps

toward establishing the office. While no firm timelines were

offered, Hyder gave a sketch of the personnel and place

within the government of the planned Strategic Export Control

Division. The Authority will be under the command umbrella

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (though it will likely not

be physically located at the Ministry),and it will be

directed on a day-to-day basis by two Ministry of Foreign

Affairs professionals with policy responsibility; Interior

Ministry, Customs, and Strategic Planning Directorate

officials will round out the interagency group. Hyder said

the current proposal for the Export Authority, which has yet

to be approved by the Prime Minister, called for 117

personnel, a fourth of which would fulfill policy and

coordination functions (17 officers

and 11 inspectors). The rest, Hyder noted, would be support

staff. Both sides agreed that specific areas of cooperation

in support of the new body could be identified once it was

open for business. (Comment: Although we have yet to see



the announcement of the Strategic Export Control Division or

the name of its director, the Pakistani government appears to

be moving toward establishing it within the next few months.

Several embassy contacts have privately conveyed that the

hold-up was in the Finance Ministry. End comment.)



5. (C) Hyder hinted that the new Authority's initial

operating budget might be considerably less than what the

Foreign Ministry recommended. He noted that use of telephone

lines for e-mail communication between the new authority and

the 76 official exit points would not be very secure and

indicated this might be a possible area where U.S. support

would be welcome. Hyder indicated that the National Chemical

Weapons Convention Authority would continue to have a role in

regulating Convention-related chemical exports - it has led

the effort since 2000 - even after the new Export Control

Division is created. Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of

the Arms Control and Disarmament Office in the Strategic

Planning Directorate, said the new Export Control Division

would have overall authority for weapons of mass destruction

and missile-related export control, and would be guided by

the 2004 export control law. As for biological weapons

precursors controlled by the Australia Group, Hyder said that

Pakistan was in the process of expanding its national control

list to encompass those items.



Efforts to Implement UN Security Council

Resolutions 1718 and 1737

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6. (U) Hyder indicated that even without a functional

independent export control authority up and running, Pakistan

was working to implement its 2004 weapons of mass destruction

law, including putting in place regulations consistent with

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1718, and 1737. Hyder

provided a copy of Pakistan's statutory notifications

covering all regulations passed by Pakistan in support of

resolutions 1718 and 1737. They are: Statutory Regulatory

Order 1063(I)/2006 in support of operative paragraph 8 of UN

Security Resolution 1718, notified on 16 October 2006 and

published on 20 October 2006; Statutory Order 1289(I)/2006 in

support of Resolution 1718, notified on 7 November 2006 and

published on 30 December 2006; and Statutory Order 65(I)/2007

in support of Resolution 1737 notified on 15 January 2007 and

published on 23 January 2007.



Megaports memorandum could be signed by late April

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7. (C) Hyder and the Planning Directorate's Banuri noted

there was "no lack of commitment in principle" to the

Megaports Initiative, and that the Government of Pakistan was

in the midst of finalizing a counter-draft of the Memorandum

of Understanding. Hyder and Banuri estimated the Government

of Pakistan would provide the counter-draft within seven to

thirty days and hoped it could be signed shortly thereafter.

Hyder also noted Pakistan's desire to avoid language in the

Memorandum of Understanding along the lines of "nothing can

be implemented unless a specific protocol is reached,"

desiring instead to get the framework agreement and all the

issues spelled out from the start. Second Line of Defense

Project Manager Anne Kohnen seconded the desire to reach as

comprehensive an agreement as possible, but noted the need to

keep the Memorandum flexible enough to accommodate new issues

that may arise. Banuri provided a list of technical

questions Pakistan had related to detection equipment,

indicating that answers to these issues would help Pakistan

expedite its response. (Note: Within one week, the

Department of Energy responded to all of these questions.

The ball is now back in Pakistan's court. End Note.)



EXBS cooperation and a systems approach to border security

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8. (C) Both sides emphasized their continuing support for

cooperation, particularly in the area of export control

training, under the State Department's Export Control and

Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program. Commodore

Banuri noted Pakistan's hope that this cooperation would

remain low-profile, given domestic sensitivities. (Note: A

number of recent EXBS activities with Pakistani officials

have taken place outside Pakistan, e.g., in London. End

Note.)



9. (C) Jimmie Collins, Program Manager for the Department of

Energy's Cooperative Border Security Program, introduced the

notion of collaboration on new border security activities.

Collins explained the Program's "systems approach" to border

security. She also outlined a cooperative approach to

addressing border security challenges through engagement with

both sides of the border and concurrent establishment of

communications links. Foreign Affairs Ministry officials

appeared receptive to the proposal and suggested she discuss

a detailed agenda for such engagement with appropriate

authorities.



Loose Parts Monitoring System and other outstanding issues

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10. (C) Turning to a list of "must-bring-ups" in front of

him, Hyder asked when Pakistan would receive the

long-requested Loose Parts Monitoring System. Kathryn

Schultz responded that the U.S. was taking another look at

Pakistan's request and hoped to have an answer within 45 days.



11. (C) Hyder noted that Pakistan was willing to join the

Missile Technology Control Regime and was asking U.S.

counterparts to support this bid. Hyder explained that

Pakistan saw value in being a part of the organization and in

exchanging denial information. Outreach, Banuri claimed, was

inadequate and perfunctory, and observer status would also be

insufficient. Hyder stressed that those countries with

capabilities should be brought into the export control groups

so that they may act together.



