FORMER ZANU-PF INSIDER OUTLINES A "THIRD" WAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000326 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS AF/S FOR S.HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI SUBJECT: FORMER ZANU-PF INSIDER OUTLINES A "THIRD" WAY Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Former Information Minister and Presidential Spokesman Jonathan Moyo requested a meeting with the Ambassador April 17. Moyo told the Ambassador that Nelson Mandela, on behalf of the ANC, had attempted to send a message to President Mugabe in advance of the March 30 Central Committee meeting that Mugabe should step down. The message, conveyed through Reserve Bank Governor Gono, was delivered after the meeting. According to Moyo, Mandela's communication, along with Mbeki's mediation effort, was part of a sophisticated South African approach to convince Mugabe to retire. ¶2. (C/NF) Moyo said that said there was deep disappointment within ZANU-PF and the country as a whole at Mugabe,s intention to run for reelection. A small group of reform-minded individuals that cut across political lines had been meeting to consider a United Front to be led by a candidate acceptable to both the ruling party and the opposition. They had identified three possible candidates: Strive Masiyiwa, Simba Makone, and Gideon Gono. The next step would be to approach the three and settle on a candidate. The Ambassador responded that the plan was an interesting approach to "breaking the mold" of Zimbabwean politics but would have to overcome many obstacles, including resistance not only from Mugabe but MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, whom it would sideline. End Summary. SIPDIS -------------- A Call from Mandela -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Moyo told the Ambassador that before the March 30 ZANU-PF Central Committee meeting, Nelson Mandela called Zimbabwe Central Bank Governor Gono and said he wanted to deliver a quick and secure message to Mugabe outside of diplomatic channels. Moyo said his source was Gono himself. Gono had told him that Mandela stated he was calling on behalf of the ANC and not the SAG. The ANC did not wish to pressure Mugabe but to "advise" him that the ANC considered Mugabe a liberation hero, not just for Zimbabwe but for Africa. The ANC had defended Mugabe and wanted to continue to defend him but the situation in Zimbabwe was creating a threat to his legacy. It was time for him to go in order to preserve that legacy. ¶4. (C/NF) Mandela had told Gono to tell Mugabe that f he missed this opportunity to step down, he would open himself up to &Pinochet dangers.8 If he went now, he could become an elder statesman and participate in African issues. Mandela had asked that the message be delivered before the Central Committee meeting. However, because the call came just before the meeting began, Gono was unable to do so, and relayed it the following Monday. According to Moyo, Mugabe had disparaged Mandela as a "western puppet" to Gono but was pleased that the ANC held him in high esteem. He told Gono to tell Mandela and the ANC he would consider their advice and would respond further at the right time. -------------- On SADC and Mbeki HARARE 00000326 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Moyo said the basis for SADC's involvement in Zimbabwe was a damning report prepared by the Defense, Politics, and Security Organ early in the year. The crack down on the opposition was Mugabe's response to the report. Moyo claimed that Tanzania's President Kikwete subsequently had raised Mugabe's retirement in a meeting at the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa in January, during Kikwete's visit to Harare in March, and at the March SADC Special Summit in Dar es Salaam. Mugabe had subsequently complained to his cabinet that "that young man Kikwete is going to cause problems." ¶6. (C/NF) By contrast, according to Moyo, Mugabe had returned from Dar with praise for Mbeki. Moyo said Mbeki had played Mugabe perfectly at the Summit. Contrary to public reporting, Mbeki was determined to get Mugabe to step down and had made a big push in this regard at the Summit. However, Mbeki had concluded that a frontal approach reprimanding Mugabe would be counter-productive. Instead, his goal had been to get Mugabe to agree to South African mediation and 2008 elections. Mbeki saw the elections as the best way to convince Mugabe to step down and also to resolve the crisis well in advance of the 2010 World Cup. Mandela's call had been at Mbkei,s behest and part of a sophisticated, multi-channel strategy to get Mugabe to eventually see the perils of standing as a candidate in 2008. -------------- Seeking a Third Way -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Moyo said there was a large group of disaffected ZANU-PF members who yearned for reform but lacked focus and leadership. There had been an expectation on the part of these individuals that the Mujuru faction, and possibly the Mnangagwa faction as well, would oppose Mugabe's 2008 plans in the March Politburo and Central Committee meetings and open the door to reform. However, Mugabe had once more out maneuvered his intra-party rivals and as a result of the Central Committee's endorsement of Mugabe's candidacy a mood of despondency had set in among many party members. ¶8. (C/NF) In the wake of the Central Committee meeting, Moyo said he and a small group of reformers that cut across political lines had spent many "sleepless nights" on what to do next. The group had concluded that relying on the factions to reign in Mugabe had been unwise and that continuing to do so would result in two possible outcomes: either Mugabe would run or Joice Mujuru or Emmerson Mnangagwa would be the ZANU-PF candidate. The former was far more likely but neither outcome was acceptable. ¶9. (C/NF) Instead, Moyo said, his group had concluded that