RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000009 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/21/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR ECON SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD? RPO DUBAI 00000009 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. REASON: 1.4 (d) 1.(S/NF) Summary: A well-connected Iranian professor criticized the Ahmadinejad's government for gross mismanagement and claimed that large portions of the population had turned against him. A clear Rafsanjani supporter, he claimed the Expediency Council is the one person in Iranian politics who can act as a counterweight to the Supreme Leader. The contact appeared to have a good understanding of Western perspectives of Iran, based on his years studying in the US and the UK. His insights into Rafsanjani are useful, and his claims of Rafsanjani activism are shared by others. His assessment of Rafsanjani as the sole counterweight to the Supreme Leader, however, seems exaggerated. End summary 2.(S/NF) An engineering professor from Sharif University shared February 26 his assessment of the current situation in Iran. Although clearly pro-Rafsanjani, he was not particularly politically active, although he came from a prominent family. His views seemed to have been shaped by three important factors. He is reportedly related by marriage to Rafsanjani and has met him on a number of occasions. He is from a reportedly prominent bazaari family, although he says he clashes with his father's traditionalist views. And his years spent studying in the US and UK appeared have allowed him to understand the Western perspective on Iran and given him some fairly pro-Western views. (For instance, he said his non-objection to his daughter studying abroad is relatively rare in Iran.) He repeatedly made clear his views were his own and that he did not have first-hand access to information, although he mentioned he and his family go to Rafsanjani's house once a year or every other year to pay respects. He also claimed that his father is one of chief informal advisors to the regime on commercial matters and as such serves as the principal liaison between the bazaaris and the government. (Note: this assertion has not been independently confirmed. Endnote) His father was reportedly imprisoned and tortured by the Shah, accused of funding Islamists against the government, and held several years in Evin prison. He later held a high level position at the Ministry of Ershad when Khatami was minister. Ahmadinejad: a bad manager -------------- 3.(S/NF) The professor said his traditionalist father supports President Ahmadinejad because he thinks he is honest, but the son disagrees and is very critical of the president's performance. In the professor's view, the Iranian government's worst enemy is its bad management. Anyone qualified has left public service or been fired. He also claimed most bazaaris have turned against Ahmadinejad because of his economic mismanagement of the country, a view echoed by other contacts. Another contact claimed that the bazaaris are actively trying to undermine Ahmadinejad by creating artificial shortages of goods to increase pressure on the government. A different contact claimed Rafsanjani is directing such meddling. 4.(S/NF) After a year and a half in office, Ahmadinejad has also alienated wider swaths of the population by not keeping his economic promises, the professor said. In a separate conversation, an Iranian economist said that that the roughly 30 percent of the population who either a) directly benefited from oil dollars in the past; or b) were staunch conservatives in support of Ahmadinejad are turning against him as their pockets become lighter. Another contact commented that Ahmadinejad's weakness is that his major economic priority from the beginning was redistribution of wealth, not economic development, but in any case has failed in his efforts. Private sector complaints -------------- 5.(S/NF) The professor, who also owns a publishing company, said he has had to lay off 20 employees since the economy started plummeting. Other business contacts have also said they've been forced to lay off large numbers of employees. The professor echoed others' comments that they are unsure how to make decisions regarding their privately owned businesses in light of undefined possible sanctions coming down the pike. Lessons learned? RPO DUBAI 00000009 002.2 OF 003 -------------- 6.(S/NF) In a view shared by many of our contacts, the professor believes Ahmadinejad's win resulted from two factors: 1) an order from the Supreme Leader to the head of IRGC to use IRGC and Basij to mobilize votes for him; and 2) votes from uneducated people who believed his promises of economic support. One source claimed that the Supreme Leader thought that Ahmadinejad would be a humble, pliable man of the people and was surprised by his antagonistic posturing. He heard that in the December 2006 elections, the Supreme Leader instructed IRGC not to work against Rafsanjani. He is also hearing that large portions of the IRGC and Basij no longer support Ahmadinejad, a view shared by some other contacts. The professor said the silver lining may be that this election will act as a maturing experience for the Iranian electorate, who will learn from the "worst mistake they have ever made." Rafsanjani moves to counter the president -------------- 7.