Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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07HARARE344 | 2007-04-24 15:55:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Harare |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000344 |
1. (C) MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador April 24 that he would plan to visit Washington the second week of May. The Ambassador urged Tsvangirai during his visit to present a strategic vision of the way forward toward elections next year. On the SADC initiative, Tsvangirai accused South African president Mbeki of selectively working with the Mutambara faction, and said Mbeki's preferred outcome to the Zimbabwean crisis was a government of national unity with ZANU-PF and the Mutambara faction. End Summary. -------------------------- A Visit to Washington -------------------------- 2. (C) Tsvangirai said he could visit Washington the second week of May, following a meeting of the Institute of Multiparty Democracy in Accra. Unfortunately, because talks between the two factions were still ongoing, a joint visit to highlight the coalition was not possible. (Note: Tsvangirai said the principal obstacle was the Mutambara faction,s insistence on maintaining its parliamentarians in their current seats. He added that democratic modalities needed to be worked out to choose candidates. End Note.) 3. (C) The Ambassador urged Tsvangirai in his Washington visit to present his strategic vision of the road to free and fair elections next year. Both the Ambassador and Tsvangirai agreed that key elements of a successful strategy were material support for elections, pressure on the region to back minimum conditions for a level electoral playing field, and maintaining international attention on Zimbabwe as a way of exerting pressure on SADC, Mbeki, and the GOZ. The Ambassador offered request high-level meetings for Tsvangirai. -------------------------- Skepticism About Mbeki -------------------------- 3. (C) Expressing skepticism about Mbeki and his role in the SADC initiative, Tsvangirai said Mbeki was selectively working with the Mutambara faction and wanted a government of national unity that would include ZANU-PF and Mutambara,s faction. He further felt that Mbeki had been a destabilizing influence for the MDC because of his approach. 4. (C) Tsvangirai said he had sought a one on one meeting with Mbeki to express his concerns. The SAG had rebuffed him and instead offered a meeting with Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of Provincial and Local Government and presidential advisor. Tsvangirai said he would meet with Mufamadi and tell him SIPDIS Mbeki was negotiating with Mugabe without leverage, and would be taken for a ride. Tsvangirai said he understood quite clearly that Mbeki did not like him personally, but in politics you have to work with people whether you like them or not, and Mbeki needed to find a more balanced approach or his mediation would fail. -------------------------- Comment -------------------------- HARARE 00000344 002 OF 002 5. (C) We share Tsvangirai,s concerns that 1) Mbeki is more interested in a government of national unity than 2008 elections, and 2) that Mbeki is insufficiently pressuring Mugabe. For meaningful elections in 2008, SADC and Mbeki must be convinced that the focus should be on elections, and that the playing field must be level well in advance of elections. DELL |