Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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07IRANRPODUBAI1 | 2007-01-03 16:50:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai |
VZCZCXRO8168 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK DE RUEHDIR #0001/01 0031650 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P R 031650Z JAN 07 FM IRAN RPO DUBAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0046 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0043 RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0039 |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000001 |
1.(S/NF) Summary: A longtime Iranian-American contact introduced IRPO Director to a former IRGC general, with whom he claimed a long acquaintance. While the former general's motivations for agreeing to such a meeting were not clear, he did not use this initial meeting in any way to offer himself as a conduit to the Iranian government or to solicit much information about US intentions regarding Iran. Instead, he presented his views of the current power structure in Iran, the conflicting factions, Al Qaida, Iraq, and the IRGC's economic role. (His views on US-Iran relations to be reported septel.) He was disdainful of President Ahmadinejad and other sources of power in Iran and conveyed the impression that he was disappointed in how the IRGC had veered off course. His disappointment in the present state of affairs did not, however, convey a lack of loyalty to the Islamic Republic of Iran. End summary 2.(S/NF) In a December 18 meeting, a long-time Iranian-American contact introduced IRPO Director to a former IRGC general who left the IRGC in the mid 1990s and left government about eight years ago. (Note: all the information in this report is sourced either to the contact or to the Iranian-American and cannot be independently confirmed. Endnote) According to the former official, he quit university to join the IRGC at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. After the war ended, he stayed in the IRGC another five years working in budget and planning offices. He attained a bachelors degree in philosophy, and a masters in urban planning. He claims to have always been politically independent and said he became a general on his own merits through his work and beliefs, not through political affiliations. He said he left the IRGC because he was being pressured to join a political faction. After leaving the IRGC, he went to the Ministry of Ershad where he said he was in charge of embassy cultural officers. Since leaving government eight years ago, he went into business and continues to live in Iran. Ahmadinejad: intelligent - to a degree -------------------------- 3.(S/NF) The former general claimed to have known President Ahmadinejad while in the IRGC. He described Ahmadinejad as very tough, with no fear, and intelligent "to a degree." In his view, however, Ahmadinejad serves as merely an extension of Supreme Leader Khamenei - not a creator of strategy, only an implementer. (Note: The Iranian-American in an earlier conversation with IRPO Director claimed the former general had told him that even in the days when Ahmadinejad was in the IRGC, he was pressing the issue of what should be done about the coming of the 12th imam. Endnote) The former general said that some of Ahmadinejad's beliefs run counter to Khomeini's, such as pro-Hojjatiyeh views, now accepted by Khamenei. Power circles -------------------------- 4.(S/NF) The former general described various power circles around the president. He was dismissive of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi but said the ideology of the Hojjatiyeh founder, the late Sheikh Mahmoud Halabi, lives on, and the Hojjatiyeh remain influential. In addition, he said, prior to Ahmadinejad's election, a politicized group within the IRGC was quite influential. When Ahmadinejad took office, this group left the IRGC and went into government. He also named Interior Ministry Security Deputy, Brigadier General Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr, and former Intelligence Minister Hojatoleslam Mohammad Reyshahri, now the Supreme Leader's representative for Hajj affairs, as powerful individuals. 5.(S/NF) The source claimed to know Zolqadr from the IRGC and said he is now in change of security for Tehran. The former general said he left IRGC when Zolqadr tried to pressure him to join political factions. He claimed Zolqadr is not popular within the IRGC. He contrasted Zolqadr with the "real" Revolutionary Guard, the real believers. These figures are popular with the Iranian people, who regard them as war heroes, he said, just like Americans regard WWII heroes. The Iranian-American called Zolqadr "crazy," and said he is close to IRGC Commander Safavi and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaie, also former IRGC. RPO DUBAI 00000001 002.2 OF 003 6.(S/NF) According to the former general, Reyshahri gained significant economic power through the food export business and is now trying to replace Rafsanjani as both a political and economic power in Iran, though he prefers to remain behind the scenes. Although Reyshahri is no longer in the IRGC or the intelligence ministry, he uses his friends in those institutions, and reportedly gets influence and income through companies controlled by the Qods force and the intelligence ministry. 7.(S/NF) The former general did not think Tehran Mayor Qalibaf had deep support in the IRGC, calling him a "fad" of the moment. However, he thinks the Supreme Leader takes Qalibaf and Larijani seriously. On the other hand, he thought that Rezaie still has a lot of influence, but he is waiting for a political opportunity in the future. He believes Rezaie is stronger than Ahmadinejad. Iran's relations with Al-Qaida, Iraq -------------------------- 8.(S/NF) When asked about his views of Iran's relationship with Al-Qaida, the former general said only that during the days of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, some of the fighters were trained in Iran and perhaps some links to Iranian elements were retained. 9.(S/NF) When IRPO Director raised the issue of Iran's support inside Iraq causing deaths of US soldiers and the potential clash that this support could cause, he said only that if it is true that Iran is giving such support, it is the result of one faction. This faction would see such actions as defending Iran on Iraqi soil, so as to deter an attack on Iran itself. However, he said, other factions in Iran want reestablishment of relations with the US. (Note: this conversation took place before the December 21 capture by US forces in Iraq of Iranian IRGC members. Endnote) The former general called Iraq a lost cause and said even Iran cannot help the situation. Nonetheless, he recommended quiet exchanges through intelligence services. He predicted the consequences of the present situation to be very dangerous. Economic Role of IRGC -------------------------- 10.(S/NF) In line with reftel, the former general said that the evolution of the IRGC's economic arm was a natural one. Although Prime Minister Bazargan formed the IRGC, the government did not initially fund it. For the first three months, funding came from the bazaaris, until the war with Iraq broke out. During the war, the government funded the IRGC generously but then cut its budget after the war ended. The organization looked for ways to generate its own income, although he said some inside the organization opposed this strategy. At the same time, then President Rafsanjani turned to IRGC engineers, who had gained a lot of experience in the war at creative problem-solving, to help rebuild the country. IRGC began to form companies. Eventually, this trend led to negative political ramifications, according to the former general. Now the IRGC can generate its own budget, reducing the government's influence over the organization. President Khatami tried to control it through the budget, but opposing factions found ways to direct business towards the IRGC. The former general maintained, in contrast to views in reftel, that the quality of work performed by IRGC companies is superior to other companies. That said, he decried both personal gain of wealth and accruement of political power that have accompanied IRGC business activity. He also acknowledged the damage done to competitiveness in bidding for contracts. 11.(S/NF) Comment: This was our first meeting with this contact and a rare chance to examine views of a former IRGC official, albeit one who has been out of the organization for over a decade. In this meeting, he did not try to offer himself as a conduit to the Iranian government in any way. Nor did he seem to be on any kind of expedition to try to collect intelligence. He appeared to simply want to express his views of the current situation and to give advice. His view of factions within the IRGC mirrors comments of others, but given his background, appear more credible. His disappointment in the present state of affairs did not, however, appear to convey a lack of loyalty to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although his current access to RPO DUBAI 00000001 003.2 OF 003 information is unknown, he claims to have ongoing contacts with some influential figures, including Mohammad Reza Khatami, the former deputy Majles speaker and brother of the president, making him a worthwhile interlocutor. BURNS |