CODEL LOWEY MEETS WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 001631



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PK, PREL, ASEC, PHUM

SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY MEETS WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF



Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b),(d).



1. (S) SUMMARY: In an April 7 meeting with Codel Lowey,

President Musharraf noted his continuing concern that HR-1

(the House version of the 9/11 legislation) would reinforce

widely held Pakistani skepticism over the United States'

long-term commitment to his country. He reiterated his

commitment to fighting militancy along the Pak-Afghan border.

The President pleaded for a Pakistan-U.S. Free Trade

Agreement, explaining that such an agreement would encourage

economic growth and thus discourage extremism. Musharraf

noted that media outlets entreating him to "take action"

against extremists inside Islamabad's Red Mosque were not

taking into account the street demonstrations that might

ensue if any of the women in the mosque were killed or

committed suicide during a police action. Musharraf assured

the codel that Pakistan's Strategic Forces Command had

developed nuclear security safeguards that met international

standards. END SUMMARY.



INTRODUCTION



2. (U) After flying all night from Europe, Codel Lowey --

Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY); Congressman Ed Royce (R-CA);

Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA); Congressman Steve Israel

(D-NY); Congressman Ben Chandler (D-KY); Congressman Tim Ryan

(D-OH); and Congressman Cliff Stearns (R-FL) -- arrived in

Islamabad the morning of April 7. After refreshing

themselves in an arrival lounge spruced up for the occasion

by Embassy GSO staff and the Pakistan Air Force, the codel

moved to President Musharraf's Camp Office. There, the

President, wearing civilian clothes, greeted his fourth

congressional delegation of the week. Musharraf allowed the

meeting to run significantly overtime, delaying the

groundbreaking ceremony for the new Islamabad International

Airport.



3. (U) After the meeting, the Codel Lowey boarded a

Pakistan Army helicopter to travel to the earthquake zone,

where Mrs. Lowey dedicated a new USAID-funded girls middle

school. Upon returning to Islamabad, the group boarded

Embassy Narcotics Assistance Section airplanes to travel to

Peshawar, where the Codel donated new equipment to the

Frontier Corps and witnessed the signing of a Memorandum of

Understanding providing enhanced U.S. support to the Frontier

Constabulary. Back in Islamabad, the codel attended an

Embassy reception where political, NGO, and relief agency

officials exchanged ideas with the codel.



4. (U) On Easter Sunday, Codel Lowey traveled to Lahore.

After a call on the Chief Minister (Septel),the delegation

met with author and journalist Ahmed Rashid, then lunched

with representatives of Pakistan's political elite. After

visiting a USAID competitiveness project, Codel Lowey watched

the Waga Border Crossing ceremony before departing Pakistan

from Lahore Airport.



5. (U) Following is a report on Codel Lowey's meeting with

President Musharraf.



HR-1: MUSHARRAF STILL CONCERNED



6. (C) According to Musharraf, HR-1 would cause some

Pakistanis to doubt the United States' long-term commitment

to Pakistan. (Note: HR-1 is the House version of the 9/11

legislation. It includes a requirement that the U.S.

President certify to Congress that Pakistan is fully

contributing to the War on Terror. End Note.) Musharraf

explained that the Pakistani public had not forgotten the

Presler Sanctions years, particularly the "F-16 incident",

when Pakistan paid for a number of F-16s but could not

receive them because of sanctions. Recounting in great

detail the saga -- including Pakistan's being billed for the



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depreciation of planes it never saw and being refused a

refund on its down payment -- Musharraf stressed that

anything that reminded Pakistanis of the sanctions years

reinforced the widely held belief that the U.S. would turn

its back on Pakistan again in the future.



PAK-AFGHAN BORDER



7. (C) Musharraf admitted the Pak-Afghan border was not as

secure as he would like. Nevertheless, he believed his plan

to encourage tribes to take more responsibility for security

in FATA was the right one. Success against militants

required a combination of military and political action. His

strategy of empowering tribal leaders was right, he said,

though some of the implementation had been flawed; he assured

the codel that he was involved personally in improving

implementation tactics. He said the tribes slowly were

turning against AQ and other foreign elements and were

increasingly cooperating with the government in efforts to

root out the foreigners. Musharraf intended to maintain

pressure on tribal leaders to live up to agreements they had

signed with the government.



8. (S) Musharraf stressed that Pakistan was committed to

shutting down Taliban and Anti-Coalition Militia elements.

The ISI was working to capture other militant leaders. Mullah

Omar, said the President, was in Afghanistan.





PAKISTAN WANTS AN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT



9. (C) Musharraf noted that Pakistan's economy was growing

at over seven percent per annum. The macro-economic

indicators were strong, and Pakistan now wanted trade more

than aid. Increased trade with the U.S., would reduce

poverty and unemployment and in turn discourage religious

extremism. Musharraf argued that a Free Trade Agreement with

the United States would support investment in Pakistan and

keep Pakistan's economy growing. Acknowledging that the U.S.

wanted to negotiate a Bilateral Investment Treaty before

discussing the possibility of an FTA, Musharraf said that his

technical experts believed a BIT would be of limited value

without an accompanying FTA.



