CUBAN NATIONALISM AND THE BOLIVARIAN IDEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 001052 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2012 TAGS: CU PGOV PREL SUBJECT: CUBAN NATIONALISM AND THE BOLIVARIAN IDEAL REF: CARACAS 2010 Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Statements made by FM Perez Roque in a CNN interview at the UN last week that Cuba is "prepared to give up its sovereignty and flag" to become part of a greater Latin America seem to be arousing still further a dormant nationalism among ordinary Cubans. The first hints that Cubans are growing more restless with the notion of subjugating their sovereignty to the broader goals of fraternal socialism came after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez spoke of a "confederation" between Cuba and Venezuela in his remarks in Villa Clara on the fortieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara on October 14 (reftel). By themselves, Chavez' remarks were viewed with disdain by many Cubans who are inclined to think of Venezuelans in general as not their social or cultural equals. But the fact that in his Alo Presidente interview with Castro, Chavez said that Cuba had two Presidents--Castro and Chavez--and then lectured the country's leadership about the Bolivarian ideal of unity among the Spanish-speaking countries while those leaders, including Raul Castro, sat by supinely without comment was even more galling. While our access to Cuban society is admittedly limited, we have been struck by the nearly unanimous anger generated among ordinary Cubans by the Chavez speech, which was printed in its entirety in the official Communist Party daily Granma. ¶2. (C) Nevertheless, that was Hugo Chavez speaking--an individual whom most Cubans don't take too seriously. That the Cuban foreign minister would take the issue a step further and suggest that Cuba would give up flag and sovereignty is seen as a more serious error by these same contacts. This reaction has been spreading in spite of the fact that, unlike the publicity surrounding the Chavez speech, the regime has not publicized Perez Roque's remarks. (NOTE: We have been doing our utmost to spread the word ourselves, but in the end information on the Cuban grapevine can move very swiftly if the topic is hot enough, and this certainly makes the grade.) ¶3. (U) In another interview outside the view of most Cubans, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon tried to explain away Perez Roque's remarks by saying that such a "grand fatherland" was something to which Cubans had always aspired anyway, but that "certainly we are not that close" to achieving it at the moment. ¶4. (C) Cuban dissident intellectuals were quick to rebut that statement, saying that early Cuban patriots had steered clear of union with Bolivar's Gran Colombia from the beginning and had never aspired to the sort of South American union that Chavez is calling for. Commentators from as distinct sides of the spectrum as dissident economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe and regime apologist Manuel Cuesta Morua both agreed in articles they have released that the comments by Perez Roque and the lamentable acceptance of Chavez' comments simply represent another manifestation of Cuba's history of looking outside its borders for help in overcoming its internal problems, first to the U.S., then to the Soviet Union, and now to Venezuela. As Espinosa points out, the disastrous management of the economy by the Castro regime has put it in the position of a mendicant who is in no position to argue with his benefactor. Still, while recognizing the economic necessity that is driving the GOC, neither can accept the explicit disrespect to Cuba's sovereignty that was only implicit in past years of dependency. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: While we are not surprised at the strength of Cuban nationalism, even after years of being submerged under the personalist Castro regime, we are surprised that the GOC seems to be underestimating the level of resentment that is building up as a result of its embrace of Chavez and some of his Bolivarian ideals. Ever since Fidel Castro took ill and stepped down, and especially since Raul Castro's July 26, 2007 speech, we have noted growing frustration among Cubans who see little evidence that the regime is addressing their everyday economic concerns. By touching on a deeply felt sense of nationalism that is common to all Cubans at home and abroad, these latest statements, or perhaps misstatements, have aroused a more fundamental anger that seems to have taken the regime by surprise. HAVANA 00001052 002 OF 002 PARMLY