MDC FACTION LEADER ARTHUR MUTAMBARA: MDC UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000092 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR S.HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ZI SUBJECT: MDC FACTION LEADER ARTHUR MUTAMBARA: MDC UNITY NECESSARY REF: HARARE 00079 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) MDC pro-Senate faction leader Arthur Mutambara told the Ambassador February 1 that cooperation between both MDC factions was necessary to defeat Mugabe. Noting that MDC anti-faction leader Morgan Tsvangirai had expressed similar sentiments in an earlier meeting (Ref),the Ambassador urged the two leaders to meet Mutambara also told the Ambassador he believed elections would take place in 2008 and that Mugabe would be the ZANU-PF standard bearer. End Summary. -------------- MDC Cooperation Necessary -------------- ¶2. (C) Mutambara told the Ambassador that the two MDC factions had no alternative to working together. Mugabe had in the past defeated a united MDC. A factionalized MDC would be even more easily defeated in a national election. Cooperation could be especially fruitful now, added Mutambara, given the chaotic situation in the country and the disarray within ZANU-PF. If the two factions could not work together, the people should reject the MDC. ¶3. (C) Mutambara said that cooperation did not necessarily mean reunification or one MDC president. Rather, it meant working together. For example, if there was a protest march or a demonstration, both factions could participate together. This would inspire confidence among the opposition as a whole. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador queried Mutambara about the effectiveness of civil society's umbrella Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Mutambara replied it was a good platform but should not be an excuse for MDC non-cooperation since the MDC factions were the two major opposition players. -------------- On Cooperation So Far -------------- ¶5. (C) Mutambara lamented that despite on-going negotiations, little progress had been made by the MDC factions toward cooperation since the split in October, 2005. Tsvangirai's faction had, for instance, refused to agree to a joint press conference to publicly present the Code of Conduct the factions had agreed to. Tsvangirai had also spoken publicly as the sole representative of the MDC on behalf of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign without acknowledging Mutambara and his faction. ¶6. (C) Mutambara said he believed Tsvangirai and his faction were afraid of legitimizing him. It was true that he had presidential ambitions but his time would come*he expected Tsvangirai to be the MDC candidate in 2008--and he had no SIPDIS objection to working under Tsvangirai for the time being, something that he had stated publicly. For that reason, he questioned why Tsvangirai and his faction continued to see him as a threat. Moreover, Tsvangirai and his people knew that Mutambara had problems with pro-Senate faction secretary-general Welshman Ncube. Attacking him, Mutambara SIPDIS HARARE 00000092 002 OF 003 argued, only served to weaken him and his ability to control his faction. -------------- The Ambassador Urges Reconciliation -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador responded that the single most important gesture the MDC could take at this point was a public show of greater cooperation between the two factions. It would send a powerful signal of the MDC,s seriousness of purpose to the government, ZANU-PF, civil society, the people of Zimbabwe, and the international community. The Ambassador told Mutambara that in a meeting a few days earlier (Ref), Tsvangirai had also acknowledged the need for greater SIPDIS cooperation. The Ambassador argued that this common ground provided a foundation for reconciliation. Mutambara responded positively, suggesting that he and Tsvangirai needed to meet face-to-face to resolve differences. -------------- 2008 vs. 2010 -------------- ¶8. (C) Mutambara said he believed Solomon Mujuru,s opposition to a 2010 election had effectively scuttled the idea and that a presidential election would take place in ¶2008. He thought Mugabe would be ZANU-PF,s candidate; assuming Mugabe decided to contest the election, nobody in the party would challenge him. Mutambara cautioned that if the opposition was not prepared for a 2008 election, ZANU-PF could win even a relatively fair election. -------------- On Gono,s Monetary Policy Statement -------------- ¶9. (C) Mutambara said that in his recent statement, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RZB) Governor Gideon Gono had accepted that RZB policies had failed, that ZANU &chefs8 had benefited from these policies, and that ultimately fixing the economy is a political problem. However, Gono needed to go further, and discuss quasi-fiscal policy, issues of governance, and RZB incompetence and corruption. The idea of a "social contract" was a good one but would not happen under this government given its corruption and lack of political will. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) MDC active cooperation, if not reunification, is the most immediate means by which the party can energize the democratic opposition to challenge the government and the ruling party at a time when both are weakened by internal dissension over the presidential succession and the country,s economic collapse. Like Tsvangirai, we believe Mutambara is genuine in his desire for greater cooperation. ¶12. (C) That said, it is elements within Mutambara's faction, notably Welshman Ncube, that remain the greatest obstacle. It is not clear at this juncture how much of his faction Mutambara could bring with him were he and Tsvangirai to agree on a way forward. In that regard, Tsvangirai's behavior toward Mutambara could be key; the greater respect he shows Mutambabra, the stronger Mutambara's position would become within his faction (and the weaker Ncube,s). A HARARE 00000092 003 OF 003 face-to-face meeting, as Mutambara suggested, could be a good start. DELL