10. (C) Answering questions from the Codel about how

Musharraf would make sure an FTA actually benefited poor

people, not just wealthy business owners, the President

explained he had a master plan to encourage small and medium

enterprises, the types of businesses that would benefit most

from an FTA.





EDUCATION



11. (C) Musharraf reported the biggest challenge facing

Pakistan was universalizing education by ensuring that every

child lived within walking distance to a school. The

government, he said, was recruiting people in local

communities and training them to be teachers. The government

was also working to improve the quality of all primary and

secondary schools.



12. (C) The government planned to open nine new

universities, reported the President. Europe, East Asia and

Turkey would provide curricula and, initially, teachers, but

Pakistan would pay to develop the universities. Musharraf

also planned to encourage a technical education office that

would work with the business community to produce graduates

that could fill needs in the technical and other sectors.



13. (C) Musharraf explained that only three percent of

students in Pakistan were enrolled in madrassahs. He

described madrassahs as "an issue, not the issue, in



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education." With the help of the U.S., Pakistan had greatly

increased its education budget, providing increasing numbers

of families with alternatives to madrassah education.

Musharraf reported that his government had officially

registered most madrassahs and had encouraged foreign

students to leave. The only foreign students still allowed

in Pakistan were those with "No Objection Certificates" from

their home governments. Musharraf also restated his

commitment to introducing academic curricula in madrassahs.



EXTREMISM



14. (C) Musharraf emphasized that extremist parties had

never polled more than five percent in a general election,

except in 2002, when negative reaction to the war in

Afghanistan pushed their results up to 18 percent. He

believed that in the next election, the religious parties

would poll closer to their historical levels. He predicted

the religious parties would lose in the NWFP, where they now

control the government, because they had not fulfilled their

election promises.



15. (C) Musharraf explained to the codel that, while parts

of FATA were "on fire" with extremism, the entirety of FATA

was only one percent of the population of Pakistan, and the

Waziristans were only .3 percent. While noting that most

Pakistanis were religious, he stressed that being religious

should not be confused with being extremist.



16. (C) Musharraf reminded the codel that Pakistan was an

illiterate and religious society. Imposing change would not

work; leaders needed to encourage social transformation

through engagement with religious elements. The alternative

-- forcing secularism on society -- had backfired on the Shah

of Iran.



RED MOSQUE



17. (C) Musharraf said he was troubled by the ongoing

stand-off at the Red Mosque in Islamabad. (Note: The

mosque, in the heart of Islamabad, adjoins a women's seminary

that is home to 2,000-3,000 women. Many of those women are

orphans, widows, and divorcees. For the last two months,

they have been joined by several hundred extremist women and

a fluctuating number of extremist men, some of them

reportedly militants. The leaders of the mosque have demanded

a variety of actions from the Government. The mosque issue

will be updated septel. End Note.) Musharraf believed about

700-800 extremists were in the mosque and madrassah, and he

believed they would commit suicide if attacked. It was the

fear that some of the women would commit suicide -- or be

killed in an ensuing fight -- that had kept him from using

force to end the stand off. Aside from the moral problem of

causing the death of young women, Musharraf worried that

attacking the mosque would provoke street unrest throughout

the country.



18. (C) Musharraf noted that religious scholars were

publicly and adamantly opposing the militants' actions at the

Red Mosque. He said religious leaders were on television and

the radio every night saying that the leaders of the sit-in

were "mad." As the sit-in leaders realized they had lost the

public's support, they would be more willing to strike a deal

with the government.



19. (C) Musharraf promised that, once the crisis is

resolved, he will assure the arrest of the two mosque leaders

instigated the stand-off.



CHIEF JUSTICE CONTROVERSY



20. (C) Musharraf said he had known that issuing a

reference against the Chief Justice would cause turbulence,



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but he believed he had no choice. Even with hindsight, he

would take the same action again. Musharraf explained that

the Chief Justice had forced officials to appoint his son to

the Health Ministry and then to a senior police position

despite the fact that the son had failed the civil service

exams. (The President related that the son had scored 13/100

on his English exam.) The Chief Justice of the High Court of

Balochistan complained to Musharraf about the Chief Justice's

intervening to order friends released on bail, according to

Musharraf, and the Chief Justice had also interfered in

police investigations against friends. He claimed that the

Justice was refusing to clear names for the High Court in

Punjab, and instead was insisting on the appointment of his

friends.



21. (C) Musharraf said he would like to get the true story

of the Chief Justice out, but since the case was now sub

judice, the government could not comment. He said his

actions had been completely constitutional, and that he was

confident the Supreme Judicial Council would handle the

matter correctly.



NUCLEAR SECURITY



22. (S) Musharraf explained that the highly secret and

decentralized nature of Pakistan's nuclear development

program up until the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests had

enabled AQ Khan to export technological know-how without

being observed by key officials. He noted that, since the AQ

Khan period, Pakistan had created a Strategic Forces Command

to bring Pakistan's nuclear security safeguards up to

international standards.



BODDE