BABIL PROVINCIAL ELECTION SHAPSHOT: CHASING A SHADOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000006 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM IZ SUBJECT: BABIL PROVINCIAL ELECTION SHAPSHOT: CHASING A SHADOW REF: A) 06 BAGHDAD 4772 B) 06 HILLAH 156 HILLAH 00000006 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Charles F. Hunter, Babil PRT Leader, REO Al-Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) CORRECTED COPY OF HILLAH 0003- Upgrading overall classification to Secret ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Corruption, stagnation and not wanting to repeat the mistakes of two years ago figure among the reasons Babil citizens would like to see elections take place sooner rather than later. An extended delay in scheduling them could plunge more potential voters into cynical abstention, just as deterioration in the security situation could keep people away from the polls out of fear. Despite the fact that many officials do not see provincial elections happening any time in the near future, Babil's five major political parties are trying to find ways to address some of the current local issues, including sectarian violence and the effect Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) will ultimately have on the province, and to use their successes or ideas to their benefit at the polls. For the moment, however, there are too many variables to hazard a guess on outcomes. End summary. -------------- OFF TO THE POLLS? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) With no sure date on the horizon for provincial elections (pending action by the Council of Representatives), the citizens of Babil are gradually beginning to focus on the desirability of heading to the polls - though not necessarily all for the same reasons. For the Sunnis, concentrated in the northern third of the governorate and comprising about 30 percent of its population, a primary motive is lack of representation. Due to their electoral boycott two years ago, they have no voice on the Provincial Council (PC) and now view their 2005 abstention as an error needing to be addressed by new elections sooner rather than later. Among the Shi'a too there appears to be growing consensus that they made a mistake in 2005, in their case by letting the guidance of the marja'iya (the four ayatollahs of the Quietist Hawza in Najaf) determine their choice of candidates rather than thinking for themselves. All told, according to Deputy Provincial Council Chairman Dr. Na'ma Jasim Hamza, at least forty to fifty percent of the province will vote in the next elections simply because they are "tired for having nothing to show" from the current leadership. -------------- KEY POLITICAL ISSUES -------------- ¶3. (C) As noted in ref A, several key political concerns are surfacing in Babil as elections slip farther into the future. Many potential voters, Sunni and Shi'a, have come to believe that their current provincial leadership is unfit: the governor because of his lack of education, the PC because of alleged corruption, and the lot of them for not doing enough to improve conditions of daily life. (Comment: The prolonged absence of the governor, the PC chair and several PC members on the recent hajj only reinforced the perception of officials' disregard for duty. End comment.) For the Sunnis, a related issue is a perception that Shi'a favoritism is depriving north Babil of its fair share of reconstruction projects. ¶4. (C) As religious extremism and sectarian violence in the province rise, partisan affiliations increasingly crystallize along confessional lines. In this regard, with Iran continuing to weave a web of economic ubiquity in a bid for political influence (ref B) and with the ability to form federal regions only a little over a year off, the more astute citizens on both sides of that divide - Shi'a versus Sunni and Shi'a versus Shi'a - are coming to recognize the broader implications of voting for one party over another. ¶5. (S) Another worry, though with only limited resonance at this point, concerns the implications of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC),currently forecast for Babil in April 2007. At several of the weekly PRT-led security coordination meetings, Deputy Governor Hasoon Ali Hasoon and Hillah Mayor Imad Lefta al-Bayati have claimed that the Babil security forces will not be ready to switch from Coalition to Iraqi protection this spring. A further deterioration in the security situation, if attributed to politicians rather than to terrorists, would clearly have implications at the voting booth. (Comment: Of greater import to us is the amount of control the governor and the PC could gain over provincial security forces following PIC, especially if the office of IP Chief becomes politicized. End comment.) -------------- HILLAH 00000006 002.2 OF 003 MITIGATING FACTORS -------------- ¶6. (S) The longer the delay in setting a date for provincial elections, the greater the chances that disillusionment and cynicism may dissuade people from voting in the first place. Among the Sunnis, for instance, some prominent tribal leaders are at risk of giving up on the political process, concluding that bias in the PC and the security forces leaves them no choice but to take up arms themselves to protect their tribes and neighborhoods. Similarly, growing distrust of elected officials who further their own agendas and pocketbooks, without real concern for the people, could convince some potential voters simply to stay home the next time around. Security concerns on Election Day could also diminish voter turnout, which otherwise is likely to be relatively strong. Babil IP Chief General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Mamouri does not have a detailed security plan yet for the elections but intends to recreate the approach that won him praise from several quarters in 2005. This plan would be based on providing IP protection around each polling site province-wide. In the instance of Hillah, three rings would form a multi-layer protective force: IP surrounding each polling site and on the streets, a ring of Iraqi Army (IA) around the outskirts of the city, and finally Coalition patrols encircling the rest of the province. -------------- BABIL POLITICAL