INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT

S E C R E T HARARE 000938 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012 TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS ZI SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES--INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING REF: SECSTATE 133921 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 b/d ¶1. (U) This cable responds to Reftel. ¶2. (S) Questions and Responses. ¶A. Watchlisting: -- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? The GOZ does not have a master watchlist or any central repository of watchlisted individuals. Each border post or POE has a list or series of lists, which are maintained by either the Immigration and/or Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) representative at the post. There is no standard for maintaining, updating, sharing or enforcing the watchlist. -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? Per above, there is no standard. At most major border posts and Harare International Airport, the list is maintained by CIO. ¶B. Traveler Information Collection: -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country? The Immigration service has a standard form that all non-resident travelers are required to complete upon entry into Zimbabwe. It asks for basic biographic data, passport data, host and residence in Harare, residence in home country, prior criminal convictions, and amount of foreign currency brought into Zimbabwe. No traveler information is collected upon departure. -- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry and for domestic flights? Entry by air and land requires the same immigration form. There are no sea POEs for Zimbabwe. There is no requirement for identification on domestic flights. -- Who collects traveler information? Traveler information is collected by an Immigration official at POE. -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments? The immigration service will not directly share that information with foreign governments. If police CID or the CIO request the information from Immigration, it may/may then be shared with some foreign governments via Interpol or existing bilateral relationships. -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? Flight manifests on all incoming flights are provided to CIO and Immigration for screening upon arrival. This data is not collected and stored for future access. No treaties exist to share this data. -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals? None of these are in place in Zimbabwe. ¶C. Border Control and Screening: -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? There are no immigration computers at any POE except for Harare Airport, which has an IOM-provided immigration computer system, and Beitbridge land border crossing (South Africa),which uses an internally designed immigration computer system. No other POEs are computerized. No specific software is used to screen travelers. -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? Only at Harare International Airport are any travelers tracked electronically. At the airport, passengers do not appear to be waived through, however, VIPs are often met by security officials who expedite their processing. Corruption is rampant in the immigration service, thus the process of waiving through travelers at land POEs may be greater. The number and frequency is impossible to estimate. -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc). Immigration officials rarely have access to criminal data. If an individual is to be detained or denied entry on grounds of criminal data, that will be done by police or CIO officials at the POE. -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? In cases of suspected alien smuggling, fraudulent travel documents, or insufficient means to remain in Zimbabwe, the CIO has been diligent in questioning, detaining, and deporting suspicious travelers. If an individual has fraudulent documents or simply is suspected of being involved in alien smuggling, the CIO will request that the police detain the traveler until he or she can be deported on a return flight. At land POEs, the traveler is simply denied entry. -- How well does information sharing function within the host government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? Information sharing within the GOZ is ad hoc and generally unreliable. In the case of a suspected terrorist, the CIO would likely handle the issue internally, given the level of corruption within the police and immigration. ¶D. Biometric Collection: -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are the systems and models used? There are no biometric systems. -- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population for collection (i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)? N/A. There are no biometric systems. -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? N/A -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? There are no procedures for fingerprinting travelers. Although it has not been done in recent history, there is a police station at or near most border posts, which could conceivably fingerprint an arriving passenger if he or she were arrested upon arrival on a criminal matter, but fingerprinting is not a standard procedure even for arrests. -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint system? There is no GOZ fingerprint system. The police maintain some fingerprints on file, as does the CIO. They do not share and neither system is searchable. -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant? Unknown. -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency collects the fingerprints? Unknown. ¶E. Passports: -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? The GOZ does not share passport data with any other government. -- Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? Replacement passports are issued for full validity periods. -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times? It is extremely difficult and a lengthy process to obtain replacement passports in Zimbabwe. Replacements may take over a year to acquire, thus, &habitual8 losers are rare. No known system is in place to track or deal with habitual losers. -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? There is no difference between regular passports and replacements. -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? &Emergency8 passports do not exist as a separate entity. The GOZ only issues regular