BABIL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTES FOR SWEEPING CHANGE AT THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000045 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: BABIL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTES FOR SWEEPING CHANGE AT THE POLLS HILLAH 00000045 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Charles F. Hunter, Babil PRT Leader, REO Al-Hillah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Babil cable. ¶2. (C) Summary. The Babil representative to the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI),Assad Abd al-Rudah, recently shared his views with Babil IPAO about methods to reduce electoral fraud and manipulation, including adopting a "one-candidate, one-vote" approach to replace the closed slate system, and thereby keep Iraq's democratic experiment moving forward successfully. Assad also asserts that the education and age requirements for both the candidates and voters must be increased to prevent the inexperienced and uneducated from gaining too much power. Finally, he believes significant procedural transformation is crucial to prevent multiple voting and to achieve proper oversight. End summary. -------------- -------------- VOTE FOR THE CANDIDATE, NOT THE SLATE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Although Assad views the January 2005 elections as a success for Iraq, he feels that the closed slate system used then prevented people from knowing whom they were selecting when they reached the polls. A coalition or political entity was included on the ballot under the name of its slate after registering its slate members with the IECI, paying a fee and having at least 500 signatures of support. The slates used their best-known candidates as their public face to attract votes. (Note: Assad believes that the closed slate system was used in Iraq because of the high illiteracy rate, rendering many voters unable to recognize and choose anything more than a symbol or a number. End note.) However, as Assad commented, even the most knowledgeable voters were no better off in knowing the true identity or composition of the selected slates, likening the vote to a shopper who buys a crate of apples based only on the shiny fruit on top, hoping that what is farther down is not rotten. ¶4. (C) However, one bad apple spoiling the bunch is precisely what took place in Babil after the January 2005 elections, according to the province's IECI representative, the prime example being the current Babil Provincial Council. As criminal allegations, candidate credential scandals and death took elected members from their seats, their replacements, as dictated by the closed slate system, were less than desirable to the populace, who view the PC as being corrupt and ineffective. (Note: Seven sitting members of the Babil PC were found by the Director General of Education, post-election, to have made false claims of university degrees in order to meet the education requirement for candidates. Three of the accused were removed from the PC, but the remaining four allegedly could not be removed based on the clout of their slate's political party. End note.) ¶5. (C) To solve this dilemma, Assad suggests that an open, one-person candidacy system be used in the future. He believes that a candidate should register with the IECI and then make his or her candidacy and platform so widely known that even the illiterate would recognize the name on a ballot. This open system would allow the voters to know what to expect from the candidate once elected and, more importantly, whom to blame if campaign promises are not met. Unlike under the current closed slate system, a candidate could not misrepresent credentials and hide behind a slate number because his or her tribe, neighborhood, or family would know the truth, adding a greater level of transparency to the process. -------------- -------------- -------------- UPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDATES AND VOTERS -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Assad posits, based on corruption among Babil provincial leaders, that the qualifications and requirements for candidates and voters need to be increased to protect this institution. Currently, the IECI requires a candidate to be a voter no less than 30 years of age, with at least a high school certificate. Assad proposes that the age limit be increased to 35 years of age and strongly emphasized the need for all candidates to have earned university diplomas certified by an independent commission through the Ministry of Education. These strengthened requirements would better equip candidates educationally and institutionally not to repeat the mistakes or crimes of the old regime. HILLAH 00000045 002.2 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Although the IECI eligibility rules require a voter to be a resident of the province in which he votes, it does not impose the same requirement on a candidate. In Assad's opinion, this oversight allows the politically savvy to manipulate the system by running in the province they feel holds the most potential for victory, without having any affiliations to that province or concern for its success. With a residency requirement, voters could expect their candidates to possess a greater affinity for the well-being of his province and a hunger to work toward that goal. (Note: The draft Provincial Powers law that the Council of Representatives is considering contains a residency requirement for candidates. End note.) ¶8. (C) These increased requirements are not just for the candidates, but the voters as well. Assad feels that everyone, from polling officials to the candidates themselves, took advantage of illiterate voters. His biggest fear, which apparently became a reality at some voting stations in Babil, is that polling officials were misleading uneducated voters who sought assistance in locating the desired slate on the ballot. Currently, an eligible voter must be an Iraqi citizen, legally competent, and 18 years old in the month of the elections. However, Assad earnestly believes that as the candidates become more cunning and educated in the democracy process, so must the voters. He suggests raising the minimum voting age to 25, with some proof of schooling, in order to cut down on fraud and increase the accuracy of voting. -------------- -------------- BETTER CHECKS AND BALANCES AT POLLS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) In the January 2005 elections many Iraqis were jubilant in the opportunity to vote, eagerly waiting in long lines and ignoring threat of militant retribution. However, as Assad noted, the registration process for Babil voters was far from perfect. Although the rules under the IECI require an eligible voter to bring some form of identification in order to vote, each polling manager had discretion whether to ask for the ID. Registration lists were mandatory for each polling station, but many sites simply checked a voter's hand for traces of ink before passing a ballot in an effort to avoid using the unorganized lists and to reduce the exposed waiting lines. Assad believes that many loyalists voted multiple times by wiping their fingers clean and getting back in line. Finally, proxy voting was allowed for those who were sick or otherwise unable to make it to the polls, and with no method to protect the choice of the voter, the proxy was given a free pass to ignore these wishes. ¶10. (C) Assad believes that swipe cards are essential to ensure an accurate election. Each voter would be issued a single-use swipe card, with the voter's name on it; upon entering the polling site, a voter would be required to show a photo ID and swipe the card prior to receiving a ballot. Once swiped, the card would be confiscated to prevent multiple voting. For those voting by proxy, the proxy must present the voter's swipe card, photo ID, and signed documentation explaining why the voter could not come to the polls and for whom he would like to cast his vote. Without these papers, the vote would not be permitted. (Note: Assad would like to use the absentee ballot method, but fears that the country's postal system is not up to that time-sensitive task. End note.) -------------- -------------- -------------- REDUCE THE NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) According to Assad's figures, in 2005 Babil had 25 branch ballot sites, overseeing over 300 neighborhood polling stations, with approximately two thousand employees to assist in collecting the votes. As the Babil IECI representative, he had the daunting task of supervising all of these sites to ensure the highest levels of transparency. Although he acknowledges that security dictated the large number of election sites, Assad believes that Babil's decreased violence and the public's desire to remove the current leadership would allow the number of polling centers to be greatly reduced. In his view, people would be willing to travel some distance to exercise their rights. On the other hand, he fears that people are becoming disillusioned about the electoral process and may stay away absent either voting reform or more stringent candidate qualifications. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) PRT Babil has heard from several contacts, including HILLAH 00000045 003.2 OF 003 Assad, that the public's faith is dwindling concerning the next provincial elections, though the linkage to a desire for voting process transformation was new. Assad's assessment of how to improve the electoral system, via action by the Council of Representatives, strikes us as mostly on the mark. In light of the widely held view that it is time for a political change in Babil, however, the wisdom of excluding all 18-to-25-year-olds from the process is debatable. End comment. HUNTER