BREAKDOWN -------------- - ¶7. (C) Similar to most other provinces within Iraq, Babil's political landscape comprises both strong national parties and other more local groupings, some nothing more than loose affiliations with sparse membership. Whenever elections do take place, a minimum of five parties, listed below in descending order of estimated membership and influence in Babil, can be expected to take part: -- Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - One of the two main parties within the religious-Shia United Iraqi Alliance, SCIRI currently holds most of the major power in Babil, including the chair and 23 of 41 seats on the PC, the governorship, and the positions of Deputy Governor and PC Chief Engineer. However, along with uneasiness over SCIRI's strong ties to Iran, the perceived corruption of some SCIRI officials has left many citizens of Babil dissatisfied and looking elsewhere for leadership. The party appears to be aware of its vulnerabilities and will work to counter them, planning a media strategy to support its eventual candidates and not over-promoting its position on Shi'a autonomy for the time being. -- Islamic Da'wa Party (Da'wa) - As the other main party making up the United Iraqi Alliance, Da'wa enjoys fairly strong support in Babil. It is seen as neither as cohesive nor as well financed as SCIRI. Rumors circling the province have led many to believe that Ali Hassan Jabur, the Babil leader of Da'wa, has aligned his party with the Sadrists so it too can have a strong militant wing, similar to SCIRI's popular committees or the former Badr Corps. -- Iraqi National Accord (INA) - INA, led by Sabah Allawi, is viewed by Babylonians as a moderate alternative. Its support appears to be collapsing, however, because of perceptions that it is too closely tied to the Coalition. -- Iraqi Nation Party (INP) - Led by Mohammed Ali, the Sunni-led NP is gaining some ground in Babil by making inroads among the Shia. On a nationalistic platform, this party's message is both moderate and non-sectarian, but it is not seen as a strong contender in the near future for political notoriety. Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) -The ICP is comprised mostly of business professional and educators and is led by Dr. Ali Ibrahim. Despite its composition, the ICP has little funding and would not have been able to achieve its two seats on the Babil PC in 2005 without joining forces with the INA. Because it is viewed as the "anti-religion" party due to its name, talks have been held about dropping the "Communist" label. ¶8. (C) Although the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) is not a registered political party in Babil at this time, the Sadrists, whether tied to Da'wa or not, are also seen as a powerful front within the province. According to several provincial officials, the Sadrists stand to do very well in the provincial elections if they were officially to become a political entity and would be primed for gaining seats on the PC and, possibly, seats of higher power. -------------- AND THE WINNER IS~ -------------- HILLAH 00000006 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Dr. Na'ma Jasim Hamza, the Babil Deputy Provincial Council Chairman and a Da'wa member, ventured a guess with IPAO as to the composition of the next PC. He anticipated that his party would gain approximately four total seats on the PC, instead of their current holdings of two; that the ICP would retain their two seats; that the Sunni tribal leaders would gain an undisclosed number of seats; and that SCIRI would lose several of its seats. The upshot, he predicted, would be a change from a predominantly self-serving PC to one serving all citizens of Babil. Asked who would take the governor's seat if the elections were held today, Dr. Na'ma did not provide a name; however, he did hypothesize that SCIRI would probably abandon the current incumbent (and nominal provincial party head),Salem Saleh Mehdi al-Muslimawi. Governor Salem commands little support beyond his home base of Al-Kifl, in the southwest corner of Babil, and only increased his unpopularity by undertaking the hajj this year for the third time. In Dr. Na'ma's analysis, SCIRI believes it could get a moderate, dark horse candidate elected, helped by Iranian money and possibly an endorsement from the marja'iya, and then use him as a pawn to push their agenda. ¶10. (C) Babil IP Chief General Qais, in a recent meeting with Babil PRT officials, concurred that although SCIRI is losing favor among the citizenry of Babil, its campaign strategy is strong (ref A). He sees SCIRI as a very formidable competitor in provincial elections. Qais anticipates that, among other strategic moves, the party plans to use "limitless" funding from Iran, claim credit for all notable reconstruction projects within Babil, pay off Directors General to stay quiet, and purchase media outlets to relay the party's campaign platforms. ¶11. (C) Although few specific names have been tossed around as the next potential leaders of Babil, our contacts seem convinced of one thing: that in contrast to the current governor, who claims a college degree but apparently didn't finish secondary school, the next incumbent will be forced to present legitimate diplomas before being elected. Furthermore, they say, besides clear proof of intelligence, contenders for leadership positions will have to demonstrate the will to serve as uniters of Babil's citizens in order to quell the tiresome violence in the province. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Although many officials and locals are willing to discuss provincial elections, each meeting is colored by Iraqi interlocutors' feeling of disbelief that the elections will actually take place anytime before autumn of 2007 at the earliest. Amongst the differing opinions PRT Babil received, one common theme remains constant: that the information given now is speculation and will be null and void by the time elections come to pass. Provincial Iraqi Control, anticipated for April 1 for Babil, is likely to have an especially significant impact on the politics of this province. At present the shape of things to come is very much a moving target, and any snapshot of it necessarily blurry. End comment. HUNTER