Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE341
2007-04-24 12:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ZI 
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1801
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000341 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
AF FOR DAS C. THOMPSON
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. LEO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000341 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL AF FOR DAS C. THOMPSON NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. LEO STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI SUBJECT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) Chairperson Reginald Matchaba-Hove on April 17 told poloffs that preparatory work needed to begin now to ensure that elections to be held next year will be free and fair. The SADC summit in Tanzania had locked the GOZ into presidential and parliamentary elections at the beginning of next year. Matchaba-Hove said necessary reforms - including relaxing of oppressive legislation now prohibiting opposition organization and campaigning, and an open and fair registration process - must be accomplished by August to level the electoral playing field for a March 2008 election. Key to achieving these reforms would be negotiations, mediated by South Africa,s Mbeki, between the GOZ and opposition. To create pressure, ZESN plans to intensely lobby internally with GOZ ministers and Parliament and in regional capitals, and will also attempt to meet with Mbeki. End Summary. -------------- SADC Locks In 2008 Elections -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove said that the March SADC Heads of State summit in Tanzania had locked Mugabe into holding simultaneous presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections by the end of March 2008. The SADC leaders had demanded this as a means to resolve Zimbabwe's internal crisis. With the election timetable now decided, Matchaba-Hove noted that the SADC-appointed mediator, South African President Mbeki, had to now establish the ground rules to ensure that the elections would be free and fair. -------------- Pressing For a Just Poll -------------- ¶3. (SBU) To allow for an adequate campaign process leading up to the election, Matchaba-Hove noted that reforms needed to be implemented at least six months before an election ) or by the end of August 2007 for the March 2008 poll. This would allow the opposition opportunity to support voter registration and to effectively campaign throughout the country, including in r
ural areas. Matchaba-Hove's August deadline for meaningful reform was also timed to capitalize on SADC's current interest, as that month will see the SADC Chairmanship pass to Namibia, historically a Mugabe supporter. ¶4. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove believed the GOZ's strategy was to stall as long as possible on reform implementation, and then to agree to reforms three months or so before the elections ) not enough time to permit a fair electoral process, but enough to allow pliable observers to deem the actual vote "free and fair". Matchaba-Hove also noted that another aspect of the GOZ strategy was the on-going abductions and police harassment of MDC members designed to crush opposition structures. Therefore, it was imperative that Mbeki move negotiations along now with the aim of creating democratic HARARE 00000341 002 OF 003 space and allowing the opposition an opportunity to regroup and campaign. -------------- Setting the Stage for Free and Fair Elections -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove said that ZESN would push the GOZ to fully implement the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, principles drafted in 2004 to which the government is a signatory. In areas where the SADC Principles were weak, ZESN planned to lobby the Mbeki-led negotiations to adopt the stiffer SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards that were drafted in 2001 but rejected by the GOZ. ¶6. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove told us that concurrently with its efforts to get the GOZ to implement the SADC Principles and SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms, ZESN would work for abolition or reform of existing repressive legislation that is in opposition to the Principles and Norms. (Note. Post emailed to AF/S ZESN's analysis of existing legislation and necessary reforms. End Note.) Such legislation included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA),which the GOZ continued to use to selectively ban political expression and to censure independent media in Zimbabwe. ¶7. (SBU) Reform of voter registration also was necessary, according to Matchaba-Hove, to permit easy registration, particularly for those turning 18, and to ensure accuracy in voting rolls. The polls now included many ghost voters while excluding many young people who came of age since the last presidential election in 2002. Matchaba-Hove commented that Zimbabwean expatriates should be allowed to vote, but he was certain the GOZ would vigorously oppose this. Finally, an independent electoral commission vice the current GOZ-directed Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was essential to oversee the entire electoral process. -------------- Institutional Obstacles -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove also discussed the ZANU-PF stranglehold over rural communities, through the use of traditional authority structures. The ruling party had successfully co-opted many traditional chiefs and other rural community leaders and used them to weed out opposition supporters and to deny the MDC access to these marginalized areas which received no independent news. Through its structures, ZANU-PF had also manipulated food assistance to garner support. Timely reforms, particularly of POSA and AIPPA, would permit the opposition to build counter-structures in the rural areas. Another potential obstacle was the recently-announced GOZ plan to merge Harare constituencies, traditionally opposition strongholds, with rural constituencies held by ZANU-PF in order to dilute them. Matchaba-Hove warned that any GOZ-delimitation of electoral constituencies needed to be transparent and that urban and rural communities should not be mixed. -------------- ZESN's Next Steps -------------- HARARE 00000341 003 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) With the MDC distracted by on-going GOZ-directed violence and intimidation, Matchaba-Hove said that civil society and ZESN in particular needed to lead the movement for electoral reform. ZESN hoped to play a key advocacy roll with Parliament, the Minister of Justice, and the Attorney General to encourage the repeal of oppressive legislation, to advocate for the establishment of an independent electoral commission, and to advocate that delimitation of constituencies be done in a transparent manner. ZESN also hoped to conduct a statistical sampling of voters' rolls in some constituencies to check for irregularities in the voters' rolls as a prelude to general reform in this area. Within the broader SADC region, ZESN hoped to liaise with civil society partners to argue for adoption of the SADC Principles. Finally, Matchaba-Hove noted that ZESN hoped to meet with Mbeki to impress upon him the need to level the electoral playing field as early as possible, but no latter than six months before the elections. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) As Matchaba-Hove clearly laid out, achieving a level electoral playing field is a daunting task in the face of opposition from the government. The GOZ's campaign of violence and intimidation is clearly designed to prevent focus on electoral reform and preparation for the 2008 elections--until it is too late. Our material support is critical to help ZESN work for reform, and to enable the opposition to prepare for the elections. Equally important will be sustained high-level diplomatic engagement with SADC ) and in particular, South Africa ) to keep them pushing for genuine electoral reforms and the creation of at least minimally acceptable conditions. All our interlocutors in civil society and the opposition agree that regional engagement with and pressure on the GOZ are the key to free and fair elections next year. They will not get there if we don't help them stay on the right path and they, in turn, limit Mugabe's room to cheat and brutalize his way to "victory". DELL

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