FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000639 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR EAID PGOV NATO AF FI SUBJECT: FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: POLITICAL CHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Budgetary realities and political discomfort amongst a few at the highest levels have currently put the brakes on the GOF's plan to increase its military commitments to NATO/ISAF in 2008. Meaningful increases in Finnish development and counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan are probable -- and the idea of PRT leadership in 2009 remains very much on the table. However, the 2008 national budget contains no funds for new or stepped-up peacekeeping operations (PKO). The Ambassador has made the case to senior leadership that Finland ought to send more troops to Afghanistan sooner rather than later -- culminating in several additional senior-level meetings the week of Aug. 13. However, it appears that Conservative politicians who committed early to contributing more troops to ISAF underestimated how strongly their own coalition partner, the Center Party -- as well as President Halonen -- would not support increases in ¶2008. END SUMMARY. EARLY MOMENTUM FADES -------------- ¶2. (C) A mere two months ago, enthusiasm in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs was high regarding an increased Finnish role in Afghanistan. In the wake of FM Ilkka Kanerva's June meeting with the Secretary and MOD Jyri Hakamies's trip to Afghanistan, SIPDIS both signaled their intentions to seek more Finnish troops for NATO/ISAF as well as increased funding for development, counternarcotics and rule of law programs. The MFA was instructed to prepare a wide ranging report to Parliament examining Finland's role in Afghanistan and the best ways to apply any additional resources. The report will be delivered to Parliament members in mid-September and publicly discussed in parliamentary session. Contacts responsible for drafting it have told us privately that increases for 2008 appeared likely (Reftel A). ¶3. (C) Since then, however, significant political opposition has emerged. Much of the most vociferous opposition came in response to Hakamies's public suggestion that the GOF should re-open the previous government's decision to deny a US/Afghan request that sought a donation of excess Finnish weapons to the Afghan National Police (ANP). (Comment: The lethal equipment issue has been politically sensitive all along (Ref A),having been characterized both as legally permissible and legally prohibited. End Comment.) In addition, more measured opposition also came from those who argued that Finland's current level of participation in NATO/ISAF (about 104 troops at two Nordic-led PRTs) was sufficient. Some Parliamentarians have argued that 2008 budget realities do not permit troop increases, given Finland's numerous other ongoing PKO obligations and its very generous contribution of 240 troops to the UN's Southern Lebanon mission. (NOTE: No other Nordic country sent ground troops to Lebanon following the Hezbollah-Israeli war last summer, and the GOF needed to pass a special budgetary supplemental in order to fund its 240-troop contribution.) Leading Conservative politicians (led by Hakamies and Kanerva) and ministry officials expressed confidence that the report to Parliament would satisfy the nay-sayers. However, in early August leading figures from the Center Party -- the Conservatives' major coalition partner -- also began to voice misgivings. MONEY BUT NO NEW TROOPS -------------- ¶4. (C) Senior officials and working level contacts in the MOD, MFA and Ministry of Finance now say that at the moment troop increases in Afghanistan appear unlikely in 2008, although other forms of assistance are likely. In an Aug. 14 meeting, a disappointed Kanerva told the Ambassador that he expected to win approval for Finnish contributions to a new EU-funded police training/rule of law mission, and quite probably additional development assistance. However, he added, "I do not exclude the military side, but getting increases to our military contribution in Afghanistan will be very hard." He noted that while many in government truly believed that sending more troops to Afghanistan was in Finland's national security interest, the Prime Minister and the President saw things differently. In an Aug. 16 meeting, PM Vanhanen confirmed this. "Discussions within government are ongoing; nothing is final," he told us. "But overall the atmosphere is such that we want to help (in Afghanistan),but changes in our military posture will not be significant." ¶5. (C) Separately, a Finance Ministry contact told PolChief that there simply is no money programmed into the 2008 budget for troop increases anywhere. (NOTE: Finland currently supports Afghanistan with 10 million euros annually.) The four parties in government are divided in their thinking about budgetary priorities, she said; in fact, political pressure within the cabinet to send troops to Darfur might currently outweigh the sentiment in favor of more forces for Afghanistan. In either case, there is no budget supplemental in the works; without one ISAF commitments would have to remain level, and there can be no major contributions to Darfur. PLANS FOR PRT LEADERSHIP IN 2009 CONTINUE APACE -------------- -- ¶6. (U) Echoing what we had heard privately, Admiral Juhani Koskeala, the armed forces chief of staff, told the press Aug. 14 that budgetary constraints would prevent significant crisis management increases in 2008. However, he emphasized that taking leadership of a PRT in 2009 -- which would require troop increases -- remains very much on the table. In his view, the current level of Finnish participation at Meymenah and Mazar was sufficient until the 2009 ramp-up for PRT leadership began. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador spent the week of Aug. 13 emphasizing to a range of senior officials that Afghanistan is a top priority. In separate meetings, she underscored to the PM, to the FM, and to Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman how important it is for Finland to make new ISAF contributions sooner, rather than later. Each interlocutor understood that the USG would be disappointed if the GOF could not do more in 2008. However, they also assured us that development and other assistance increases would be forthcoming and that planning for PRT leadership in 2009 would continue apace. Kanerva, in particular, noted that plans for a "rotation" of leadership with the Swedes at the Mazar- al-Shariff PRT in 2009 remained quite active. COMMENT: CONSERVATIVES UNDERESTIMATE THEIR OPPONENTS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) It may be that the Conservatives' ambitious plans were a classic case of early over-exuberance, which has been tempered over time in the face of political realities. Indeed, Conservative politicians rode the wave of their election landslide holding two beliefs on Afghanistan: first, that increasing the GOF's already significant PKO contributions was truly important for Finland's own national security; and second, that they could convince a skeptical PM and even more skeptical President of this fact. However, President Halonen simply feels that Finland is currently doing enough in Afghanistan. PM Vanhanen, meanwhile, keenly values his working relationship with Halonen, and faces staunch opposition within his own Center Party to increasing Finland's PKO profile; he therefore has absolutely no domestic political incentive to tangle with Halonen on the ISAF issue. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (C) Finland's overall role in Afghanistan is still being hammered out. The GOF's current troop commitment to ISAF remains solid, and we can continue to count on the Finns to do good work at the Meymenah and Mazar PRTs. We also expect other significant assistance, including more development aid; counterdrug efforts; and Finnish police and judicial trainers as part of the EU's rule of law mission. And as noted, PRT leadership remains very much in the planning cards for 2009; we will continue to work hard with the Finns to make this a reality. HYATT