what was needed was a third candidate willing to lead a "united front" and stand against Mugabe. This individual would have to be a prominent personality, reform-oriented, acceptable to the ruling party but with crossover appeal for the opposition. The plan would be to have this individual declare their candidacy close to the election, no more than 90 days in advance, catching Mugabe off-guard and diminishing the chances of foul play. The candidate would catch the wave building against Mugabe's reelection and either Mugabe would see the inevitable and step aside or he would be swept away. HARARE 00000326 003 OF 004 ¶10. (C/NF) Moyo said three names had been discussed: Strive Masiyiwa, Simba Makoni, and Gideon Gono. Each of the three had pluses and minuses. Although affiliated with the opposition, Masiyiwa was viewed positively across the political and ethnic divide. He lacked government and political experience but brought business skills to the table and was acceptable to Mbeki and the international community. Makoni was in good-standing in the ruling party but acceptable to the opposition. He had government experience as a former Minister but lacked leadership qualities, particularly the courage it would require to take on Mugabe. ¶11. (C/NF) Moyo said the third candidate, Gono, was close to Mugabe and perceived as a strong ZANU-PF supporter, but was actually anti-ZANU-PF. Gono believed there could be no reform through the ruling party. He had used his monetary statements to say hard truths about political and economic reform and had not blamed the international community for Zimbabwe's woes. Gono as the candidate would cause the most damage to Mugabe's chances. Gono had been in the system since 2003, had been intimately involved with party structures and doling out patronage, and now had many supporters throughout the military, the security services, and the party. Gono was also close to Masiwa, which could make him acceptable to the opposition. -------------- Obstacles -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) The Ambassador told Moyo that the idea was attractive in breaking the existing Zimbabwean electoral mold. The broader the base, the easier it would be to sell. However, he thought it might be difficult to get ZANU-PF members and security structures behind it, especially those loyal to Mugabe, many of whom could not be part of any new government if it was to be internationally acceptable. In addition, it might also be difficult but not impossible to convince Tsvangirai to step aside at the eleventh hour in favor of another candidate with better prospects for victory. The Ambassador also expressed reservations about how Mugabe might react, noting that he could impose a state-of-emergency rather than going forward with elections that he looked likely to lose. ¶13. (C/NF) Moyo responded that this was a long process that had to begin by engaging the prospective candidate directly. The plan would require a memorandum of understanding setting out a reform agenda, including a commitment on a new constitution as the first order of business of a new government, in advance. Mugabe loyalists would definitely not be part of any new government or its institutions. Moyo noted that Gono, Masiyiwa, and pro-Senate MDC faction leader Mutambara were aware of and supportive of the plan and agreed that Tsvangirai might be an obstacle but that Tsvangirai's support would be critical. Finally, Moyo said the government had been close to declaring a state-of-emergency several weeks ago but Mugabe himself had blocked it because of the adverse reaction it would cause internationally and regionally. With SADC mediation underway and elections scheduled, Moyo said a state of emergency was less likely as Mugabe had a "sixth sense" of what would be damaging politically for him. -------------- Comment HARARE 00000326 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶14. (C/NF) This was the most significant meeting we have had since March 11 ushered in the latest phase of Zimbabwe's crisis. We would assess that Moyo was most likely acting on behalf of Gono and was sent to gauge USG reaction to the plan and specifically the extent of our commitment to Tsvangirai, as Moyo asked for nothing specific in support of the plan. A decision on Gono's part to distance himself from Mugabe would in fact damage the latter significantly. It is not entirely unexpected. In that regard, he and Moyo are soulmates, and no doubt both are keen to advance their own interests. Gono has always struck us as deeply ambitious, supremely confident, and fundamentally disloyal. As a potential president he is in our view clearly the weakest of the three. However, in a spoiler role, he could prove the most effective in bringing cross-over support with him, damaging ZANU-PF in the process ¶15. (C/NF) Many other permutations are possible. Much of he renewed talk we're hearing about creating a ceremonial president and an executive prime minister could, for example, be designed to square the circle of getting Tsvangirai on board while broadening the base of support and cross over appeal of a united front. However this plays out, and whether or not Moyo's maneuvers ever amount to anything, it is bound to keep the waters roiling inside ZANU-PF, adding to the stress on the party. ¶16. (C/NF) Moyo, and for that matter Gono, Masiwa, and Mutambara as well, would also appear to be acting with the blessing of the SAG. This would be the perfect outcome for Mbeki: an elected government of national unity that sidelines both Mugabe and Tsvangirai. That of course is the rub since neither is likely to accept this outcome without a fight. Moyo, Gono, and others who may be involved, including possibly Mbeki, also face the inevitable fact that whatever his possible limitations as a president himself, Tsvangarai remains the most popular candidate and the plan is stillborn without his support. DELL