GIDEON GONO REINVENTS GIDEON GONO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000076 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN STATE PASS TO USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E.LOKEN TREASURY FOR J. RALYEA AND T.RAND COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016 TAGS: EFIN PGOV ZI SUBJECT: GIDEON GONO REINVENTS GIDEON GONO REF: HARARE 01361 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a January 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono said that January 31's Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) would be "totally different" from previous statements. Gono said he would confront the governance problems that were the root cause of the country's economic decline and call on Zimbabwe to "bite the bullet" and embrace market reforms. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. and the international community would welcome a genuine reform package. Gono added that it was not necessary to devalue the currency, as has been widely assumed, as it would accomplish little by itself. Gono added that he felt increasingly under threat and expected the pressure to increase following the MPS. End Summary -------------- Governance Is The Issue -------------- ¶2. (C) Governor Gono told the Ambassador at a January 29 meeting at the Reserve Bank that he would deliver his long awaited ) and several times delayed -- Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) on January 31. Gono said this MPS would be "totally different." He would go beyond monetary policy and address the governance issues that were at the root of Zimbabwe's economic problems. It was time to acknowledge past mistakes, begin "true reform," promote national unity and engage the international community "East, West, North and South," as well as the IMF. ¶3. (C) Gono said the key to success would be stakeholder buy-in to the implementation of a "holistic package" of complementary reforms. In that regard, Gono claimed to have consulted widely in the government and the business community, showing the Ambassador a series of written summaries of the consultations. Gono claimed he had not briefed the Cabinet on his approach to the MPS to prevent them from taking a defensive position in the market. However, in response to a direct question from the Ambassador as to whether he had briefed the MPS to President Mugabe, who �A;had been out of the country, Gono avoided a direct response. -------------- A Call for Market Reforms -------------- ¶4. (C) Gono said Zimbabwe had to "bite the bullet" and embrace market reforms. He said he would call for market determined prices, convergence of foreign exchange rates and interest rates, privatization of parastatals, the honoring of Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements, and an end to farm disruptions. With respect to the latter, Gono said Zimbabwe couldn't continue chasing away Zimbabweans who HARARE 00000076 002 OF 003 could contribute to the turnaround. The RBZ head said he intended to zero in on governance issues and hold ministers accountable for their portfolios. Zimbabwe was making a mockery of its assets, and the damage was being perpetrated by ZANU-PF brass. If market policies and reforms were not adopted, Gono claimed he was prepared to resign. ¶5. (C) Echoing remarks he made to the Ambassador in November (reftel),Gono admitted that the GOZ had overplayed sanctions as the root of all of Zimbabwe's woes. He added that no economic turnaround in history had succeeded without a "thumbs up" from the U.S. In that regard, the Ambassador noted for the record that contrary to recent reports in the Zimbabwean press, the USG did not tell American companies where to invest, but if Zimbabwe implemented the right reforms, the U.S. would be at its side. Gono conceded the point and said that government control of the media was a "soft" issue on which the GOZ should be prepared to give ground. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador said many donors were willing to support a genuine reform program but that Zimbabwe would have to take the first steps and that reforms would have to be political as well as economic. Gono replied that he had approached Mugabe about the "tension in the country" and said Mugabe was "aware" of the futility of trying to turn around the economy in the present political climate. -------------- Devaluation Is Not the Issue -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked by the Ambassador whether a significant devaluation was in the cards (N.B. the currency has swooned recently to Z$5,000:US$ on the street, against an official rate of Z$250:US$ - unchanged since July 31, 2006 despite quadruple-digit inflation),Gono replied that it was not necessary, and devaluation was "not the issue." He pointed out that none of the eight devaluations he had announced in his three-year tenure as Governor had stabilized the economy, and no devaluation could cure Zimbabwe's economic crisis until the GOZ got pricing right. In that regard, he recited a litany of price distortions that, he said, continued to compel him to print money, including among others the electric power company's tariff structure, which was so skewed that a household paid less for a month's power than for candles or firewood to cover one evening's power outage. -------------- Heaping Scorn on Finance Minister Murerwa -------------- ¶8. (C) Gono heaped scorn on Finance Minister Murerwa for failing to define a "holistic package" of reforms and for failing to address price distortions in his 2007 budget. He mocked him for having expected a complementary monetary policy statement from Gono within a week of the budget release in November. Waving Murerwa's March 2006 letter to the IMF in the air, and pointing to the promises he had made, Gono said Zimbabwe's credibility was running out fast. HARARE 00000076 003 OF 003 Unless there was buy-in to his MPS and real progress to point to, he would not attend the February IMF Board meeting on Zimbabwe. -------------- "Scary Times" For Gono Personally -------------- ¶9. (C) Gono said his enemies were sharpening their knives for him, and that infighting now extended as far as the state security forces. With suspicion rife, these were "scary times" for Gono personally. He feared for his personal safety, and had begun to use decoy automobiles and move to different houses at night. -------------- Ring Fencing Quasi-Fiscal Spending -------------- ¶10. (C) In a hasty aside, as he walked the Ambassador to the elevator, Gono let slip, without further explanation, that he had "ring fenced" the RBZ's quasi-fiscal activity into a separate company "so the spending would not interfere with the monetary anchor." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Gono was as usual short on specifics and long on words. However, this was a different Gono, more agitated and more accommodating than any time in the previous year. In fact, there was an echo of the Gideon of two years ago, the Gono in whom the business and international community had seen a potential market reformer. He is right, of course, that governance, or rather mis-governance, is at the heart of Zimbabwe,s economic collapse and he is right that fundamental reforms are needed. ¶12. (C) That said, we are skeptical that Gono is sincere in his call for bold reforms. In fact, his comment at the end, about fencing off quasi-fiscal activities, would seem to indicate that he has no intention of pursuing genuine reform. Instead, we suspect that this may be a clever ploy to blame the country's economic ills on ZANU-PF insiders, many with a grudge against Gono, rehabilitate his reputation as a reformer and, perhaps most importantly, at the same time avoid a "useless" devaluation that might harm those like himself and President Mugabe who are profiting massively from Zimbabwe's multiple exchange rates. DELL