U.S.-CHINA COMMISSION VISIT TO HONG KONG: MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 001689 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2032 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CH HK SUBJECT: U.S.-CHINA COMMISSION VISIT TO HONG KONG: MEETINGS WITH GOVERNMENT AND DAB Classified By: Acting DPO Laurent Charbonnet; Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 30, a visiting delegation from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) discussed Hong Kong political developments with Hong Kong Chief Executive's Office Director John Tsang and Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam. Lam, while noting that on the "democratization front" the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSARG) had "only been able to make limited progress so far," claimed this was an improvement over the pre-1997 situation. There were, however, "some trappings" of democracy, and the HKSARG planned to initiate a community-wide dialogue on universal suffrage through issuance of a "green paper" in July. After about three months of public comment, the HKSARG would see if any "mainstream view" emerged and forward that plan to the central government in Beijing. Lam said that Chief Executive Donald Tsang wanted to resolve the universal suffrage issue sometime during his current five-year (2007-12) term, and that the 2012 CE election would include at least two candidates chosen by a "broadly based nominating committee." John Tsang noted the Basic Law's requirement for achievement of a tripartite consensus among the CE, two-thirds of Legco, and Beijing on any proposal for constitutional reform. ¶2. (C) In a separate meeting, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) leaders Maria Tam and Greg So provided their views on the political reform process, in large part matching those of the HKSARG. Regarding the need to reach consensus and gain approval of at least sixty percent of the people of Hong Kong, Tam observed that a referendum mechanism "won't work here" and "will not happen" because "the source of power is from Beijing, not from the people." Tam said the DAB at this time did not have a formal position on universal suffrage. On the March 2007 CE election, Tam opined that the process had gone well and the two televised debates had demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates. Asked for the central government's view on the political situation in Hong Kong, Tam replied that Beijing was "happy" because there were fewer protests under CE Tsang. End Summary. HKSARG -------------- ¶3. (C) On April 30, Hong Kong Chief Executive's Office Director John Tsang and Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Stephen Lam discussed Hong Kong's political development with a visiting delegation from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Lam, listing some of Hong Kong's economic advances since the 1997 reversion to the PRC, also noted that on the "democratization front" the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSARG) had "only been able to make limited progress so far," although he claimed this was an improvement over the pre-1997 situation. Lam said the televised debates and publication of platforms by both candidates in the March 2007 Chief Executive (CE) election had made it possible for the Hong Kong people to appreciate fully the "pluses and minuses" of each candidate; while Hong Kong did not yet have full universal suffrage, there were "some trappings" of democracy. To advance to the next stage, Lam said CE Tsang had promised to initiate a community-wide dialogue on universal suffrage by issuing a "green paper," which he said would not include any "government stance." After about three months of public comment, the HKSARG would see if any "mainstream view" emerged; if so, then it would forward that plan to the central government in Beijing. Asked by USCC Chairman Bartholomew to reconcile that approach with the report in that morning's "South China Morning Post" (SCMP),according to which Beijing had expressed concern about the idea of a "green paper" and, more generally, about early introduction of universal suffrage in Hong Kong, Lam replied that the SCMP report was "not official and not confirmed." He added that CE Tsang had promised to hold discussions, then publish the green paper sometime after July 1, and then resolve the universal suffrage issue sometime during his current five-year (2007-12) term. Lam said that for the 2012 CE election, there would be "at a minimum two candidates" chosen by a "broadly based nominating committee" as required by the Basic Law. In the end, Lam said "we will have universal suffrage." ¶4. (C) In response to Chairman Bartholomew's concern that, ten years after reversion, there still was no timetable for implementation of universal suffrage, John Tsang noted the Basic Law's requirement for achievement of a tripartite HONG KONG 00001689 002 OF 003 consensus among the CE, two-thirds of Legco, and Beijing (the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) on any proposal for constitutional reform. CE Tsang had offered a constitutional reform package in late-2005, but Legco had rejected it. Tsang said this issue was "very high on the (CE's) agenda." Lam, noting USG support for democracy around the world, said that "here in Hong Kong we need to find democracy that suits Hong Kong," a process which he said the government had started. For that purpose, in November 2005 the HKSARG had established the Commission for Strategic Development (CSD) to consider options within the constraint imposed by Beijing that the 2007 CE and 2008 Legco elections were "too soon" for universal suffrage. The Government had done so, producing the proposal for limited reform that Legco rejected in December 2005. ¶5. (C) Chairman Bartholomew asked why CE Tsang sometimes referred to the pan-democratic parties as "the opposition," when there was no actual "government party" in Hong Kong. Lam noted that the pan-democrats, including "(Democratic Party legislator) Martin Lee and his merry men," sometimes supported the Government, for example on this year's budget proposal. He said the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB),the Liberal Party, and The Alliance supported the Government on most issues and hence constituted an "informal coalition." Furthermore, the Government was considering bringing in political appointees to fill a limited number of sub-Cabinet-level positions; this would further the development of Hong Kong's relatively small political parties, which he said needed time and room to grow. DAB --- ¶6. (C) On April 30, the delegation met with newly elected DAB Vice Chairman Greg So and his predecessor, NPC deputy and Hong Kong Basic Law Committee member Maria Tam. Asked about the status of democratization in Hong Kong, Tam said it was part of a process begun during the 1980s, when the U.K.-PRC Joint Declaration mandated selection of both the CE and the Legco by "consultation or election." Tam said it was necessary to consider Hong Kong's "actual situation" during the implementation of this "package" delivered by the Basic Law, and "they" currently were "trying to find out how to do that." Hong Kong, with half of Legco elected directly (geographical constituencies) and half indirectly (functional constituencies),now was at the midpoint of this process. In July, the CSD's "Green Paper" would compile the 40-odd formulas for transition to democracy that had been proposed by various groups in Hong Kong. Next, there would be a "huge public debate," lasting up to one year, to attempt to reach "some kind of consensus" that at least sixty percent of the Hong Kong people support; at that point, CE Tsang would transmit the consensus proposal to Beijing for its approval. Asked whether the HKSARG would conduct a referendum to assess public support for that plan, Tam replied that the referendum mechanism "won't work here" and "will not happen" because "the source of power is from Beijing, not from the people." ¶7. (C) Tam also discussed DAB positions and her own views on various Hong Kong political issues. Asked by Chairperson Bartholomew about the DAB's position on universal suffrage, Tam replied that the party currently was consulting with its 18 Hong Kong local branches and would announce its position in June. She said that under current law, the CE could not be a member of a political party, and therefore the CE had no base of support in the Legco. The proposal to increase the number of political appointees in the government was intended to "build a ladder for new people to climb" and also set up a "revolving door" mechanism. Elaborating, Vice Chairman So said Hong Kong needed a system to groom young political talent, in part due to the "high opportunity cost" of a career in politics. He added that in the past the DAB had "not had much success" recruiting students, but now was doing better with younger people, although they still were "not so motivated" to join a political party. Currently, the DAB had about 1,000 members under the age of thirty (total membership is nearly 10,000). Tam added that no single political party in Hong Kong had "earned the esteem of the general population," as most people were more interested in making money. ¶8. (C) Asked about the March 2007 CE election, Tam said it was "no surprise" that pan-democratic challenger Alan Leong HONG KONG 00001689 003 OF 003 had surpassed the 100-nomination threshold required to contest the election. The two televised debates had "gone well" and demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of both candidates, with Leong "scoring higher" in the first debate and Tsang doing better in the second. Asked for the central government's view on the political situation in Hong Kong, Tam replied that Beijing was "happy" because there were fewer protests under Tsang; it also had "gotten used to" the occasional Falun Gong demonstrations. ¶9. (SBU) The USCC delegation cleared this cable. Cunningham