passports, which conceivably could be done on an emergency basis for someone with correct political connections. -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? No increase has been noticed. -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? There is no special identification included in a passport that is used to replace a lost or stolen passport. ¶F. Fraud Detection - How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up? The GOZ is attempting to improve its efforts at detecting fraudulent travel documents and will refuse entry to a traveler if suspicions exist. Generally, once a document is determined to be fraudulent, the traveler is detained and deported as soon as possible. Follow-up investigation on the source of a fraudulent document is generally not done. -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? Older passports, which have less security features, are taken out of circulation only when they expire. Due to the difficulty in obtaining new passports, there is no system for replacing older passports while they are still valid. ¶G. Privacy and Data Security -- What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long? Record keeping is not standardized between services (Immigration, police, CIO) and often is not documented at land POEs. There are no standardized reporting or storage procedures. -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? In practice, there are no restrictions. Police and CIO can collect and use any information or data that they wish. -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? There is no requirement. Databases, if they exist, are not a matter of public record. -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? No. -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? Citizens and non-citizens have no rights to access information or records held on them by CIO. -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? Unknown. -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? No. ¶H. Immigration Data Bases: -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries and exits? The Harare International Airport has an IOM-provided immigration database, which is not connected to any other POE. The Beitbridge land POE also has an internally designed computer immigration system, which is not connected to any other POE. There is no interface between the Beitbridge system and the Harare Airport system. No other POEs are computerized. -- Is the immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? No. -- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? The Harare airport is computerized because IOM gave them the computers. This was a contentious issue and required years of negotiation. Immigration officials have refused to allow computer systems to be put in place at other border posts. The Beitbridge computer system, designed within Immigration and thus not auditable by other GOZ entities, was presented to the GOZ as a pilot program that would eventually be expanded to encompass all POEs. In reality, there are no plans to expand the system. -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? No interface with other border posts, frequent power outages, rampant corruption, no oversight on data entry and usage. -- How often are national immigration databases updated? There are no national immigration databases. ¶I. Watchlist and Information Sharing: -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? Each POE has a separate system. At Harare International Airport, a small notebook with handwritten names is maintained by a CIO officer at the departure terminal, apparently to monitor activities of the opposition and dissidents. At other land POEs, it is a list or stack of lists, that may or may not be present at the border crossing. Immigration and other border security officials are expected to remember and recognize the names of watchlisted individuals at most POEs. -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? CIO, Immigration and police CID contribute to the watchlist. -- What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.? No international watchlists are used. If CID receives a name from Interpol or CIO obtains a name through a bilateral relationship, it determines whether to include it on the Zimbabwean watchlist. Most watchlisted names appear to be related to internal Zimbabwean politics. -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between host government and its neighbors? None. ¶J. Biometrics: -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such a system? No. GOZ has no plans to install any biometric systems. -- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? N/A -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant? None used. -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued, what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric document in the future? When? No biometric data is included in Zimbabwean passports. No plans exist for including biometric data in near future. ¶K. Identifying Appropriate Partners: Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. Considerations include whether host government watchlists may include POLITICAL dissidents (as opposed or in addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. -- Are there POLITICAL realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S? Relations between the U.S. and Zimbabwe are poor and it is unlikely we could enter into an agreement at this time. -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? While Zimbabwe has a relatively sophisticated legal system, it is corrupt and subject to POLITICAL influence. Therefore, it is unlikely to reliably provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information. -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? Zimbabwe does not have a consolidated data base. It is unlikely ministries share information among themselves. Information sharing, to our knowledge, is done informally through the Joint Operations Command (JOC),comprised of the State Minister for Security, the head of the CIO, the heads of the security forces and the head of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? The Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Act became law in August 2007. Terrorism is defined as "(a)the doing of any act inside or outside Zimbabwe against the government of any State which, if committed against the Government of Zimbabwe, would constitute an act of insurgency, banditry, sabotage or terrorism; or (b) engaging in mercenary activity." DHANANI