UNODC OFFICIAL VIEWS IRAN DRUG CHIEF REPLACEMENT A SIGN OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000026

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IRAN, INL, INR, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/23/2027
TAGS: IR KCRM PGOV PREL PINR SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIAL VIEWS IRAN DRUG CHIEF REPLACEMENT A SIGN OF
HARDLINER RESURGENCE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: The head of Tehran's UNODC office sees the
recent dismissal of Fada Hossein Maleki as head of the Drug
Control Headquarter as a sign that President Ahmadi-Nejad got
the upper hand over Expediency Council head Rafsanjani.
Although appointed by Ahmadi-Nejad, Maleki reportedly moved into
Rafsanjani's camp as he came to see value in international
engagement on the drug issue. When he reportedly confronted
Ahmadi-Nejad over the president's decision not to let him attend
a ministerial level meeting in Vienna, Ahmadi-Nejad fired him
but was unable to actually get rid of him until the crisis over
the British sailors strengthened his position over pragmatists,
in Arbitrio's view. The UN official noted that while he
believed hardliners currently had the upper hand in Iran, the
internal political dynamics could shift again. He also said
Iranians increasingly recognize that their own government is the
source of Iran's tense international relations. End summary.

2.(S/NF) UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Tehran-based Field
rep Roberto Arbitrio (Italian citizen, please protect) opined in
an April 21 meeting with IRPOffs that the recent dismissal of
Fada Hossein Maleki as secretary-general of the Drug Control
Headquarters demonstrates that currently hardliners have the
upper hand in Iran. Arbitrio's account fills in holes from
recent conflicting reports in the Iranian press whether or not
Maleki was on his way out, prior to the definitive news of
Brigadier General Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moqaddam's swearing-in April

11. Arbitrio's assessment is based on a conversation between
his staff and Maleki and therefore only tells Maleki's side of
the story. Arbitrio's updates on the drug situation in Iran and
Iran's regional cooperation to be provided septel.

Maleki unemployed or not?
--------------

3.(S/NF) As background, Arbitrio said that when UNODC Director
General Costa visited Iran in November 2006, Maleki appealed to
him for assistance in helping Iran approach the international
community on the drug issue via Afghanistan and specifically
NATO. Maleki's interest in international engagement, Arbitrio
said, was the result of UNODC's efforts over a year and a half
to convince him of the benefits of such activities. He noted
that in Costa's subsequent meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad, the
president did not specifically reiterate the point about
reaching out to NATO, calling only for regional engagement.
Nonetheless, UNODC assumed his endorsement, given that Maleki
was seen as close to Ahmadi-Nejad, who had appointed him.

4.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio, Costa took this request on board
and worked on organizing a ministerial level delegation from
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to address major donors in
Vienna. When he heard the meeting was moving ahead, Maleki was
reportedly very happy and grateful, and said he would attend.
However, when the Iranian authorities sent passports to the
Tehran UNODC office for the trip, Maleki's was missing. Late
February, UNODC in Tehran heard that perhaps Maleki would not go
and perhaps no one else would go either. However, in Vienna,
the Iranian mission told UNODC that all was on track. By
February 27, Arbitrio, already in Vienna, heard no one was
traveling from Iran. Reportedly, the Pakistanis were very upset
when they heard the Iranians were pulling out, and Afghanistan
and Pakistan eventually sent a lower level delegation.

5.(S/NF) On March 2, Iranian Ambassador Soltaniyeh requested a
meeting with Costa, attended by Arbitrio. Soltaniyeh reportedly
made no apologies for Iran's no-show, simply saying that Maleki
had a "personal commitment," and reiterated Iran's interest in
increasing international cooperation. Costa was reportedly very
upset by Iran's handling of the matter but said he would
continue to try to facilitate international contacts.

6.(S/NF) Arbitrio said his staff later (no date given) talked
directly to Maleki about what had happened. Maleki reportedly
said that when he learned about the ministerial meeting, he
requested a meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad. After the president
"reluctantly" gave him an appointment, he told Maleki he would
not approve the meeting. When Maleki pressed for a reason,
saying that Costa had organized the meeting as a response to the
president's request, Ahmadi-Nejad gave no explanation.

7.(S/NF) According to Arbitrio's readout of the conversation

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with Maleki, others lobbied the president to change his mind
about Iranian attendance at the Vienna meeting, including
Judiciary chief Shahroudi and Foreign Minister Mottaki, without
success. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi could not even
get a meeting with the president, according to Maleki. Maleki
claimed he managed to get a second meeting with Ahmadi-Nejad in
which he pleaded to be allowed to go. When Ahmadi-Nejad did not
change his mind, Maleki claimed he told the president he was
making a mistake, and Ahmadi-Nejad reportedly responded by
firing him.

8.(S/NF) Maleki reportedly then contacted Expediency Council
Chair Rafsanjani, who got angry that he had not been consulted.
According to Iran's drug policy, the president is the chair of
the Drug Control Headquarters, but the Expediency Council plays
a supervisory role. After some kind of intervention by
Rafsanjani, Maleki's dismissal was reportedly rescinded, and
Maleki traveled mid-March to Vienna for a different
anti-narcotics meeting. In Vienna, Maleki reportedly reassured
Costa that he was still in charge. Arbitrio said it was a
strange delegation that traveled with Maleki, less than half of
whom seemed pro-Maleki, most pro-IRGC. When Maleki met with
Costa, the delegation insisted on providing its own interpreter,
which Arbitrio said was not standard.