12. (C) With respect to UN Security Council Resolution 1540,

Hyder opined that the U.S. had overcome its concerns during

exchanges at the 1540 experts group in the nonproliferation

and strategic stability dialogue, and urged the U.S. to

consider favorably the experts which Pakistan had nominated

for the group. Hyder expressed dismay that India had been

harsher about resolution 1540 yet had still been invited to

send experts. (Note: The Department subsequently forwarded

to USUN its approval of all three of the Pakistani-nominated

experts. End Note.)



13. (C) Turning to the India Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Initiative, Hyder reiterated the Pakitani view that the

Initiative would harm Pakistani security by allowing India to

utilize all of its indigenous uranium resources in its

military program. He passed the U.S. delegation a paper,

which he said represented his own calculations regarding the

additional weapons-grade plutonium India would be able to

accumulate if the civil nuclear initiative was implemented.

He also noted Pakistan's restraint in not raising these

concerns publicly, and underscored Pakistan's belief in a

criteria-based approach at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.



14. (C) Hyder raised the Proliferation Security Initiative

and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On

the Global Initiative he reiterated concerns with the Terms

of Reference. On the Proliferation Security Initiative he

claimed the U.S. and Pakistan had had only "sporadic"

discussions and noted concerns about Pakistan being treated

either as a "target" or a "partner." Schultz raised the

prospect of Assistant Secretary-level nonproliferation and

strategic stability talks with Pakistan at the earliest

opportunity, where these and other issues could be discussed;

Hyder and Banuri both supported the proposal.



Possibilities for radiological security cooperation

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15. (S/NF) Members of the U.S. delegation met separately

with Dr. Jamshed Azim Hashmi, Chairman of the Pakistan

Nuclear Regulatory Agency, on March 21. Two of the agency's

other high-level leaders were also present - Executive Member

Mohammad Shakilur Rahman and Chief Scientific Officer

Muhammad Khaliq. Hashmi reviewed Pakistan's Nuclear Security

Action Plan, initiated in June 2006. The Nuclear Regulatory

Agency's Action Plan focused on five priorities:



1) Management of Radioactive Sources in category 1, 2, and 3

and evaluation of vulnerable facilities and supporting their

efforts

2) Establishment of a Nuclear Safety/Security Training Center

3) Establishment of a National Nuclear Security Emergency

Coordination Center

4) Locating and securing orphan radioactive sources

5) Provision of detection equipment at strategic points



16. (S/NF) The delegation welcomed this plan and turned to

Kelly Cummins and Christopher Landers, who proposed Pakistani

participation in the National Nuclear Security

Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Cummins

outlined the Threat Reduction mission and program, which

include:



A) Repatriation of U.S. and/or Russian origin Highly Enriched

Uranium fuel from research reactors,

B) Disposition of other high-risk vulnerable material,

C) Conversion of research reactors from Highly-Enriched to

Low-Enriched fuel,

D) Security upgrades to research reactors, and

E) Efforts to reduce risks posed by radiological materials of

concern both domestically in the U.S. and in other countries.





17. (S/NF) With respect to "A", Cummins noted approximately

80 Highly-Enriched Uranium spent fuel assemblies of U.S.

origin that are located at the Pakistan Atomic Research

Reactor-1 would be eligible for removal and disposition to

the U.S. if Pakistan was interested. Hashmi stated that he

personally thought there was no further use for this material

in Pakistan and that it should be returned to the U.S.

Hashmi promised to convey the U.S. offer to the Chairman of

the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, which has

responsibility for this fuel. Turning to "E", which was the

focus of the meeting, Cummins explained the types of efforts

offered in the U.S. to secure and/or dispose of radiological

sources. Cummins then discussed various types of cooperation

the United States engaged in with other countries and

explained how the U.S. would like to initiate radiological

security cooperation with Pakistan. Examples of these

activities include, but are not limited to, physical

protection upgrades at radioactive source user facilities,

transportation security upgrades, and disused or orphaned

source recoveries. Hashmi was immediately receptive to these

ideas but stressed that cooperation would depend on the

approval of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. (Note: The

delegation raised the possibility of this cooperation in the

Hyder meeting at the Foreign Ministry and received a positive

response. End Note.)



18. (S/NF) Hashmi stated that he would prefer this type of

engagement be routed through the International Atomic Energy

Agency, but that strictly bilateral cooperation was possible.

The Chairman suggested the two sides begin drafting a

Memorandum of Understanding to be signed in October/November

2007 on the margins of an International Atomic Energy Agency

training course; the Chairman also suggested the two sides

develop a two-year action plan. On Atomic Energy Agency

involvement, Energy representatives explained that the Office

of Global Threat Reduction typically works bilaterally, but

that it has worked with the Atomic Energy Agency on training

and other activities and would remain open to various options

for cooperative work. Pakistan proposed that Chairman Hashmi

meet with Energy officials in Washington, DC, in early May.

The U.S. delegation proposed Christopher Landers return to

Islamabad in mid-June to hold further detailed discussions

regarding the two-year action plan and work with Pakistan

Nuclear Regulatory Agency officials on moving the Memorandum

of Understanding forward to allow for signature in October

2007.



BODDE