NO SECURITY - NO BUSINESS: READOUT FROM JUNE 2007 APEC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001261 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP AND OES USDA FOR FAS (SMITH/BEASLEY) USDA FOR FSIS (MACZKA) HHS FOR FDA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO PTER APECO EAGR ETRD CA JA RS AS TH VM ID MY RP, MX, RS, SN, BX, PP, HK, CH, CI, NZ, KS, PP, PE, TW SUBJECT: NO SECURITY - NO BUSINESS: READOUT FROM JUNE 2007 APEC FOOD DEFENSE WORKSHOP IN VIETNAM REF: 2006 STATE 184154 ¶1. (U) Summary: On June 14-15 in Hanoi, Vietnam, the United States and the Government of Vietnam hosted the follow-on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) bioterrorism workshop to protect the food supply from deliberate contamination, in support of the APEC Food Defense initiative "Mitigating the Terrorist Threat to the APEC Food Supply." The workshop focused on the potential threat to the food supply and distribution system, ways to communicate information among the various stakeholders, developing the appropriate supportive infrastructure, writing food defense plans that work for industry, and developing food defense communication strategies in advance of, during, and post event. Speakers and participants continued to emphasize the importance of building a relationship between the private sector and government counterparts, engaging law enforcement (as well as the intelligence community),sharing information with all stakeholders in a timely manner, and prioritizing what areas need to be addressed first based on each economy's individual needs. The discussions also led to the drafting of the groundbreaking APEC Food Defense Principles that the United States hopes to have endorsed by APEC Leaders and Ministers in September 2007. By endorsing these Principles, APEC would be taking an unprecedented progressive stance on food defense, exceeding that of any other multilateral forum. The meeting concluded with a consensus among APEC participants for the importance of continuing the dialogue and encouraging follow-on APEC discussions in the years to come. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (U) In 2006, the United States, along with co-sponsors Australia and Chile introduced and began implementing the "Mitigating the Terrorist Threat to APEC Food Supply" initiative at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's Counter-terrorism Task Force (CTTF). This initiative looks to strengthen protection of the food supply from deliberate bioterrorist contamination through the use of vulnerability assessment tools applied to the food distribution system and to identify countermeasures to threats. ¶3. (U) In November 2006 the United States and Thailand co-hosted the first-ever APEC Food Defense Workshop in Bangkok, Thailand (reftel). APEC Leaders also committed to working together to protect the food supply from deliberate contamination (APEC 2006 Leaders' Statement issued in Hanoi). ¶4. (U) Building on these 2006 efforts, the United States and Vietnam co-hosted a follow-on workshop in Hanoi in June 2007, which focused on building appropriate infrastructure, developing risk communication strategies, and building partnerships between governmental bodies and the private sector. Fifteen APEC economies participated in the Hanoi workshop. In addition to building on the work from the Bangkok workshop, the experts in Hanoi prepared a draft set of voluntary "APEC Food Defense Principles" that APEC economies are reviewing. These principles put APEC in the forefront of international thinking on critical issues in protecting the food supply against deliberate terrorist contamination -- and help pave the way for sustained APEC counterterrorism efforts on food defense. -------------- -------------- THE APEC "FOOD DEFENSE" WORKSHOP: DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE FOOD DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN APEC ECONOMIES -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) The two-day workshop in Hanoi addressed the overarching goal of "Developing Effective Food Defense Strategies in APEC Economies" by focusing on four strategic topics: potential information sharing mechanisms, developing supportive infrastructure within the government and between governmental entities and the private sector, writing and developing food defense plans, and developing food defense communication strategies in advance of and during a food defense incident. The United States and Vietnam set the tone at the outset of meeting by highlighting the interconnectivity of the global food supply in their welcoming remarks. Both emphasized the importance of this on-going dialogue and called for a Food Defense deliverable at the APEC Summit later this year. ¶6. (U) Over the course of two days, several key themes emerged and were self-reinforcing. Participants acknowledged the importance of establishing and strengthening public-private partnerships. Several speakers (as well as participants) emphasized the importance of law enforcement's role in food defense preparedness and response, and the intelligence community's role in supporting food defense HANOI 00001261 002 OF 003 activities. (Comment: This was particularly notable given that earlier discussions had indicated reticence about the law enforcement inclusion -- signaling a maturation in APEC economies' understanding of the truly multi-sectoral nature of addressing bioterrorism, including food defense. End Comment) All presenters repeatedly emphasized that food defense builds on a strong food safety foundation. Participants noted the importance of timely and transparent reporting and information sharing in order to minimize the risk to human health, trade, and society. The developing economies also inquired how their economies could begin building such infrastructure given limited resources. The last session of the workshop, in which the experts began developing potential Food Defense Principles, clearly reflected the exchange of ideas throughout the meeting. -------------- NOT A NEW THREAT -------------- ¶7. (U) Harry Gardiner from Canada's Food Inspection Agency touched on these elements, noting that targeting the food supply and distribution system was not a new threat, nor should it come as a surprise that it is a soft target given the ease in which one might target a node along the farm-to-food continuum. He outlined steps Canada has taken to address food defense concerns, such as conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, exercises, building partnerships with Canadian private sector firms, and identifying gaps in risk assessments to determine S&T needs. Both publicly and privately, he applauded U.S. efforts to address food defense concerns. -------------- -------------- NO