TSVANGIRAI ON SADC MEDIATION PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000882 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR S.HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON SADC MEDIATION PROCESS REF: HARARE 881 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) In a diplomatic briefing on September 26, MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai briefed on progress in the SADC-Mbeki mediation and steps ahead. Elements of a new constitution have been agreed upon. The parties are now discussing a new electoral act, security laws, communication laws, and the political environment. Sanctions will also be considered. While ZANU-PF wants MDC cooperation in lifting sanctions (understood to include lines of budget support and balance of payment assistance),the MDC opposes resumption of development assistance until free and fair elections have taken place. Agreement between the MDC and ZANU-PF is expected in October with elections to take place in June or thereafter. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Agenda items established in May were 1) constitutional issues; 2) the Electoral Act; 3) security laws (Public Order and Security Act--POSA); communication laws (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Authority (ZBA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA); and the political environment (violence, food politicization, role of traditional leaders, sanctions, and pirate radios). -------------- Constitutional Issues -------------- ¶3. (U) Tsvangirai, who has been holding briefings for a wide array of allies and onlookers, told diplomats on September 26 that the Mbeki-mediated talks had achieved basic agreement on constitutional issues, including a bill of rights. While the MDC would have preferred a "people driven" constitution, it had agreed to Amendment 18 as part of the negotiation process; Amendment 18 would have passed without the MDC given ZANU-PF's parliamentary majority, and the MDC was able to win some concessions in terms of amendments to the originally proposed Amendment. (Note: These included elections of all members of the House of Assembly vice a number of presidential appointments, and removal of delimitation of constituencies from the partisan Registrar's office with responsibility given to the Electoral Commission. End Note.) The MDC had consulted civil society, but Tsvangirai admitted that the civics involvement had been limited. Notably civil society opposition to the agreement on constitutional issues was not to substance, but to process. -------------- Electoral Issues -------------- ¶4. (U) According to Tsvangirai, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) now in charge of delimitation and registration, had the task of proving its independence. Although its composition included an equal number of ZANU-PF and MDC members, the chair was appointed by the president; this was a matter of concern. A new registration process and period was critical as there were at least a million potential voters within Zimbabwe who were not registered. HARARE 00000882 002 OF 003 ¶5. (U) The MDC was insisting on voting by the Diaspora and ZANU-PF was resisting. This could be a potential deal breaker. (Comment: ZANU-PF will never agree to voting by those who have resettled outside of Zimbabwe, but there are numerous Zimbabweans living and working temporarily outside the country, particularly in South Africa, who could presumably be considered residents for purposes of Diaspora voting. End Comment) ¶6. (U) Technical support for the ZEC would be critical. The ZEC would now have to address delimitation and registration and did not have the resources to do so in a comprehensive and independent way. ¶7. (U) Elections most probably would not be held in March. After an agreement, expected in October, a minimum six-month cooling-off period would be necessary to introduce reforms crucial to a free and fair election. The earliest elections could take place would be June, and they would probably slide past June. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (U) Tsvangirai said reform of POSA, to permit unrestricted campaigning; and ZBA and AIPPA to permit unrestricted access to the media, were next on the agenda. Also of critical importance was amelioration of the political environment, which was now characterized by violence, intimidation of the opposition, food politicization, and the politicization of traditional leaders which permitted ZANU-PF to manipulate and control voting. ¶9. (U) Once agreement had been reached on these issues, a timeline would be drawn for implementation. Elections would be the last step in the timeline, giving time for the opposition to organize and campaign in the new environment. ¶10. (U) International observers should be present not only for the elections, but for a three-month period before the elections to ensure an open environment and compliance with the agreement. -------------- Sanctions and Assistance -------------- ¶10. (U) Tsvangirai believed ZANU-PF was hoping that with an agreement, the MDC would join in calling for the lifting of sanctions to permit budget support and balance of payment assistance. Although the economy was in desperate shape, the MDC would opposed development assistance, including loans, until an internationally supervised election had taken place. Obviously, the longer elections were delayed, the more the economy would deteriorate, but to permit assistance earlier would be to throw ZANU-PF a lifeline and possibly permit it to avoid fair elections. (Note: The European Commission Head of Delegation suggested that with an agreement some assistance could begin. Tsvangirai was adamant that it should not. End Note.) Humanitarian assistance, particularly food aid, would be welcome. -------------- On the MDC Split -------------- HARARE 00000882 003 OF 003 ¶11. (U) Tsvangirai commented that both factions of the MDC had worked well together in the negotiations. The increase in the number of seats in Parliament created the possibility of less friction between the factions and the possibility of an electoral coalition in the future. -------------- ZANU-PF not to be Trusted -------------- ¶12. (U) Tsvangirai insisted the MDC was under no illusion as to the nature of the ruling party. Nevertheless, the MDC would continue to work with ZANU-PF until it became clear ZANU-PF was not complying with the expected agreement. The MDC reserved the right not to contest the elections if it could not do so under fair conditions. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Although there has been much skepticism about the SADC process--and criticism of the MDC for the Amendment 18 agreement--we believe the MDC had little choice. Having been battered by the government, it--and civil society--are weak. The SADC initiative has created potential opportunity and an agreement in October is likely. Rather than focus on Amendment 18, we should focus on the entire agreement. Further, as we continue to note, as important as the agreement is its implementation in what the MDC hopes will be an improved environment. Although the ZANU-PF record does not bode well for an improved environment, including an end to violence and a dismantling of the oppressive ZANU-PF structure, ruling party internal turmoil (reftel) and the crumbling economy offer some hope that it will comply with an agreement. DHANANI