9.(S/NF) Per Arbitrio's Foreign Ministry sources, the source of
the tension between Maleki and Ahmadi-Nejad was Maleki's growing
closeness with Rafsanjani. As Maleki reportedly came to see the
value of engagement on the drug issue to Iran's overall foreign
policy, he gradually moved towards Rafsanjani, who was more
sympathetic to this view than Ahmadi-Nejad. Ahmadi-Nejad was
reportedly unhappy about the situation but only saw his chance
to act upon it in the aftermath of the British sailors crisis.
According to Arbitrio, Ahmadi-Nejad had orchestrated the
incident to get the upper hand over the pragmatists. Arbitrio
believes that one consequence of the situation was that
Ahmadi-Nejad succeeded in dismissing Maleki. Two days after the
sailors' release, Maleki received his dismissal letter. What
was particularly unusual, the letter did not include an onward
assignment.

10.(S/NF) Arbitrio also commented he was surprised how
out-of-the-loop the Foreign Ministry had been on the issue,
saying that UNODC heard before the ministry did that Maleki was
not being allowed to attend the ministerial meetings in Vienna.

Starting over with a new head
--------------

11.(S/NF) Maleki's replacement, Ahmadi-Moqaddam, also retains
his role as Chief of Police and supposedly has the protection of
the president. He is reportedly married to the president's
sister. He comes out of the IRGC and reportedly met
Ahmadi-Nejad working on security issues in Kurdistan. He was
also deputy commander of the Basij. Rafsanjani reportedly
criticized Moqaddam for helping Ahmadi-Nejad in the presidential
elections. Arbitrio said that Maleki had earlier told him
before that Ahmadi-Nejad wanted to replace him with Moqaddam, in
order to get the police inside the Drug Control Headquarters.

12.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who was in Dubai en route to Pakistan, said
he would meet Moqaddam for the first time after his return to
Iran. He expressed frustration at having to rebuild a
relationship with the new head and - he hoped - convince him of
the benefits of international engagement on the drug issue.
Arbitrio could not say he understood what Ahmadi-Nejad's policy
on the issue was. Maleki's dismissal could have been the result
of policy differences on this issue of international engagement,
or it could have been simply intended to punish Maleki for
switching alliances. He also noted that other issues could have
been at play. Maleki had come from mid-level ranks of the
Ministry of Interior and as such was not widely accepted by the
police. This supposedly caused problems in implementing Drug
Control Headquarters policy. Now, the drug office and the
anti-narcotics police are unified, but Arbitrio said it was too
soon to judge whether this would have positive or negative
effects on drug policy. He also repeated a rumor that Moqaddam
may have been appointed to the new position in essence to
sideline him because of unhappiness with his performance
regarding the deteriorating security situation in Sistan-va
Baluchistan.

Hardliners on the upsurge
--------------

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13.(S/NF) Arbitrio, who very clearly caveats between what he
knows and what he surmises, said he believes that as a result of
the seizure of the British sailors, the hardliners generally
have the upper hand in Iran. He noted, however, that this could
change at any time, making Iranian decision-making hard to
predict. He believes that Ahmadi-Nejad knows he faces a
legitimacy gap, demonstrated in every democratic exercise in
Iran, including the December 2006 elections and the push-back he
has gotten from the Majles. Arbitrio said the Iranians he knows
believe the hardliners know they will lose in any future
election absent any change, so the hardliners are either
plotting to forego elections or to make sure elections are held
in a crisis situation. Therefore, in Arbitrio's view,
Ahmadi-Nejad uses crises like the nuclear issue and the British
sailors to artificially create consensus and to confront
pragmatists. Arbitrio also believes that Ahmadi-Nejad, who he
has met in two short meetings as well as the long meeting with
Costa, suffers from a Napoleonic complex (Arbitrio estimated his
height at 168 cm). He had heard that the president has fired
people for being taller than him.

14.(S/NF) The religious-military alliance sees itself above
democracy, and isolation and tension simply empowers them.
Arbitrio also claimed that Iran is increasingly militarized,
citing visible anti-aircraft weapons both around Tehran and en
route to Esfahan. He is also increasingly doubtful of the
Supreme Leader's control over the situation. He thinks the
Supreme Leader feels more threatened by Rafsanjani than by
Ahmadi-Nejad, particularly given Rafsanjani's calls to reassess
the role of the Supreme Leader. Arbitrio also said that he is
hearing for the first time in a long time that there are limits
to Rafsanjani's scope of action, and he doubted reformers could
have much impact on the political scene.

15.(S/NF) Arbitrio said there is a real fear in Iran that war is
on the horizon. UNODC and embassies are doing contingency
planning, he has stocked up on food and water at home, and
embassies are counting their nationals. One ambassador told him
that until three months ago, he thought conflict was unlikely
but that he was now discouraged and saw no sign that Iran would
pursue a sensible solution. One change Arbitrio noted among
Iranian people with whom he has contact, however, was that in
the past they blamed US policy for the tense bilateral
relations, but now they've realized that their president is to
blame. They are more worried what the "Iranian Hizballah" will
do and say next than what the US will do. They also see that it
is no longer a US-Iran issue, but that the international
community is unified in their objections to Iranian behavior.
BURNS