SECURITY, NO BUSINESS: THE PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) Participation and engagement from individual companies and trade associations were particularly critical to the workshop's discussions and success. Given that the private sector owns most, if not all, of the infrastructure, these participants described why it is important to build better relationships with the government, what type of regulatory landscape they need to implement or enforce certain measures, how to prioritize and implement certain food defense measures, and what they see as the risks if they do not take action. At each opportunity, the private sector noted the importance of incorporating food defense into every aspect of their enterprise. One of the private sector experts summed it up by succinctly stating, "NO SECURITY, NO BUSINESS" - meaning that lack of planning and preparedness would be disastrous in the event of a hoax or a deliberate contamination. -------------- DEVELOPING PLANS FOR DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS -------------- ¶9. (U) It was very clear that developing economies are thinking about how to begin building food defense infrastructure (e.g., specialized offices and lab capacity) and creating effective public-private partnerships to protect the food supply from terrorist attack. Much discussion, for example, focused on how those just beginning to address food defense should do so with limited or no budgets. The United States noted that it had faced similar dilemmas of limited or no resources when initiating efforts and emphasized the importance of prioritizing and adapting to individual needs. The private sector also acknowledged there would be upfront costs, but noted many of the efforts improved efficiency over the longer term and in some instances, added to product marketability. -------------- INFORMATION SHARING -------------- ¶10. (U) Both the private sector and government experts emphasized the importance of communication among ALL stakeholders - noting that this includes not only the obvious stakeholders, such as health, food regulators, agriculture, and affected sectors, but also law enforcement and intelligence communities. Additionally, all agreed for the need to share information in a timely and transparent manner. For example, New Zealand (NZ) noted during its presentation that an economy runs the risk of losing its international market share if it is not forthcoming with trade partners, citing NZ's own response to minimize the impact of an accidental contamination to their export market. WHO's Jenifer Bishop presented WHO's work on HANOI 00001261 003 OF 003 the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN),as a potential example for sharing information internationally. She noted that the newly-revised and adopted International Health Regulations (IHR) specifically included food defense under the public health emergencies of international concerns (PHEIC) and that INFOSAN would be responsible for the dissemination of the information in such an event. -------------- DEVELOPING APEC FOOD DEFENSE PRINCIPLES -------------- ¶11. (U) To move APEC's food defense work forward, experts from the range of economies collaborated on the development of "APEC Food Defense Principles" -- fundamental areas of importance in protecting the food supply from deliberate contamination. The draft principles represent the start of a process that could help put APEC on the road to giving multilateral voice to an important issue. The United States indicated it will push for APEC endorsement of the principles, and signaled its desire for acknowledgement of the work in this year's APEC Leaders' and Ministerial Statements. ¶12. (SBU) Comment: The level of interest and awareness among APEC economies has increased considerably since the 2006 Bangkok meeting - resulting in more robust and lively exchange among economies on how to address food defense across the spectrum of stages of economic development. Unlike the Bangkok meeting where it was clear that only the United States, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were focusing on food defense, the other economies came this time seeking information on ways to introduce and begin implementing food defense efforts in their respective economies. (Note: Canada did not attend the last meeting. End Note.) One reason for possible increased awareness and engagement is likely due to the fact that many of the experts participated in the first meeting in Bangkok. -------------- -------------- U.S. DELEGATION OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SELECTED ECONOMIES -------------- -------------- ¶13. (U) PERU - During side bar conversations, it was apparent Peru is thinking ahead to its own APEC host year. Peru expressed strong interest in hosting any follow-on work in 2008, and intimated having funds to support the activity. It also appears that Peru was trying to obtain regional support and possibly assistance from its neighboring APEC members. ¶14. (U) THAILAND - Technical experts from Thailand noted that Thailand would begin incorporating food defense into their internal dialogue, noting that it hoped the United States would provide speakers to their national Food Safety meeting. They also inquired if the United States would be willing to co-host the event. The U.S. delegation indicated it would have to consult with Washington and asked for a written request (proposal),which could be shared with the appropriate USG agencies for review. ¶15. (SBU) On a final note, while none of the economies have directly or overtly accused the United States of using food defense as a means of creating a trade barrier, at least within APEC, some have questioned whether this will inadvertently happen. To date, the United States has managed to address all trade concerns raised by various economies and has avoided any contentious discussions during the food defense discussions. The United States should be aware that these unvoiced concerns might be a subtext for future discussions. (Australia and New Zealand both candidly acknowledge they participate in this effort not only out of mutual concern, but also to learn about any changes or efforts underway that may impact their exports to the United States.) End Comment. ¶16. (U) The U.S. delegation drafted and cleared this cable. Any questions regarding this workshop and these efforts should be directed to OES's Office of International Health and Biodefense (COMELLANX@STATE.GOV; 202-647-4689). ¶17. (U) Posts' and Department's work, along with the strong interagency collaboration with USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS),and HHS's Food and Drug Administration helped make the APEC Food Defense Workshop a success. MARINE