CAMPAIGN 2008: A ROAD TO DISASTER?

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000448 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN 2008: A ROAD TO DISASTER? Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The ruling ZANU-PF party remains beset with infighting over Robert Mugabe's efforts to hang on to power. Mugabe is likely to secure the ruling party's endorsement as its candidate for next year's presidential lection at an Extraordinary Congress to be held later this year, according to ruling party insiders and observers. However, opposition to his reelection bid, chiefly by Solomon Mujuru, continues, albeit below the surface. Down but far from out, Mujuru is trying to build opposition to Mugabe within some of the party's provincial executive structures, possibly as a bargaining chip at the Congress to influence discussions on succession. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Unprecedented Opposition Prompts Extraordinary Congress -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The ZANU-PF mouthpiece, The Voice, announced plans earlier this month to hold an Extraordinary Congress later this year. The article quoted ruling party commissar Elliott Manyika as stating that, although not required under ZANU-PF rules, it was customary for a Congress to be held to officially nominate the party's candidate for the presidency. (Note. ZANU-PF's constitution stipulates that the party's first secretary and president (positions now held by Mugabe), is automatically the party's national presidential candidate. End Note.) ¶3. (C) ZANU-PF insider Eddie Zvogbo Jr. told the Ambassador on May 15 that an Extraordinary Congress would indeed be held in December at Mugabe's behest. Zvogbo said that Mugabe wanted the Congress's formal backing to unify the party behind his reelection bid. Separately, University of Zimbabwe Political Studies Department Chairman Eldred Masunungure echoed these statements to polchief, adding that Mugabe wanted to erase any doubt, created by the railroading of his candidature through the Politburo and Central Committee in March, about his support. -------------- An Inevitable Train Wreck? -------------- ¶4. (C) Zvogbo, who is the namesake and son of erstwhile Mugabe opponent and Masvingo strongman Eddison Zvogbo, told the Ambassador that he and other like-minded reformers believed the ZANU-PF-directed violence and economic mismanagement would be disastrous for the country and would likely shorten ZANU-PF's hold on power. Yet Zvogbo thought it would be futile for ZANU-PF reformers to oppose Mugabe in an effort to right the party ship. Zvogbo, a party loyalist despite his misgivings about the party,s current course, also believed that it would be disastrous for ZANU-PF if the opposition gained power, and he and his fellow reformers thus agreed with ZANU hardliners that elections must be won at all costs. All in all, with no change in course, Zvogbo did not see a good outcome in sight. -------------- Mujuru Changes Tactics -------------- ¶5. (C) Masunungure noted that Mugabe had successfully outmaneuvered chief rival Solomon Mujuru in the party's national structures and forced the party's Politburo and Central Committee to accept his candidature. He was attempting to further improve his hand by replacing through elections the provincial chairpersons loyal to the Mujurus in Masvingo, Bulawayo, and several other provinces. Ironically, the current chairpersons had been installed by Mugabe in 2004 to ensure Joyce Mujuru's then-elevation to the post of vice president. Masunungure said this ploy had backfired on Mugabe as ex-military officers allied to Mujuru won key elections in Masvingo and the race in Bulawayo had been postponed several times in the face of opposition to Mugabe's hand-picked candidates. Zvogbo told the Ambassador that Mugabe, after Mujuru's success in Masvingo and the inability to hold an election in Bulawayo, had shelved his initial plan to replace other provincial committees. ¶6. (SBU) According to a local independent newspaper, The Financial Gazette, Mujuru also attempted to sideline ZANU-PF commissar and Mugabe loyalist Elliot Manyika - ostensibly because of the latter's efforts to manipulate the party elections in Bulawayo. Manyika has also been blamed for the ruling party's failure to make electoral headway in the opposition stronghold. The article added that the Mujuru faction has targeted Manyika since it was he who had curtailed debate on the succession at the Central Committee meeting in March that had backed Mugabe's candidacy for reelection. ¶7. (C) Further indicating that the ruling party remains in turmoil over succession, Justice Minister Partick Chinamsa on May 9 announced that the Central Committee had decided to scuttle an earlier proposal that Senators be elected by proportional representation based on the outcome of the House of Assembly races. Instead, Senators would continue to be elected. (Note. We view this apparent about-face as a victory for Mugabe. By forcing more ruling party stalwarts to hit the campaign trail, Mugabe implicitly ties their fates to his and further augments his own campaign. Secondly, the move undercuts ruling party MPs ) many of whom support Mujuru ) who since the recreation of the Senate have been attempting to exert their authority over their fellow legislators. End note.) -------------- Possible Outlines of a Deal -------------- ¶8. (C) Mugabe's decision to call an Extraordinary Congress suggested to Masunungure (and us) that he has already enacted plans to stage-manage the event and thus is in no danger of being replaced as the party's first secretary and presidential candidate. Masunungure, however, stated that the Mujuru's strength in the provincial structures could force Mugabe to cut a deal in exchange for securing the party's full backing for his reelection. Such a deal might entail Mugabe promising to step down after the 2008 election, formally backing Joyce Mujuru as his successor, and amending the constitution to ease her succession. In exchange would be a promise to grant Mugabe immunity. Masunungure conceded however that Mugabe had reneged on past promises to retire and that there was little that Mujuru could do to guarantee such a deal. ¶9. (C) Zvogbo told the Ambassador that Mugabe, worried about his personal safety if he left office, would most likely try to remain in office indefinitely and not step down after being reelected as has been speculated. He would be reluctant to choose either Joyce Mujuru or the other leading contender, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as successors, fearful that they would renege on any promises to protect him. If Mugabe did select a successor, it would most likely be Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono. Without a powerbase of his own, Zvobgo noted, Gono would be dependent on Mugabe for his own survival and could be expected to protect him. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) For the moment Mugabe appears to have largely sidelined his internal opposition and is on course to run as ZANU-PF's candidate in 2008. However, below the surface, the succession question and the country's desperate economic situation continue to roil the ruling party. DELL