PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13 - 14 VISIT TO FINLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000725 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EAID PGOV AF FI SUBJECT: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13 - 14 VISIT TO FINLAND Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PDAS Volker visited Helsinki Sept. 13-14 for wide-ranging discussions with FM Kanerva, with MFA and MOD officials, and with senior advisors to the President and Prime Minister. Bilateral discussions focused on Finland's intention to increase its contributions in Afghanistan (septel) and in Kosovo; OSCE issues (election monitoring, CFE, Kazakhstan, Finland's priorities as chairman, and Russia's behavior); Russia; and NATO and the NRF. PDAS Volker also held three very successful Public Diplomacy events (see reports in PD channels). End Summary. Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) Volker raised US views on the current situation in Kosovo and possible next steps in separate meetings with Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva, State Secretary to the Prime Minister Riisto Volanen, and Kosovo Office Director Juha Ottman. Ottman noted that Finland is very pessimistic about what will occur after the Troika- sponsored negotiating period closes on Dec. 10. There is a "growing realism" within the EU that Russia will block a UNSC resolution on final status and the Union needs to prepare itself for what comes next. Ottman suggested that a "movement toward critical mass" may be emerging within the EU in favor of recognizing Kosovo should Pristina declare unilateral independence. This would involve the difficult task of convincing the MS that oppose recognition to "constructively abstain," but it increasingly appears to be the only way forward. Ottman added that the US would have to play a key role in using its influence to ensure that no violence breaks out among the Kosovars. He also noted that some EU MS have suggested again postponing the deadline from Dec. 10 to sometime in Spring -- perhaps after the Russian election. However, "for Finland, Dec. 10 is the key date." ¶3. (C) Volker emphasized to Ottman -- and later to FM Kanerva -- that "Dec. 10 is the deadline" and that this is not negotiable. More time will not make a difference, and in the absence of a UNSCR, the fall-back must be UNSCR 1244 and the Ahtisaari recommendations. He agreed with the Finns' assessment that the future of KFOR and the ESDP mission will be jeopardized without a clear path toward final status, adding that the decision to give the Serbs (and Russians) more time has already hurt the process. Recognition of a Kosovar independence declaration might be the only way to ensure stability, and it is clearly something the US and EU must come together on, he concluded. ¶4. (C) Volker also emphasized to Kanerva that if violence were to break out, KFOR's mandate needs no changes; if KFOR acts decisively to protect life and property, its current mandate is sufficient. Kanerva agreed. The FM was also pleased to report that the GOF will re-assume a framework nation role within KFOR at the beginning of 2008 and increase its troop contribution from 400 to more than 450. Finland, NATO, and the NRF -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Volker's visit occurred in the midst of widespread political debate in Finland over whether to join the NATO Response Force (NRF),and Kanerva, Volanen, MFA Political Director Pilvi-Sisko Vierros- Villeneuve, MOD Policy Planning Director Pauli Jarvenpaa and former Finnish Ambassador to NATO Antti Sierla all raised the issue with him. Kanerva noted that Finland has a six-month EU Battlegroup commitment beginning in January, which may include a deployment to Chad. However, the FM fully supports joining the NRF as well. He said he hopes to join Sweden in making a formal commitment this spring, and then work toward actual troop participation by 2010. Vierros-Villeneuve, Sierla and Volanen all confirmed in separate meetings that there is strong support for NRF participation across the government, although as usual in Finland public opinion lags somewhat behind. PM Matti Vanhanen wants government consensus on the matter by January. ¶6. (SBU) Volker acknowledged that there have been some "mixed signals" from certain Allies regarding Partners' potential role in NRF operations. He explained NATO welcomes partners, but does not want to place the NRF in a position of having to rely on them. He noted that in joining the NRF now, Finland would be "jumping on a moving train," but urged the GOF to nevertheless make a positive statement of commitment soon. NATO is moving toward rethinking the NRF's size, structure and uses, with an eye toward "deploying in pieces" -- something that should actually suit quite well the role Partners like Finland are looking to play. Kanerva, Volanen and Sierla welcomed this information, noting that the "mixed signals" had fueled the anti-NRF arguments of Finnish NATO skeptics within the government, but that Volker's clarifications would help them move the issue forward. Finland's 2008 OSCE Chairmanship -------------- ¶7. (C) Volker discussed a range of OSCE issues with Kanerva and separately