CUBA: TOURISM'S DECLINE MAKES GOC NERVOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 000342 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2017 TAGS: ETRD EINV PGOV CU SUBJECT: CUBA: TOURISM'S DECLINE MAKES GOC NERVOUS HAVANA 00000342 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cuban tourism figures for the first trimester of 2007 were dismal: An overall decrease of 15 percent, the worst drop in 15 years. For years the GOC ignored the warnings from foreign hotel companies about addressing weaknesses in the sector. Successful competition from alternative all-inclusive destinations finally seems to have convinced the GOC that it must deal with what are now systemic problems in tourism. While it is clear that the GOC wants solutions, it is not so clear that it is willing to countenance a solution that would include devaluing its artificially overvalued currency. End Summary. Tourism in 2006 -------------- ¶2. (U) The total number of tourists decreased by four percent, from 2.319 million in 2005 to 2.235 million in 2006 (see Reftel). There were fewer tourists who came from Latin American while European tourists increased slightly. But despite the overall reduction in 2006, the number of tourists coming from the big three -- Spain, Canada and United Kingdom -- increased in 2006. Rough Start in 2007 -------------- ¶3. (C) Econoff spoke with Eric Peyre, Director of Operations in Cuba for giant French hotel company ACCOR on 2 April. Peyre, based at a four-star hotel in Old Havana, confirmed that the tourism figures for the first trimester of 2007 were dismal: An overall decrease of 15 percent. Peyre said this constitutes the worst decrease in 15 years. Spanish tourists in particular dropped a whopping 45 percent for the quarter. He also said that the situation was even worse in Varadero, Cuba's premier resort destination, where the occupancy rate was the lowest in 10 years. Causes of Decline -------------- ¶4. (C) Peyre pointed out the following causes for the decline: -- Marketed Image. Peyre commented that the increase in advertising in Europe for non-Cuba destinations, particularly the Dominican Republic, has been remarkable. While these destinations were busy broadening marketing campaigns, investing in improvements and lowering prices, the GOC was not. -- Cost. It costs airlines 30 percent more to land in Cuba than in places like Dominican Republic. At least part of 
this cost is passed on to the customer purchasing a ticket. Peyre has seen comparable packages from Europe to competing destinations for about 200 Euros less. In addition, even though European credit cards can be used in Cuba, the 11.24 percent surcharge (8% overvalued currency plus 3.24% in banking fees) on every purchase is a major disincentive. He said with price differences like this, "No sane middle class European will come to Cuba." -- Salaries. Peyre said hotels must pay the GOC between 500 and 600 CUC monthly (Cuban Convertible Currency; 1 CUC = 1.08 USD) for each one of its employees. The salaries, as most other payments, are paid directly into an account at the Central Bank, centralizing tourism's hard currency into a fund under the exclusive control of the GOC. Separately, the GOC pays each employee a meager 15 CUC monthly. In addition, hotels incur extra salary costs in that they are unable to hire and fire employees without GOC approval or must hire whoever the GOC wants hired. For example, whenever a hotel is built GOC state security makes a thorough assessment and then tells the hotel how many guards to hire, which ones, and even where to place them. -- Lost Profits. Between the eight percent exchange rate revaluation that took effect on April 2005 and the GOC compelling hotel companies to raise salaries, operating costs have skyrocketed. The enactment of those measures has translated into a 20 percent profit loss for ACCOR. HAVANA 00000342 002.2 OF 004 Other additional costs may apply, as in the case of Old Havana hotels, which must contribute 5 percent of revenues to Havana Heritage Czar Eusebio Leal's renovation project of that part of the city. -- Neglected Investments. Peyre said that every hotel must pay four percent of revenues into a "reinvestment fund," which he has never seen used. For years his and the other hotel companies have hopelessly tried to get the GOC to carry out not only needed investments but required maintenance and upkeep of things like air conditioning systems, water pipes, water filtration for pools, room renovations, etc. Peyre used an example from one of his ACCOR hotels to illustrate this point. The hotel requested authorization to purchase a USD 15,000 compressor, which it never got. The hotel had to close 60 rooms for five months -- a hotel which, according to Peyre, is always full -- at a cost of USD 800,000 before it could convince the GOC about the compressor. Peyre said finally, "They just didn't care." -- US Sanctions. Sometimes GOC incompetence is compounded by difficulties caused by US sanctions. Peyre gave the example of one of his hotels, the four-star Sevilla in Old Havana, which has had two elevators out of order since October 2005. He explained that the Spanish company which supplied the parts went bankrupt and ever since it has been impossible to get parts from a company "unaffected" by the sanctions. Another example had to do with two hotels in Holguin province, Playa Pesquero and Costa Verde, which were originally built by Iberostar and Melia, respectively. Prior to inauguration, it was found that the properties formerly belonged to US citizens. The hotels were dropped like "hot potatoes" by the European chains, yet were eventually opened under GOC management. -- Limitations. The GOC has a limited capacity to expand its tourism infrastructure. Fearing exposure to Cuba's political reality, the GOC would never allow this sector to adapt to other forms of tourism such as ecotourism, shopping (after buying some rum, cigars and perhaps some local art, there is