(S/NF) The professor said he thought one of Rafsanjani's most significant recent statements was his speech for anniversary of the revolution, in which he claimed to have advised Ayatollah Khomeini that then President Bani-Sadr was not the right person for the job, prior to Bani-Sadr's ouster. The professor said this comment was believed to have been a veiled threat that he could do the same with Ahmadinejad. 8.(S/NF) The professor claimed that Rafsanjani has a good relationship with the grand ayatollahs and has persuaded them not to meet Ahmadinejad. He claimed the grand ayatollahs are generally suspicious that Ahmadinejad is dragging the country into conflict and specifically peeved that the president took it upon himself to write a letter to the Pope. Another source also mentioned that the grand ayatollahs are shunning the president, but for the more selfish reason in that they believe he is jeopardizing their interests. His view of Rafsanjani -------------- 9.(S/NF) The professor asserted that Rafsanjani genuinely cares about Iran, wants a better relationship with West, and can make it happen. He called him the only counterweight to the Supreme Leader in Iranian politics. Without indicating how many times he has met Rafsanjani, he indicated at least several occasions of family gatherings. He described the Expediency Chair as honest in his politics, though he quickly qualified that perhaps he is less honest in other ways, alluding to the rampant rumors of corruption. He said Rafsanjani is very intelligent, with an IQ of 170. He also said he has the knack of remembering details about people. The first time he met him, he said, they discussed the Internet. When they met again years later, Rafsanjani recalled the conversation. 10.(S/NF) The professor said Rafsanjani made a lot of mistakes as president, although he claimed he was the only person who would give the Supreme Leader realistic assessments of the situation during the Iran-Iraq war. The professor felt that then President Khatami and the reformers made a mistake by humiliating Rafsanjani instead of bringing him onboard to help them fight their battles. He said Rafsanjani's two electoral humiliations sent him into a state of depression but that his landslide win in December had reenergized him. When asked about the rumor that the Supreme Leader may be replaced by a council, he didn't answer, simply saying Rafsanjani has the ability to energize any institution with which he is associated. Differing views of Supreme Leader's current take on Ahmadinejad -------------- -------------- 11.(S/NF) The professor believes that unlike Rafsanjani, the Supreme Leader changes his opinion frequently, according to whoever gets his ear. The professor believes the Supreme Leader dropped support for Ahmadinejad briefly in the time around the December election but has given him back his support in the past few weeks. He argued that although the leader knows he made a mistake by bringing Ahmadinejad in, cutting him loose will undermine the leader's authority. On the other hand, a Tehran-based businessman disputed this assessment and said he did not think Ahmadinejad had returned to the leader's good graces, citing his absence at several recent meetings the leader RPO DUBAI 00000009 003.2 OF 003 had with cabinet members. US-Iran relations -------------- 12.(S/NF) Regarding relations with the US, the professor understood the US need to forcefully counteract Iranian aggression in Iraq, but he thought it was necessary to find a way for the two countries to talk. He was very worried that the countries were drifting into war, predicting disastrous results. He said there was little understanding of the US position on the nuclear issue inside Iran because of the spin the regime puts on the news. Specifically, he said there was little knowledge of what P5-1 is offering Iran, little understanding of the US position on civilian energy, and little recognition of the symbolic importance of the offer that Secretary Rice would conduct the negotiations herself. 13.(S/NF) He maintained that the US now sees itself as a father figure in the world, and it should therefore deal with Iran as an errant son, assuring him that acceptance back in the fold is possible, rather than like someone who will always be an outsider. He said acts of "kindness" go a long way and applauded efforts such as the recent travel to Iran by the US wresting team. He believed that President Bush should offer a meeting with no preconditions, but only with the Supreme Leader or Rafsanjani. There would be enormous pressure from Iran to accept. The leader would likely refuse, but Rafsanjani would find a way to do it. 14.(S/NF) Comment: While his statements to a US official may have been colored by the fact that his son was applying for a US student visa the next day, he repeatedly stressed that these are simply his views and what he is hearing others say, and didn't claim any firsthand access to knowledge. Both he and the Iranian-American who introduced him to IRPO Director are clear supporters of Rafsanjani, who they pitch as the key to solving the Iranian problem. Given our limited access to the Iranian population, it is difficult to assess the general sentiment on Rafsanjani at this time, although Rafsanjani's December election results would seem to indicate significant popularity in Tehran. Several contacts claim that Rafsanjani is actively working to isolate Ahmadinejad and influence decision-making, in cooperation with Khatami. On the other hand, calling Rafsanjani the only counterweight to the Supreme Leader seems to run counter to the predominant view of Iranian politics as dominated by multiple spheres of influence. BURNS