with Aleksi Harkonen, Director of the MFA's OSCE Task Force. -- Kazak Chairmanship: Harkonen said that the GOF has no national position yet; however, Finland is leaning toward a "sympathetic view" of the GOK's 2009 bid because it does not want the issue to polarize the OSCE. Volker pushed back, noting that Kazakhstan had a clear set of standards to meet but has instead moved in the wrong direction, and that the US strongly favors the Greece-Lithuania- Kazakhstan 2009-2010-2011 "package" approach. Germany now appears prepared to support this, and Volker urged the Finns, upon assuming the chair, to do so as well. Kanerva said that this three-country package "won't be enough for those who are promoting Kazakhstan," prompting Volker to suggest that Finland and the Western democracies may need to think creatively about what they can achieve in a "non- consensus" environment. -- CFE: Volker said that Russia is going down the wrong road on the CFE and abusing the OSCE's "consensus" mechanisms to force an "adapted treaty." The OSCE must not reward this behavior by producing a compromise that is undesirable to Western democracies but "acceptable to Moscow" simply for the sake of consensus. Harkonen acknowledged Volker's point, but noted that hammering out something more suitable will be difficult, especially for countries like Finland that are not members of the CFE. -- Missile Defense: Harkonen noted that Finland supported "discussions" of MD at the OSCE, so long as "decisions are made elsewhere." Volker agreed, but urged vigilance given Russia's penchant for simply seeking new venues to "sow discord." -- Election Monitoring: Volker and Harkonen agreed that Russia will never be happy with an ODHIR that meets the western democracies' expectations, but that such an ODHIR must be "protected." It remains one of the most important and valuable OSCE activities, and a strong OHDIR keeps the OSCE relevant. -- Funding: Volker assured Harkonen that the US would pay its assessed contribution on time and in full. Harkonen agreed on the need to maintain assessment current scales. -- Finnish OSCE Priorities will include safety and security of maritime inland waterways, TIP, law enforcement cooperation, and other issues that "glue OSCE member states together." Volker encouraged the Finns to take a pro-active interest in Central Asian states, a region that could benefit greatly from OSCE outreach. He expressed strong support for OSCE border training missions in Afghanistan/ Tajikistan. Russia -------------- ¶8. (C) Director General for Russia Kirsti Eskelinen said that, for obvious geographic and historical reasons, Finnish-Russian relations are far deeper than any other EU member state's relationship. This "strategic partnership" is a key to how Finland operates in other fora such as the OSCE or the EU, and explains the emphasis Finland has placed on issues such as a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) or Russia's participation in the EU-Russia "four common spaces" initiatives. Despite Russia's current "international posturing," the GOF does feel that Russia is making progress on "day-to-day issues" that are of importance to Finland, the US and the EU. ¶9. (C) Volker accepted Eskelinen's points, but noted that they do not change the "long list of really troubling" developments we have seen in Russia. Moscow is in a period of clear "overexuberance," which the EU has confronted with neither unity nor a strategic view aimed at protecting its own interests, particularly on energy security. Volker said that Russia appears interested in creating a "superpower" conflict -- which is something the US has no interest in. The response is for the US and Europe to focus on finding ways to convince Moscow to engage constructively on real world issues like Kosovo, Iran, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Eskelinen agreed, noting that the framework of EU-Russian relations seeks areas for cooperation, but that Moscow must do its part to make the relationship work. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Finland is currently engaged in several crucial domestic foreign policy debates aimed at clarifying its future roles in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the EU and the OSCE, and vis--vis NATO and the NRF. Volker's visit came at a crucial time and he was able to weigh in directly and deliver a clear message regarding the direction the US would like to see some of those debates go. On Kosovo, the decision to re-assume a Framework Nation role and increase the troop presence is a very welcome development, and clearly a "deliverable" the Finns felt they could offer. They are also making definite progress toward a larger role in Afghanistan, although this process will continue to need our careful shepherding (see septel). Likewise on NRF participation: the right ministers have all the right instincts, but we will need to continue our proactive engagement to encourage a Finnish commitment and help them respond to the NATO skeptics. As for OSCE, the Finns are clearly leaning toward nuanced chairmanship, one in which they may be inclined, for the sake of unity within the organization, to bow to some member states' heavy-handed tactics or demands. HYATT