nothing left to buy in Cuba), non-package travel (traveling outside the resort or on one's own throughout the island is limited to venturesome tourists/backpackers willing to "rough it" and put up with state security). -- Quality of Services. While hotel managers in competing destinations can pick from the best cooks, contractors, tour companies and other service providers that money can buy, hotels in Cuba must use the services of the GOC monopoly. Without having to face any competition, these services have steadily deteriorated over the years (see para. 6 below). All-Inclusive = Funneling Money to the GOC -------------- ¶5. (C) Besides the aforementioned reasons, Peyre attributes the sharp decline in places like Varadero to the GOC wanting to, "Keep tourists in a bubble" and what he describes as the "ghetto-for-tourists" phenomenon. According to Peyre, all of Cuba's resort hotels, except two, are now all-inclusive. In economic terms, this means that the vast majority of the money spent by tourists takes place either at the time of booking (before arriving in Cuba),or within the confines of the resort or in the "canned" tours to GOC-approved destinations offered by GOC tour operators. Peyre remarked that, "Some tourists leave Cuba without ever knowing what a CUC is." As a result, very little money is ever spent on the non-tourist and non-GOC-controlled economy. ¶6. (C) Since most packages are prepaid, less money is being spent inside the resorts themselves; as more components of the trip are prepaid, there are fewer opportunities for tips, creating a disincentive to good service. ACCOR customer satisfaction surveys have consistently shown a deterioration of Cuban customer service, overwhelmingly rating it as "no amable" (discourteous or impolite). And because all-inclusiveness concentrates most activities to the resort, tourists barely get to see any of the real Cuba that lies beyond and base their overall impression of the trip on their hotel stay. Peyre remarked that everyone in HAVANA 00000342 003.2 OF 004 the sector is aware of a pervasive "loss of Cubania" (Cubanness) in the resorts. Spain's Nose-dive -------------- ¶7. (C) According to Spanish Commercial Attach Jose Luis Lancho, and confirmed by Peyre, two embargo-related factors were also important contributors to the 45 percent drop from Spain: -- 1) Spanish Iberworld, which used to have three 747 (US Boeing) flights per week, was bought by a Carlisle, a US pension fund. -- 2) Spanish Pullmantur, which until the end of 2006 ran a weekly cruise from Havana, was bought by US Royal Caribbean. Heads Rolling at MINTUR -------------- ¶8. (C) Peyre said there was a meeting the third week of March at the Ministry of Tourism (MINTUR) to which all the hotel chains were summoned. Peyre learned at the meeting that the Vice Ministers for Marketing and Investment were being fired. Although he speculated on several candidates he thought were being considered for Marketing Vice Minister, he said he knew that the new Vice Minister for Investment would be Jose Rodriguez Santos and opined that the Minister of Tourism was hanging by a thread but could possibly survive until the end of the year. ¶9. (C) Peyre said that despite the familiar tactic, "Fire someone yet make no substantive changes," he felt that at the meeting the GOC was, for the first time in years, actually listening. He further remarked with frustration that it would have never gtten to this point if the GOC had listened; "We've been trying to warn them for years." The GOC at least suspected that things were getting out of control when it ordered last fall that all Gaviota hotels (managed by the military) transfer administrative functions to foreign partners. (Note: We thought this only applied to some Spanish hotels, but Peyre confirmed it was for all and supposed to have been carried out by 1 November 2006. End Note.) Changes Likely -------------- ¶10. (C) The GOC asked the hotel chains for their budgets for 2008. Peyre said this was the first time the GOC has done this, as they have usually asked for the current year's budget projection, and always a few months after the year has already begun. MINTUR also announced at the meeting that the "reinvestment fund" will be used this year, to which Peyre remarked, "That would be a first." He added that there will be a Tourism Trade Fair held 8-12 May in Havana, where MINTUR will announce, "New forms of investment and new incentives to promote joint ventures in tourism." Venezuelan Social Tourism -------------- ¶11. (C) One of the 16 accords signed earlier this year between the GOC and Venezuela is a social tourism project which was supposed to begin by March 1. The plan aims to bring 100,000 poor Venezuelans on vacation to Cuba. Peyre said the project will use an Airbus aircraft with capacity for 300 passengers, which means that they would have to fly it almost daily in order to meet the 100,000 goal. He confirmed the flights have not begun, although he did not know why. As to where Venezuelans would stay, he speculates that barring any new construction which could take years, the GOC could use the Horizonte hotels. This is a GOC chain of lower quality (1-2 star) hotels for domestic use. ¶12. (C) Comment: Cuba's lost competitiveness in the "fun-in-the-sun" all-inclusive package market vis vis places like Dominican Republic and Cancun is a reality. It is possible that Cuba will have less than 2 million tourists in 2007. To the extent that some of this may be HAVANA 00000342 004.2 OF 004 attributable to U.S. sanctions, we count this as a success, in the sense that the average tourist who takes his business elsewhere deprives the regime of roughly 1,000 dollars. Even worse for the regime is that the problems are systemic in nature and not amenable to quick fixes. The GOC may attempt to use figures from the soon-to-come "social tourists" from Venezuela to compensate for the lack of real tourists, but we would view that as a clear measure of desperation. PARMLY